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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs

GHSA-CPRC-WHX4-V3F5

Unauthenticated SSRF via azure RemoteConf type bypasses the FetchAndWriteNeedle endpoint guard

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CVSS 3.1
5.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición63 dDesde la divulgación, 18 sept 2026, 3:00 p. m.
Detección62 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Tranqui, pero que no se quede en el olvido.Tranqui, va para la ventana de mantenimiento.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
18 sept 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
18 sept 26
4 oct 26
20 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-CPRC-WHX4-V3F5 divulgada · CVSS 5.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
`VolumeServer.FetchAndWriteNeedle` fetches a caller-supplied remote endpoint. CVE-2026-73080 (GHSA-87fv-vqqr-m4jr) added an SSRF endpoint deny-list + rebinding-safe pinned dialer, and the follow-up refactor routes the guard through `S3CompatibleEndpoint(remoteConf)`. The `azure` backend has no `case "azure"` in that switch, so it takes the unguarded `else` branch and reaches the azblob download sink with an attacker-supplied endpoint. This is a DISTINCT variant from GHSA-8wr4-8f39-p7x2 (which covers only the 9 S3-SDK backends via `aws-sdk-go`): azure uses a different SDK (`azure-sdk-for-go/.../azblob`), a different field (`AzureEndpoint`), a different constructor (`NewAzBlobClient`), and requires a different fix.

## Root Cause
`weed/server/volume_grpc_remote.go`: `endpoint, isS3Compatible = s3remote.S3CompatibleEndpoint(remoteConf)` (line 244); the deny-list + guarded dialer run only inside `if !vs.AllowUntrustedRemoteEndpoints && isS3Compatible` (line 249). `s3CompatibleClientOptions` (`weed/remote_storage/s3/s3_storage_client.go:68`) switches on `conf.Type` with cases for `s3, aliyun, b2, baidu, contabo, filebase, storj, tencent, wasabi` — no `azure` — so `isS3Compatible=false` and azure falls to the `else` at line 260: `remote_storage.GetRemoteStorage(remoteConf)` → `azureRemoteStorageMaker.Make` → `NewAzBlobClient(accountName, accountKey, clientId, conf.AzureEndpoint)`. The only endpoint validation is `azureServiceURL` (`weed/remote_storage/azure/azure_credentials.go:71-84`), which checks solely `url.Parse` success, `Scheme=="https"`, and non-empty `Hostname()`. No loopback / link-local / RFC1918 / IMDS deny-list exists on this path (contrast `checkBlockedIP`, wired only into the S3 branch). `remoteConf := req.RemoteConf` is read directly from the gRPC request, so type and endpoint are request-time attacker-controlled.

## Impact
Unauthenticated (default deployment) blind SSRF: an attacker coerces the volume server into opening TCP+TLS connections to arbitrary internal hosts/ports and distinguishes connect-refused / TLS-failure / HTTP-status via the RPC error string — an internal-network reachability/port-scan error oracle. Constrained relative to CVE-2026-73080: `https`-only (`azureServiceURL` rejects `http://`), so IMDSv1 credential theft is not achievable; the fetched bytes are written to a local needle and success additionally requires `len(data)==req.Size`, so straightforward body read-back is not the primary primitive. Calibrated MEDIUM.

## Proof of Concept
Single unauthenticated gRPC `FetchAndWriteNeedle` to `volumeserver:18080` with an existing `VolumeId`, `RemoteConf{Type:"azure", AzureAccountName:"aaaa", AzureAccountKey:"AAAA", AzureEndpoint:"https://169.254.169.254/"}`, `RemoteLocation{Bucket:"probe", Path:"/x"}`. The server dials `169.254.169.254:443`; the returned error distinguishes reachability. Use a valid-base64 account key (e.g. `"AAAA"`) so `NewSharedKeyCredential` succeeds locally before the dial. No non-default config required.

