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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · poweradmin/poweradmin

GHSA-CMWH-G2H8-C222

Poweradmin: OIDC `sub` collation bypass in Poweradmin leading to account takeover

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones4.2.5 · 4.3.4
Exposición119 dDesde la divulgación, 24 jul 2026, 4:56 p. m.
Detección115 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Saqué la lupa: aquí hay algo que investigar.Ojo con los rangos de versión, son traicioneros.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
24 jul 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
24 jul 26
23 ago 26
22 sept 26
22 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-CMWH-G2H8-C222 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Preface

Poweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` plus `provider_id`. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC `sub` is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope.

The confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users:

  • Victim subject: `victim-login`
  • Attacker subject: `victím-login` (`í`, U+00ED)

MySQL reported those two subjects as equal under `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`. After the victim linked their OIDC account, the attacker authenticated to the same provider with the attacker's own password and Poweradmin resolved the session to the victim's local account.

Server Info

  • Application: Poweradmin
  • Version: `targets/poweradmin` git `e1f9c9a`
  • Database: MySQL `8.4.10`, `character_set_server=utf8mb4`, `collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci`
  • Access Permissions: Any user who can create or control an account in the connected OIDC provider
  • Auth Method: OIDC generic provider
  • Tools: Docker Compose, local OIDC provider, Python PoC harness

Affected Entry Point:

GET /oidc/login?provider=generic
GET /oidc/callback?code=...&state=...

Relevant request properties:

  • Authentication: valid OIDC authorization code flow
  • Trigger: attacker OIDC account has a `sub` that collides with a victim's linked `sub`
  • Vulnerable field: OIDC `sub` stored and looked up as `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject`

Root Cause Analysis

part0 — `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` uses an accent-insensitive collation

The MySQL schema defines the OIDC link table with `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`:

-- sql/poweradmin-mysql-db-structure.sql:341-356
CREATE TABLE `oidc_user_links` (
  `user_id` INT(11) NOT NULL,
  `provider_id` VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,
  `oidc_subject` VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
  ...
  UNIQUE KEY `unique_subject_provider` (`oidc_subject`, `provider_id`)
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4 COLLATE=utf8mb4_unicode_ci;

In the PoC database:

Field          Type          Collation
provider_id    varchar(50)   utf8mb4_unicode_ci
oidc_subject   varchar(255)  utf8mb4_unicode_ci

SELECT 'victim-login' = 'victím-login' COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-- accent_collision = 1
part1 — OIDC `sub` flows into a normal SQL equality lookup

Poweradmin reads the subject from OIDC userinfo data. If no custom `subject` mapping is configured, it uses the `sub` claim:

// lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php:424-459
$resourceOwner = $provider->getResourceOwner($token);
$userData = $resourceOwner->toArray();
...
subject: $userData[$mapping['subject'] ?? 'sub'] ?? '',

The callback passes the resulting `OidcUserInfo` to provisioning:

// lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php:269-291
$userInfo = $this->getUserInfo($provider, $token, $providerId);
$userId = $this->userProvisioningService->provisionUser($userInfo, $providerId);

Provisioning first tries to find an existing user by subject:

// lib/Application/Service/UserProvisioningService.php:86-90
$existingUserId = $authMethod === self::AUTH_METHOD_SAML
    ? $this->findUserBySamlSubject($userInfo->getSubject(), $providerId)
    : $this->findUserByOidcSubject($userInfo->getSubject(), $providerId);

The lookup is normal SQL equality evaluated under the column's weak collation:

// lib/Application/Service/UserProvisioningService.php:145-149
$stmt = $this->db->prepare("
    SELECT user_id FROM oidc_user_links
    WHERE oidc_subject = ? AND provider_id = ?
");
$stmt->execute([$subject, $providerId]);

When the attacker authenticates with `sub = victím-login`, MySQL matches the existing row for `oidc_subject = victim-login` and returns the victim's `user_id`.

part2 — The returned user ID becomes the authenticated session

After provisioning returns the matched `user_id`, Poweradmin fetches the database username for that user and stores the matched user ID in the session:

// lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php:307-317
$databaseUsername = $this->userProvisioningService->getDatabaseUsername($userId);
$this->setSessionValue('userlogin', $databaseUsername);
// lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php:360-371
$this->setSessionValue('userid', $userId);
...
$this->setSessionValue('authenticated', true);

The attacker's OIDC password is validated by the IdP, but the local `user_id` selected by Poweradmin comes from the weak-collation SQL lookup.

