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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · zebra-rpc

GHSA-C8W6-X74F-VMG3

zebrad vulnerable to full node denial of service via crafted Sapling receiver in z_listunifiedreceivers

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -34 d de la divulgación
Exposición140 dDesde la divulgación, 2 jul 2026, 2:37 p. m.
Detección137 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 8.0.0 +1
Monitoreo
Detectada
29 may 26
2 jul 26
3 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
29 may 26
12 jul 26
24 ago 26
7 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 8.0.0 zebra-rpc · -34 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 4.5.0 zebrad · -34 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-C8W6-X74F-VMG3 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Am I affected

You are affected if:

  1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.
  2. Your `zebrad.toml` sets `rpc.listen_addr` to a TCP address (RPC server is enabled).
  3. An attacker can authenticate to the RPC endpoint. With the default `enable_cookie_auth = true`, this requires the attacker to read the `.cookie` file (typically local access). With `enable_cookie_auth = false`, any network client reaching the RPC port can trigger it.
Summary

The `z_listunifiedreceivers` RPC handler panics when processing a structurally valid Unified Address whose Sapling receiver carries 43 bytes that fail cryptographic validation (`sapling_crypto::PaymentAddress::from_bytes` returns `None` for non-subgroup Jubjub points). The handler calls `.expect("using data already decoded as valid")` on the fallible result. Because Zebra's release profile sets `panic = "abort"`, the panic terminates the entire node process, not just the RPC task.

Details

`zcash_address::unified::Encoding::decode` validates only the structural envelope of a Unified Address (F4Jumble, bech32m, typecode ordering, 43-byte length for Sapling). It does not validate that the embedded `pk_d` is a valid Jubjub subgroup point or that the diversifier produces a valid `g_d` preimage.

At `zebra-rpc/src/methods.rs:2893`, the handler calls `Address::try_from_sapling(network, data)`, which delegates to `sapling_crypto::PaymentAddress::from_bytes`. When `from_bytes` returns `None` (most random 32-byte strings fail the subgroup check), the `.expect()` fires and the process aborts.

The same crate already handles this correctly in `try_from_unified` at `zebra-chain/src/primitives/address.rs:99-110`, which returns `Err` when `from_bytes` fails. The vulnerable code path bypasses this validated route.

Patches

zebra-rpc 8.0.0 and zebrad 4.5.0.

Replace `.expect()` with `.map_err(|e| ErrorObject::owned(...))` for proper error propagation, or route through the existing `try_from_unified` path which already handles this case correctly.

Workarounds
  • Disable the RPC server by removing `rpc.listen_addr` from `zebrad.toml`.
  • Ensure `enable_cookie_auth = true` (the default) and restrict filesystem access to the `.cookie` file.
  • Place a reverse proxy in front of the RPC port that rejects `z_listunifiedreceivers` calls with untrusted address parameters.
Impact

A single authenticated RPC request terminates the `zebrad` process. The attack is repeatable on restart (the same request triggers the same abort), allowing an attacker to keep the node down indefinitely until the request is filtered upstream. Operators using `lightwalletd` backends, Zaino indexers, or mining pool infrastructure that forward RPC calls to `zebrad` may be exposed if the forwarding path passes through `z_listunifiedreceivers`.

Credit

Reported by `@robustfengbin` via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
zebrad< 4.5.0
zebra-rpc< 8.0.0
4.5.0
7.0.0
8.0.0
19.0.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iozebra-rpc
Corregida 8.0.0 -34 d 19.0.0 no afectada
crates.iozebrad
Corregida 4.5.0 -34 d 7.0.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.5.08.0.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-c8w6-x74f-vmg3
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/d4cd662c716382f6397d2a730148025a1ca79fec/Cargo.toml#L305
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/d4cd662c716382f6397d2a730148025a1ca79fec/zebra-rpc/src/methods.rs#L2867-L2914

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