## Attack Chain
1. Entry — unauthenticated gRPC `FetchAndWriteNeedle` with `RemoteConf{Type:"azure", AzureEndpoint:"https://169.254.169.254/", AzureAccountName:"aaaa", AzureAccountKey:"AAAA"}`.
- Guard: `checkGrpcAdminAuth` (`volume_grpc_admin.go:43`) → peer-IP whitelist.
- Bypass proof: default `-whiteList ""` → `util.StringSplit("")` returns `nil` (`fullpath.go:147-149`) → `isEmptyWhiteList=true` (`guard.go:188`) → `IsWhiteListed` returns `true` for every peer (`guard.go:137`). Same default posture under which CVE-2026-73080 was accepted.
2. Volume precondition — supply a valid existing `VolumeId`.
- Guard: `vs.store.GetVolume` existence check (`volume_grpc_remote.go:230-233`).
- Bypass proof: volume IDs are small sequential integers; any live volume server has ≥1. Weak precondition, identical to CVE-2026-73080.
3. Branch routing — `Type:"azure"`.
- Guard: `S3CompatibleEndpoint(remoteConf)` gating `validateRemoteEndpoint` + `newGuardedHTTPClient` (deny-list + guarded dialer), applied only when `isS3Compatible` (`volume_grpc_remote.go:249`).
- Bypass proof: `s3CompatibleClientOptions` switch (`s3_storage_client.go:68`) has cases `s3/aliyun/b2/baidu/contabo/filebase/storj/tencent/wasabi` and no `azure` → returns `("",false)` → guarded block skipped → `else` at line 260 `remote_storage.GetRemoteStorage(remoteConf)`.
4. Endpoint validation — `NewAzBlobClient(...,conf.AzureEndpoint)` → `azureServiceURL` (`azure_credentials.go:71`).
- Guard: `azureServiceURL`.
- Bypass proof: enforces only `url.Parse` success, `Scheme=="https"`, `Hostname()!=""`. `https://169.254.169.254/`, `https://10.0.0.5/`, `https://127.0.0.1:6443/` all pass. No loopback/link-local/RFC1918/IMDS check on this path (`checkBlockedIP` wired only into the S3 branch). Account name `^[a-z0-9]{3,24}$` — `"aaaa"` passes; `NewSharedKeyCredential` only base64-decodes the key locally (no network), and `"AAAA"` is valid base64.
5. Sink — `client.ReadFile`/`ReadFileWithConcurrency` → `blobClient.DownloadBuffer` (`azure_storage_client.go:345`) opens TCP+TLS to the attacker's host:port. The dial (and its distinguishing error at `volume_grpc_remote.go` post-read) occurs BEFORE the `len(data)==req.Size` success check.
6. Impact — unauthenticated blind SSRF: internal host/port reachability probing via connect + error oracle. https-only; no IMDSv1 cred theft.

## Bypass Evidence
- `git show 5b51948 --name-only | grep -i azure` → empty (sibling S3-family fix never touched azure).
- `s3CompatibleClientOptions` switch (`s3_storage_client.go:68`) has no `case "azure"` (verified on HEAD).
- `azureServiceURL` (`azure_credentials.go:71-84`) on release tag 4.41 validates only `Scheme=="https"` + non-empty `Hostname()`; no IP deny-list.
- Empty whitelist ⇒ `IsWhiteListed==true` (`guard.go`), reachable unauthenticated in default config exactly like CVE-2026-73080.
- GHSA-8wr4-8f39-p7x2's own description enumerates only the 9 S3-SDK-family types; azure is out of scope → DISTINCT, not duplicate.

## Affected Versions
`<= 4.41` (verified present on the latest release tag `4.41` and on HEAD; sibling fix `5b51948` present on HEAD does not cover the azure path).

## Suggested Fix
Apply the endpoint deny-list and pinned/rebinding-safe dialer to the azure backend as well: either wrap the azblob client with an `azcore.ClientOptions.Transport` around `newGuardedHTTPClient`, or add a `checkBlockedIP`-equivalent validation inside `azureServiceURL`. More generally, gate the guard on "any maker that dials a caller-supplied endpoint" rather than membership in the S3-compatible switch.

---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs≤ 4.41
4.41
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-cprc-whx4-v3f5

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.