GHSA-CCJQ-25J8-M4PH
Repo-local .gortex.yaml index.transforms runs arbitrary commands when an untrusted repository is indexed (incomplete fix of #1201)
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CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-CCJQ-25J8-M4PH divulgada · CVSS 7.8 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Repo-local `.gortex.yaml` `index.transforms` runs arbitrary commands when an untrusted repository is indexed (incomplete fix of #1201)
## Summary
A repository can commit a `.gortex.yaml` with an `index.transforms` rule whose `command` is an arbitrary argv. When the victim indexes that repository (for example `gortex init --analyze` in a freshly cloned repo, or tracking it with the daemon), Gortex runs that command for every matching file, as the victim, with no opt-in.
PR #1201 ("config: gate repo-local extractor plugins behind opt-in") fixed the same problem for `index.extractor_plugins`, and #1203 did the same for `llm.custom`. `index.transforms` is a sibling field that also runs an external process, but it is still copied from the repo-local config. The gate only covers the two fields it names.
## Affected versions
- `main` at `eb3237d` https://github.com/zzet/gortex/commit/eb3237d1acaf3938d68ce2d42417ddd9f2ab91b4 (2026-11-08), reproduced.
- The latest release, v0.64.11, contains the same transform code and predates #1201 (so extractor plugins are ungated there too). I expect every version that has `index.transforms` to be affected.
## Details
- `internal/config/manager.go#L459-L474` https://github.com/zzet/gortex/blob/eb3237d1acaf3938d68ce2d42417ddd9f2ab91b4/internal/config/manager.go#L459-L474: `repoConfig` copies the repo-local workspace config and clears only `Index.ExtractorPlugins` (unless `GORTEX_ALLOW_LOCAL_EXTRACTOR_PLUGINS=1`) and `LLM.Custom` (unless `GORTEX_ALLOW_LOCAL_PROVIDERS=1`). `Index.Transforms` is left as-is.
- `internal/config/config.go#L852-L856` https://github.com/zzet/gortex/blob/eb3237d1acaf3938d68ce2d42417ddd9f2ab91b4/internal/config/config.go#L852-L856: `IndexConfig.Transforms []TransformRule` is loaded from `index.transforms`.
- `internal/indexer/indexer.go#L755` https://github.com/zzet/gortex/blob/eb3237d1acaf3938d68ce2d42417ddd9f2ab91b4/internal/indexer/indexer.go#L755: the indexer builds `newTransformPipeline(cfg.Transforms, ...)`.
- `internal/indexer/transform.go#L81-L88` https://github.com/zzet/gortex/blob/eb3237d1acaf3938d68ce2d42417ddd9f2ab91b4/internal/indexer/transform.go#L81-L88: every rule with a non-empty `Command` becomes a command transform.
- `internal/indexer/transform.go#L376-L378` https://github.com/zzet/gortex/blob/eb3237d1acaf3938d68ce2d42417ddd9f2ab91b4/internal/indexer/transform.go#L376-L378: `exec.CommandContext(ctx, c.argv[0], c.argv[1:]...)`, with the comment "argv is operator-declared config, not user-derived input". That is not true once the argv comes from the repository's own `.gortex.yaml`.
- Load paths: `cmd/gortex/init.go#L568-L569` (`init --analyze`) and `internal/indexer/multi.go#L2289-L2291` (daemon track/reindex) both call `LoadWorkspaceConfig(prefix, root)` and then `GetRepoConfig(prefix)`. The transform also runs again on incremental re-index of changed files (watcher/poller). This means a later malicious commit pulled into an already-tracked repository triggers it too.
## Steps to reproduce
1. Build gortex at `eb3237d` (`go build ./cmd/gortex`).
2. Create a repository containing `main.go` (`package main; func main() {}`) and this `.gortex.yaml`:
```yaml
index:
transforms:
- name: poc
extensions: [".go"]
command: ["sh", "-c", "id > /tmp/gortex-transform-poc-marker; cat"]
```
`git init && git add -A && git commit -m init`.
3. In that directory run `gortex init --analyze -y --no-hooks --no-skills .`
4. `/tmp/gortex-transform-poc-marker` now contains the output of `id`. Indexing still succeeds because the command echoes the file back through `cat`, so nothing looks wrong to the user.
5. Control: put the same command under `index.extractor_plugins` in another repo and repeat. No marker is created, so the #1201 gate works for that field.
I reproduced this twice in fresh, network-isolated containers, with the control negative both times.
## Impact
Anyone who can get a victim to index a repository can run arbitrary commands as the victim. This includes cloning a project to evaluate it, an agent tracking a repository it was pointed at, or pulling a new commit into a tracked repo. The attacker can then read source, credentials and tokens, or persist on the machine. #1201 already treats this as a security issue ("a cloned repo can force the victim's indexer to execute attacker-chosen code"), and `index.transforms` is the same capability through a different key.
## Suggested fix
- Clear `out.Index.Transforms` for repo-local config in `repoConfig`, as is done for `ExtractorPlugins`. Allow it only behind an explicit operator opt-in (reuse `GORTEX_ALLOW_LOCAL_EXTRACTOR_PLUGINS` or add `GORTEX_ALLOW_LOCAL_TRANSFORMS`).
- Consider an allow-list instead of a deny-list: copy only known-safe fields from repo-local config, so that new exec-capable keys are not exposed by default. `index.grammars` (`GrammarSpec.Library`, loaded as a shared object) is another repo-local field that loads native code. It is weaker because it needs an absolute path on the victim's machine, but it is worth gating too.
This issue was found with automated analysis and manually verified.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/zzet/gortex |
Sin parche | — | — | v0.64.11 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/zzet/gortex/security/advisories/GHSA-ccjq-25j8-m4phLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
