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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp

GHSA-CG26-4C6J-2X8H

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: OHTTP codecs retain consumed outer cumulation buffers after completed exchanges

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CVSS 3.1
5.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -105 d de la divulgación
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 20 nov 2026, 11:22 a. m.
Detección1 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Tu backlog la recibirá con los brazos abiertos.Parche en la próxima ventana y listo, campeón.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.0.27.Final
Monitoreo
Detectada
Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories +2
7 ago 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
7 ago 26
3 sept 26
29 sept 26
26 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.0.27.Final io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp · -105 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-CG26-4C6J-2X8H divulgada · CVSS 5.3 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary:

OHttpClientCodec and OHttpServerCodec retain the encrypted outer HttpContent in a handler-level cumulationBuffer. After a valid OHTTP exchange completes, the OHTTP request/response context is destroyed, but the outer cumulationBuffer is not released or reset. It remains referenced by the codec until a later inbound content frame replaces it or the handler is removed/channel is closed.

This can pin attacker-influenced pooled/direct buffer capacity on idle keep-alive channels. Across many long-lived idle connections, this can create availability pressure.

Affected components:

  • codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpClientCodec.java
  • codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpServerCodec.java
  • codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java

Root cause:

OHttpClientCodec retains inbound content into a handler-level cumulationBuffer. On LastHttpContent, it destroys only the OHttpRequestResponseContextHolder. The cumulationBuffer is released in handlerRemoved(), not immediately after successful exchange completion.

OHttpServerCodec follows the same pattern: it retains inbound content into a handler-level cumulationBuffer, and on completed request/response it destroys the OHttpRequestResponseContext. The outer cumulationBuffer remains owned by the codec and is released only when the handler is removed.

OHttpRequestResponseContext.parse() consumes bytes from the caller-provided outer cumulation buffer, but its destroy() path releases only the inner binary HTTP cumulation, not the codec-level outer cumulationBuffer.

PoC:

A local test only:

codec-ohttp/src/test/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpCumulationBufferRetentionTest.java

The test reuses existing OHTTP test helpers and BouncyCastle crypto provider to perform valid completed OHTTP exchanges over EmbeddedChannel pairs. It sends both a small and a large request/response exchange, confirms completion, then reflects the private cumulationBuffer field from both OHttpClientCodec and OHttpServerCodec.

Command:

./mvnw -pl codec-ohttp -Dtest=OHttpCumulationBufferRetentionTest -DfailIfNoTests=false test

Observed output:

small client after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=1064 readerIndex=1064 writerIndex=1064 readableBytes=0
small server after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=1110 readerIndex=1110 writerIndex=1110 readableBytes=0
large client after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 readerIndex=131114 writerIndex=131114 readableBytes=0
large server after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 readerIndex=131160 writerIndex=131160 readableBytes=0
small after close: clientOldRefCnt=0 serverOldRefCnt=0
large after close: clientOldRefCnt=0 serverOldRefCnt=0
Tests run: 1, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
BUILD SUCCESS

Interpretation:

After completion, both the client and server cumulationBuffer objects have:

  • refCnt=1
  • readableBytes=0
  • large retained capacity for the large exchange
  • channel still open/active
  • OHTTP context completed/destroyed

After channel close/handler removal, the previously retained buffers are released and their old refCnt values become 0.

Impact:

A peer can complete a large valid OHTTP request/response and keep the connection open. The codec retains the high-water outer cumulation buffer for the lifetime of the idle keep-alive channel, or until a later inbound content frame replaces it. Across many idle keep-alive channels, this can pin pooled/direct memory and create availability pressure.

This is not unbounded growth per exchange on a single channel. The more precise impact is connection-lifetime retention of the current consumed high-water outer cumulation buffer.

Suggested fix:

After successful LastHttpContent processing, release and reset the codec-level outer cumulationBuffer once parsing has consumed the complete message and no unread bytes remain.

Care is needed not to release the buffer if unread bytes remain for pipelined data. A safe fix would release/reset the outer cumulationBuffer in the completed-exchange path only when the parse consumed the full outer body.

Test environment:

  • WSL Ubuntu
  • Java 11
  • Current main branch / 0.0.24.Final-SNAPSHOT
  • PoC test used BouncyCastleOHttpCryptoProvider and existing OHttpCodecsTest helpers

Affected version testing:

The issue was reproduced on the following release tags:

  • netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.20.Final
  • netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.21.Final
  • netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.22.Final
  • netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.23.Final

It was also reproduced on main / 0.0.24.Final-SNAPSHOT.

For 0.0.20.Final through 0.0.23.Final, the PoC output consistently showed:

  • large client after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 ... readableBytes=0
  • large server after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 ... readableBytes=0
  • large after close: clientOldRefCnt=0 serverOldRefCnt=0
  • BUILD SUCCESS

This confirms that completed exchanges leave the consumed outer cumulation buffer retained until channel/handler close in these versions.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp≥ 0.0.20.Final < 0.0.27.Final
0.0.20.Final
0.0.27.Final
0.0.28.Final
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavenio.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp
Corregida 0.0.27.Final -105 d 0.0.28.Final no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.0.27.Final
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69133
Otrahttps://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-cg26-4c6j-2x8h
Otrahttps://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/commit/a82cd85099c1a1fb78b73b068c77c8c902fc32ce
Otrahttps://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp
Otrahttps://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/releases/tag/netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.27.Final

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.