Security Impact

An attacker who can register or control an OIDC principal with an accent/collation variant of a victim's OIDC subject can authenticate with the attacker's own IdP credentials and obtain a Poweradmin session for the victim's local account.

The confirmed PoC used distinct OIDC usernames, subjects, emails, and passwords. The attacker did not know or modify the victim's password.

Reproduction

1. Start the local Poweradmin OIDC lab
sudo -n docker compose -p poweradminoidcpoc -f poc/work/poweradmin-oidc-collation/docker-compose.yml up -d

The lab uses MySQL `utf8mb4_unicode_ci` and a local OIDC provider with two real login accounts:

Victim:
  username/sub: victim-login
  email: victim.poweradmin@example.com
  password: VictimPassword123!

Attacker:
  username/sub: victím-login
  email: attacker.poweradmin@example.com
  password: AttackerPassword123!
2. Log in once as the victim through OIDC

Authenticate through `GET /oidc/login?provider=generic` using:

username: victim-login
password: VictimPassword123!

Poweradmin creates the victim local user and OIDC link:

users:
id  username      fullname            email
2   victim-login  Victim Poweradmin   victim.poweradmin@example.com

oidc_user_links:
id  user_id  provider_id  oidc_subject
1   2        generic      victim-login
3. Log in as the attacker OIDC user

Authenticate from a separate browser session with:

username: victím-login
password: AttackerPassword123!

Observed result from `poc/work/poweradmin-oidc-collation/run_poc.py`:

{
  "attacker_login": {
    "selected_idp_user": "attacker",
    "selected_idp_username": "victím-login",
    "has_session_cookie": true,
    "home_contains_victim_username": true,
    "home_contains_attacker_username": false
  },
  "attacker_resolved_to_victim": true
}

Database evidence after both logins:

version  charset_server  collation_server
8.4.10   utf8mb4         utf8mb4_unicode_ci

accent_collision
1

users:
id  username      fullname            email
2   victim-login  Victim Poweradmin   victim.poweradmin@example.com

oidc_user_links:
id  user_id  provider_id  oidc_subject  oidc_subject_hex
1   2        generic      victim-login   76696374696D2D6C6F67696E

The application audit log also records all OIDC login events as the victim user:

user:victim-login operation:login_success auth_method:oidc

No local user or OIDC link was created for `victím-login`.

Recommended Fix

Treat OIDC subject identifiers as byte-exact strings.

For MySQL, migrate the OIDC mapping identifiers to a binary or byte-preserving collation:

ALTER TABLE oidc_user_links
  MODIFY COLUMN provider_id varchar(50)
    CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_bin NOT NULL,
  MODIFY COLUMN oidc_subject varchar(255)
    CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_bin NOT NULL;

Also make lookup queries byte-preserving so patched application code protects existing deployments before schema migrations are complete:

$stmt = $this->db->prepare("
    SELECT user_id FROM oidc_user_links
    WHERE BINARY oidc_subject = BINARY ?
      AND BINARY provider_id = BINARY ?
");

Review related identity and authorization lookups:

  • `findUserByEmail()` uses `users.email = ?` and can be impacted when `link_by_email` is enabled.
  • `findPermissionTemplateByName()` uses `perm_templ.name = ?` for SSO permission template mapping.
  • `findGroupByName()` uses `user_groups.name = ?` for SSO group mapping.

Those fields should either be intentionally documented as case/accent-insensitive or migrated/looked up with byte-preserving semantics where they represent security boundaries.

Patches

Fixed in 4.2.5, 4.3.4, and 4.4.0. OIDC and SAML subject identifiers are now matched byte-for-byte. The fix includes a database migration that changes the collation of the identity link columns, so upgrading requires running the SQL update script for your database in the `sql/` directory.

Acknowledge / Credit

whale120 (@whale120_tw), working with DEVCORE Internship Program

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.1.0 < 4.2.5
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.3.0 < 4.3.4
4.1.0
4.2.5
4.3.0
4.3.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin
Corregida 4.2.5, 4.3.4 — —
Versiones corregidas4.2.54.3.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/commit/cbb78f401a9cc77c976939e93b558f39cb738965
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/commit/f814f9e241a7af742193cb68f80b19867c24ba69
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.2.5
Otrahttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.3.4

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