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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · zebrad

GHSA-CWFQ-RFCR-8HMP

Zebra's Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Handling Diverges from zcashd for Corresponding Outputs

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -6 d de la divulgación
Exposición195 dDesde la divulgación, 7 may 2026, 4:02 p. m.
Detección193 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.4.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
1 may 26
7 may 26
3 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
1 may 26
21 jun 26
10 ago 26
30 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.4.0 zebrad · -6 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-CWFQ-RFCR-8HMP divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

`Zebra` Transparent `SIGHASH_SINGLE` Corresponding-Output Handling Diverges From `zcashd`

### Summary
For V5+ transparent spends, `Zebra` and `zcashd` disagree on the same consensus rule: `SIGHASH_SINGLE` must fail when the input index has no corresponding output. `zcashd` treats this as consensus-invalid under ZIP-244, while `Zebra`'s transparent verification path computes a digest for the missing-output case instead of failing.

The result is a direct block-validity split. A malformed V5 transparent transaction can be accepted by `Zebra`, retained in `Zebra`'s mempool, selected into `Zebra` `getblocktemplate`, mined into a block, and then rejected by `zcashd`.

### Details
Validated code revisions used during analysis:

  • `zcashd`: `2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5`
  • `Zebra`: `a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb`

Scope note:

  • earlier triage material grouped pre-V5 and V5 behavior together;
  • re-execution on the pinned revisions did not reproduce the claimed pre-V5 / V4 reject-side behavior;
  • this advisory therefore covers the V5+ / ZIP-244 variant only.

`zcashd` side:

  • Transparent scripts in blocks are checked through `TransactionSignatureChecker::CheckSig()` and `SignatureHash()`: `zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp` https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5/src/script/interpreter.cpp#L1386-L1407.
  • In the ZIP-244 branch, `SignatureHash()` explicitly throws when `SIGHASH_SINGLE` or `SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY` is used with `nIn >= txTo.vout.size()`: `zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp` https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5/src/script/interpreter.cpp#L1221-L1259.
  • `CheckSig()` catches that exception and returns `false`, causing the transparent script to fail.

`Zebra` side:

  • V5 transparent inputs route into the same FFI-based transparent script verifier used for block validation: `zebra/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs` https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs#L989-L1098.
  • `Zebra` converts the decoded hash type and asks its Rust sighash engine for a digest without adding the corresponding-output pre-check that `zcashd` enforces first: `zebra/zebra-script/src/lib.rs` https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-script/src/lib.rs#L160-L175, `zebra/zebra-chain/src/primitives/zcash_primitives.rs` https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-chain/src/primitives/zcash_primitives.rs#L307-L343.
  • `Zebra` forwards canonical `SIGHASH_SINGLE` into the Rust ZIP-244 implementation.
  • In that implementation, when `input.index() >= bundle.vout.len()`, the code uses `transparent_outputs_hash::<TxOut>(&[])` instead of erroring: `zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs` https://github.com/zcash/librustzcash/blob/c3425f9c3c7f6deb20720bb78b18f35fbbed8edd/zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs#L101-L107, `zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs` https://github.com/zcash/librustzcash/blob/c3425f9c3c7f6deb20720bb78b18f35fbbed8edd/zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs#L131-L139.

Why this is exploitable:

  • the malformed transaction only needs fewer transparent outputs than inputs;
  • the attacker signs the digest that `Zebra` computes for the missing-output case;
  • `Zebra` then sees a valid transparent signature, while `zcashd` never reaches the same digest because it fails first.

Ordinary path viability:

  • `zcashd` ordinary mempool admission is not the practical trigger path, because the same ZIP-244 `SignatureHash()` checks fail there first: `zcash/src/main.cpp` https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5/src/main.cpp#L1981-L1995, `zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp` https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5/src/script/interpreter.cpp#L1221-L1259.
  • `Zebra` ordinary mempool admission is viable because `Zebra` uses the same transparent verifier for mempool and block validation and does not have a separate "one output per input" standardness rule here: `zebra/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs` https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs#L414-L519, `zebra/zebrad/src/components/mempool/storage.rs` https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebrad/src/components/mempool/storage.rs#L255-L376.
  • `Zebra` is a block-template producer, so the realistic stock path is `Zebra` mempool -> `Zebra` `getblocktemplate` -> external miner: `zebra/zebra-rpc/src/methods/types/get_block_template/zip317.rs` https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-rpc/src/methods/types/get_block_template/zip317.rs#L72-L105.

### PoC
Validated commits:

  • `zcashd`: `2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5`
  • `Zebra`: `a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb`

Manual reproduction steps:

  1. Build an otherwise-valid V5 transaction with at least two transparent inputs and only one transparent output.
  2. Sign input `0` normally.
  3. Sign input `1` with canonical `SIGHASH_SINGLE` or `SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY`.
  4. Use the digest returned by `Zebra`'s ZIP-244 path, where the missing output contributes `transparent_outputs_hash([])`.
  5. Submit the transaction to `Zebra` and to `zcashd`.
  6. Observe:
  7. `Zebra` accepts it into the mempool;
  8. `Zebra` selects it into `getblocktemplate`;
  9. `Zebra` can mine and accept a block containing it;
  10. `zcashd` rejects it in the ordinary mempool path.

### Impact
This is a direct V5+ transparent consensus split.

Who can trigger it:

  • an ordinary transaction author can craft the malformed V5 transparent transaction;
  • the accept-side stock path is `Zebra`'s mempool and block-template path;
  • an external miner still has to include the transaction in a block for the split to materialize.

Who is impacted:

  • `Zebra` can accept and template a transaction / block that `zcashd` rejects;
  • this makes the issue both a consensus-divergence problem and a practical `Zebra` block-template safety problem.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
zebrad< 4.4.0
4.4.0
7.0.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iozebrad
Corregida 4.4.0 -6 d 7.0.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.4.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.4.0

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