GHSA-CP2W-PC8V-R54P
Users who rename themselves to "anonymous" can connect to MCP servers they were not granted
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-CP2W-PC8V-R54P divulgada · CVSS 9.6 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Obot let users change their own username, and the access check for MCP server connections skipped authorization for any caller whose username was `anonymous`. An authenticated user could rename themselves to `anonymous` and then connect to, and call tools on, any MCP server whose ID they knew, including servers they were never granted access to.
Am I affected?
Obot releases `>= v0.21.1, <= v0.28.1` are affected when authentication is enabled. The attacker needs a regular account that is not provisioned through SCIM (SCIM-provisioned users cannot change their username) and the ID of the target MCP server. Members of a shared virtual MCP server can learn the IDs of its component servers from the API; IDs of servers a user has no relationship to are random and not exposed to them.
Details
The fix for GHSA-vw82-7fv8-r6gp made the per-server access check decisive for MCP connection requests, but added a pass-through so unauthenticated callers could reach the gateway and be prompted to log in. That pass-through identified unauthenticated callers by the username `anonymous` instead of by their authentication state. Because users could set their own username, a signed-in user named `anonymous` skipped the entire access check, including ownership, access control rules, virtual MCP server profiles, and API key scopes, and the gateway then served the request as that authenticated user.
Impact
An authenticated user could connect to and call tools on MCP servers they were not authorized to use, with the server's stored configuration applied, such as admin-configured static headers and the owner's configured values. A member of a shared virtual MCP server could also reach its component servers directly and use all of their tools, bypassing the tool selection their profile grants. Servers that require per-user OAuth are not exposed: the attacker would be prompted to authenticate, and the owner's upstream tokens are not used. Access through the REST API is unaffected.
Mitigation
Upgrade to v0.28.2 or later. In the fixed release, the connection pass-through is limited to callers that are actually unauthenticated, and users can no longer change their own username; usernames come only from the auth provider or SCIM. Special accounts such as the bootstrap user are now recognized by how they signed in rather than by username.
Severity
CVSS v3.1 Score: 9.6/10 (Critical) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N`
Credits
The Obot team would like to thank @jakub2929 https://github.com/jakub2929 for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with our security policy https://github.com/obot-platform/obot/?tab=security-ov-file.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/obot-platform/obot |
Sin parche | — | — | v0.28.1 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/obot-platform/obot/security/advisories/GHSA-cp2w-pc8v-r54pLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
