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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-F8WV-XP27-6GQ7

Grav: Blueprint dynamic-data bare-function branch is denylist-gated and omits error_log, giving arbitrary file write

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.0.15
Exposición64 dDesde la divulgación, 17 sept 2026, 3:44 p. m.
Detección60 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (crítica) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Me tiemblan las patas. Tú encárgate del parche.Te miro fijo: agenda esa ventana de cambio.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
17 sept 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
17 sept 26
4 oct 26
20 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-F8WV-XP27-6GQ7 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Affected versions and vulnerable location

  • Confirmed on grav core at `78ebfc1` (tag 2.0.13).
  • Sinks:
  • `system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:455-458` `call_user_func_array($o, $params)` (bare-function dynamic-data provider).
  • Twin: `system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/FlexDirectory.php:936-938` `call_user_func_array($function, $params)`.
  • Validation gate: `Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()` at `Blueprint.php:514-536`.
  • `Class::method` branch (`:514-527`) uses a strict positive allowlist `self::$allowedDynamicCallables`.
  • Bare-function branch (`:530-534`) uses only a denylist: `if (is_string($function) && Utils::isDangerousFunction($function)) return false; return !self::paramsContainDangerousCallable($params);`.
  • Denylist: `Utils::isDangerousFunction()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php`, list around `:2020-2270`).

Root cause

GHSA-7pgq/CVE-2026-64850 hardened the `Class::method` half of the dynamic-callable validation to a positive allowlist because a page-edit account could otherwise name any static method as a provider and reach file/secret gadgets. The bare-function half was left on a denylist (`isDangerousFunction`). Any bare PHP function not on that list executes.

`error_log` is not on the denylist (verified: no occurrence in `Utils.php`). `error_log($message, 3, $destination)` appends attacker-controlled `$message` to attacker-controlled file `$destination`, an arbitrary-file-append primitive. `paramsContainDangerousCallable()` (`:587-603`) only scans params for dangerous callable strings, so a PHP payload string and a destination path both pass. (`stream_socket_client`, `dl`, and `mb_send_mail` are likewise absent, giving SSRF/other primitives.)

Attacker model

The same surface the published dynamic-data advisories accept as reachable: a `data-*@` directive in a form blueprint the Form plugin assembles from page frontmatter (GHSA-fj2p), or a `data@` field in a Flex directory/pages/users blueprint (GHSA-c4wf). A page-edit / blueprint-config account, no shell.

Reachability trace

  1. Author a blueprint field with a bare-function data directive, e.g.
  2. `Blueprint::init()` resolves the directive; `isSafeDynamicCall('error_log', $params)` reaches the bare-function branch (`:530`), `isDangerousFunction('error_log')` is false, `paramsContainDangerousCallable([...])` is false (no callable strings), so it returns true.
  3. `call_user_func_array('error_log', ['<?php ...', 3, 'user/data/x.php'])` (`:455`) appends the PHP payload to `user/data/x.php`.
  4. Writing to a web-served path (or any path later included) yields code execution. The upload extension denylist does not apply, this is a direct `error_log` write, not an upload.

Reproduction

Executed end to end against the real `Grav\Common\Data\Blueprint` class loaded via `composer install` autoload (PHP 8.5.8, core clone at HEAD 78ebfc1). A harness called the real public `Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()`, then drove the sink and executed the written file:

[1] isSafeDynamicCall('error_log', [payload,3,dest]) => true      # guard ACCEPTS error_log (bug)
[2] isSafeDynamicCall('system', ['id']) => false                  # control
    isSafeDynamicCall('exec',   ['id']) => false                  # control
[3] call_user_func_array('error_log', ['<?php echo "PWNED"; ?>'.EOL, 3, '/tmp/grav_rce_proof.php'])
    file written: /tmp/grav_rce_proof.php (23 bytes) = <?php echo "PWNED"; ?>
[4] php /tmp/grav_rce_proof.php  =>  PWNED                        # arbitrary PHP executed (RCE)

The guard returns true for `error_log` (and false for the denylisted `system`/`exec` controls), the `error_log` sink wrote attacker PHP to disk, and executing that file yielded `PWNED`. Source confirmation:

rg -n "error_log|stream_socket_client|mb_send_mail" system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php   # no hits
rg -n "isDangerousFunction|allowedDynamicCallables|call_user_func_array" system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php

`error_log` absent from `Utils.php`; `Blueprint.php` gates the bare-function branch on `isDangerousFunction` only, while the `Class::method` branch uses the positive allowlist.

Suggested fix

Convert the bare-function branch to a positive allowlist, symmetric with the `Class::method` allowlist at `:523` (only the option-provider functions first-party blueprints actually use). A denylist cannot be complete: `error_log` (arbitrary append), `stream_socket_client` (SSRF), and others must otherwise each be enumerated.

Severity and CVSS reasoning

Suggested severity: High (same class and reach as GHSA-fj2p / CVE-2026-64850).

Suggested CVSS:3.1 vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` (9.6) for the RCE outcome; the maintainer may prefer the exact rating they gave GHSA-fj2p.

  • `PR:L`: a blueprint/page-edit account, not super.
  • `C:H/I:H/A:H`: arbitrary file write leading to code execution.

How I found it and a note on tooling

I compared the two branches of `isSafeDynamicCall()`: the `Class::method` branch is a positive allowlist (the GHSA-7pgq fix) while the bare-function branch is a denylist, then checked the denylist for append/exec-capable functions and found `error_log` missing. I used AI assistance for enumeration and drafting. I then executed the real `Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()` (loaded via composer autoload) to confirm it accepts `error_log` and rejects `system`/`exec`, and drove the `error_log` sink to write and execute attacker PHP. Verification is executed end to end against the real class; I did not run it through a full HTTP request into a bootstrapped Grav site.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav< 2.0.15
2.0.15
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.0.15 — —
Versiones corregidas2.0.15
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75827
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-f8wv-xp27-6gq7
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-arbitrary-file-write-via-error-log

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