GHSA-F4G2-5496-9233
Path traversal in face-recognition management endpoints (arbitrary file write via register, arbitrary file delete via delete)
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-F4G2-5496-9233 divulgada · CVSS 3.8 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Vulnerability Details
Files: `frigate/data_processing/real_time/face.py` (register sink), `frigate/embeddings/__init__.py` (delete sink)
CWE: CWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ("Path Traversal")
Root Cause
Two of Frigate's four face-management code paths in `frigate/api/classification.py` pass the
`name` path parameter straight through to `FACE_DIR`-relative filesystem operations with no
`sanitize_filename()` call and no post-join containment check — unlike their sibling functions
in the exact same file/class, which both correctly protect the identical parameter:
| Route | Sanitizes `name`? |
|---|---|
| `POST /faces/{name}/create` | ✅ `sanitize_filename(name.replace(" ", "_"))` |
| `PUT /faces/{old_name}/rename` | ✅ regex allowlist + `sanitize_filename` equality + `os.path.normpath(...).startswith(FACE_DIR)` |
| `POST /faces/{name}/register` | ❌ none |
| `POST /faces/{name}/delete` | ❌ none |
1. Arbitrary file write via `register_face`:
# frigate/api/classification.py:283-291
async def register_face(request: Request, name: str, file: UploadFile):
...
context.register_face(name, await file.read()) # `name` unsanitized
# frigate/embeddings/__init__.py:190-197 — passthrough, still unsanitized
def register_face(self, face_name: str, image_data: bytes) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self.requestor.send_data(
EmbeddingsRequestEnum.register_face.value,
{"face_name": face_name, "image": base64.b64encode(image_data).decode("ASCII")},
)
# frigate/data_processing/real_time/face.py:392-401 — the sink
folder = os.path.join(FACE_DIR, label) # label = request_data["face_name"], raw
file = os.path.join(folder, f"{label}_{datetime.datetime.now().timestamp()}.webp")
os.makedirs(folder, exist_ok=True) # creates ANY directory, no containment check
with open(file, "wb") as output:
output.write(thumbnail.tobytes())2. Arbitrary file deletion via `delete_face_ids`:
# frigate/api/classification.py:350-362
def deregister_faces(request: Request, name: str, body: DeleteFaceImagesBody):
...
context.delete_face_ids(name, map(lambda file: sanitize_filename(file), body.ids))
# `name` itself is passed RAW -- only body.ids elements are sanitized
# frigate/embeddings/__init__.py:227-236 -- the sink
def delete_face_ids(self, face: str, ids: list[str]) -> None:
folder = os.path.join(FACE_DIR, face) # `face` = raw `name`, no sanitization
for id in ids:
file_path = os.path.join(folder, id)
if os.path.isfile(file_path):
os.unlink(file_path) # deletes the file
if face != "train" and len(os.listdir(folder)) == 0:
os.rmdir(folder)Attack Scenario
Both routes require the admin role (`Depends(require_role(["admin"]))`).
An important, non-obvious routing detail: a literal `..` path segment (e.g.
`POST /faces/../delete`) is normalized away client-side by any RFC-3986-compliant HTTP client
(browsers, httpx, most HTTP libraries) *before the request is even sent*. The percent-encoded
form is not — `POST /faces/%2e%2e/delete` survives client-side normalization and Starlette
percent-decodes it server-side, *after* route matching, resolving `name == ".."`. (An embedded,
percent-encoded slash within the same `{name}` segment, e.g. `%2e%2e%2fsome_dir`, does not
survive — Starlette's router matches against the still-encoded path and 404s — so the reachable
payload is exactly the slash-free, single-level `..` escape, not a deeper multi-segment
traversal.) A raw/manually-crafted request (curl `--path-as-is`, Burp Repeater) can send either
form.
- `POST /faces/%2e%2e/register` with a multipart image attached → the server creates
- `POST /faces/%2e%2e/delete` with body `{"ids": ["<target-filename>"]}` → `folder =
Impact
An admin account (own, or compromised via another vector) can write an attacker-controlled image
file directly into `CLIPS_DIR`, or delete arbitrary files by name directly under `CLIPS_DIR` (and
potentially remove `CLIPS_DIR` itself if transiently empty) — bypassing the intended "faces only"
containment of this feature entirely. `PR:H` reduces CVSS from a hypothetical unauthenticated
case, but this is still a meaningful containment failure, and mirrors the same class of bug as
GHSA-hh3j-7g2f-43j2 ("the code that should scope an operation to one directory doesn't").
Dynamic Verification
Both sinks were dynamically confirmed via real-code-import pytest (not a hand-copied
reimplementation) — `EmbeddingsContext.delete_face_ids()` and
`FaceRealTimeProcessor.handle_request()`'s register_face branch were called directly, unmodified,
against a temp-directory sandbox with `FACE_DIR` monkeypatched, proving files land/are deleted
outside `FACE_DIR`. The routing-layer reachability of the `%2e%2e` payload was separately,
empirically confirmed against a live FastAPI/Starlette TestClient instance. A differential
control in the same test suite confirms the sibling `rename_face()` function correctly *rejects*
the identical payload via its existing containment check, proving this is a gap specific to
`register_face`/`delete_face_ids`, not a missing feature across the whole class.
Recommended Fix
Apply the exact containment pattern already implemented (and proven correct) in
`EmbeddingsContext.rename_face()` in the same file to both `register_face`'s sink and
`delete_face_ids`:
from pathvalidate import sanitize_filename
label = sanitize_filename(request_data["face_name"], replacement_text="_")
folder = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(FACE_DIR, label))
if not folder.startswith(os.path.normpath(FACE_DIR) + os.sep):
raise ValueError(f"Invalid face name: {request_data['face_name']}")Consider factoring `rename_face()`'s containment check into a shared helper so all four
face-management code paths (`create`, `register`, `delete`, `rename`) use one audited
implementation instead of independent (and here, missing) copies.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypifrigate |
Sin parche | — | — | 0.7.0 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/security/advisories/GHSA-f4g2-5496-9233Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
