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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · jupyter-mcp-server

GHSA-F8RF-RCRX-H6R9

Host-header spoof bypasses the CVE-2026-77359/GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h fix - ManagementRouteSecurityMiddleware checks the client-supplied Host header, not the real TCP peer

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.1.3
Exposición80 dDesde la divulgación, 31 ago 2026, 11:34 p. m.
Detección79 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
1 sept 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
1 sept 26
21 sept 26
11 oct 26
31 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-F8RF-RCRX-H6R9 divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The fix for CVE-2026-77359/CVE-2026-77318 (GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h) added a middleware that checks whether `request.url.hostname` is `localhost`/`127.0.0.1`/`::1` before allowing access to the `/api/connect`, `/api/stop`, and `/api/healthz` management routes. That check reads Starlette's parsed URL, which is built from the client-supplied `Host` header whenever one is present - not from the actual TCP peer address. A single request with a forged `Host: localhost` header, regardless of where it actually originates, passes the check.

Details

  • `jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:105-169` - `ManagementRouteSecurityMiddleware.dispatch` and `_is_local_hostname` (lines 110-111) do a pure string comparison against the parsed Host header, never referencing `request.client` or `scope["client"]` (confirmed via grep - neither appears anywhere in this file).
  • Confirmed against the actual pinned dependency: `starlette==1.6.0`'s `datastructures.py` builds `URL.netloc` from `scope["headers"]`'s host entry (validated only against a syntax regex) whenever present, falling back to `scope["server"]` (the real bind address) only if the header is absent or malformed.
  • `utils.py:429` - the server still binds `0.0.0.0` by default, so this is reachable from the network, not just localhost.

Proof of Concept

Started the real server (`--insecure-mcp-noauth --transport streamable-http`).

`curl -X PUT /api/connect -H "Host: evil.com"` correctly returns 421 Misdirected Request.

The same request with `-H "Host: localhost"` and a full attacker-controlled payload (`code_sandbox_url`, `document_url`, tokens) is accepted - server logs confirm the `connect()` handler ran, `DocumentCodeSandbox(**data)` validated, and `set_config()` overwrote the live server's `code_sandbox_url` with the attacker's URL, followed by the server actually attempting to connect a kernel to attacker infrastructure.

Scoping

In `--mcp-token` (secure) mode, `/api/connect` and `/api/stop` still correctly require a valid bearer token after the Host check passes, so the spoof alone doesn't achieve full config hijack there - only `/api/healthz` is reachable via the spoof in that mode, which is a lower-severity status/info-disclosure gap, not a full takeover. The full critical-severity impact (unauthenticated backend hijack) is specific to `--insecure-mcp-noauth` mode, which your own CLI already labels "NOT recommended for production" - but that mode's entire security guarantee currently rests on this one check, and it fails completely.

Duplicate check

Read both existing advisories in full - neither describes Host-header string forgery as a bypass mechanism (GHSA-9x8x's PoC used DNS rebinding; this needs no DNS trickery at all, just one header). No commit since the fix (`c2e98fc`) has touched `_is_local_hostname` or the middleware. The existing regression test (`tests/test_tools.py::test_management_routes_reject_forged_host`) only asserts that a non-local-looking Host is rejected - there's no test for a forged `Host: localhost` from a genuinely non-local source, which is exactly the gap here.

Suggested Fix

Check the actual ASGI `scope["client"]` peer address (or require the literal TCP connection to be `127.0.0.1`) instead of, or in addition to, the client-supplied Host header.

I'd appreciate being credited by name (Syed Anas Mohiuddin) if this results in a fix, changelog entry, or advisory - happy to provide any additional detail needed for that.

Reported by: Syed Anas Mohiuddin, independent security researcher

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
jupyter-mcp-server< 2.1.3
2.1.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPIjupyter-mcp-server
Corregida 2.1.3 — —
Versiones corregidas2.1.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-f8rf-rcrx-h6r9

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