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Advisory · GitHub · npm · knowns

GHSA-FC85-99VC-9C75

Insecure Default Configuration leads to Unauthenticated Management API Exposure on All Interfaces

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
9.8
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición96 dDesde la divulgación, 16 ago 2026, 5:52 a. m.
Detección94 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaAtender
Priorizar en el próximo ciclo de cambios
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.30.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
16 ago 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
16 ago 26
9 sept 26
3 oct 26
28 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FC85-99VC-9C75 divulgada · CVSS 9.8 (GitHub)
Remediación Parche 0.30.0 knowns · 0 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Overview

Verified. The default deployment of the Knowns browser server operates in a fully unauthenticated state, binds to all network interfaces (`0.0.0.0`), and exposes the entire management API to the local network. Furthermore, the server includes a built-in Cloudflare Quick Tunnel feature that can be triggered via an unauthenticated API endpoint (`POST /api/tunnel/start`) or a CLI flag, instantly exposing the unauthenticated instance to the public internet.

This insecure default posture acts as the linchpin for the entire application's threat model, escalating every subsequent vulnerability (Path Traversal, SSRF, XSS, and the previously identified RCE chain) from localized/network-restricted issues to zero-credential remote attacks from the public internet. When exposed via the tunnel feature, the attack surface yields a Critical severity (CVSS 3.1: 9.8).

Affected paths

| File Path / Component | Role | Vulnerability & Execution Impact |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| `internal/server/auth.go` | Security Bypass | Authentication Disabled by Default (CWE-306): `AuthManager.Middleware` is explicitly coded as a no-op when no password is configured, allowing unrestricted access to all protected routes. |
| Server Initialization | Insecure Network Binding | Unsafe Default Bind (CWE-668): The HTTP server defaults to binding on all interfaces (`0.0.0.0`) instead of the loopback address (`127.0.0.1`), exposing the service to the local network (LAN). |
| `internal/server/routes/tunnel.go` | Public Exposure Sink | Missing Function Level Access Control (CWE-862): The `POST /api/tunnel/start` endpoint directly invokes `tunnelMgr.Start()` without any internal authorization checks, opening a public Cloudflare Quick Tunnel. |

Root Cause

Insecure Default Authentication

In `internal/server/auth.go`, the authentication middleware explicitly bypasses all security checks if the server is started without a password:

if am == nil || !am.HasPassword() {
    next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
    return
}

Because there is no mandatory first-time setup or auto-generated token, a default installation has no password. Consequently, every API endpoint-including configuration, workspace management, LSP control, and tunneling-is fully accessible to anyone with network reach.

Insecure Default Network Binding

During server initialization, the listener is typically configured using a pattern like `net.Listen("tcp", ":"+port)`. In Go, omitting the host portion of the address implicitly binds the server to all available network interfaces (`0.0.0.0`). This exposes the unauthenticated API to any device on the local network, rather than restricting it to `127.0.0.1` (localhost).

Unauthenticated Public Exposure (Cloudflare Tunnel)

The application includes a feature to create a Cloudflare Quick Tunnel for remote access. In `internal/server/routes/tunnel.go`, the `SetupTunnelRoutes` function registers the `/start` endpoint which directly calls `tunnelMgr.Start()`. There are absolutely no internal authorization checks within the handler; it delegates security entirely to the global middleware.

Because the global `AuthManager.Middleware` is a no-op by default, any unauthenticated user on the LAN can send a single request to `POST /api/tunnel/start`. This immediately provisions a public internet URL pointing directly to the unauthenticated management API, bypassing any local firewall or NAT protections.

Attack Vector

| Phase | Request / Action | Effect |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1. Reconnaissance | `GET /api/auth/status` | Confirms `{"authenticated": false, "protected": false}`, verifying the server is unauthenticated. |
| 2. Exposure | `POST /api/tunnel/start` | Triggers `tunnelMgr.Start()` via the unauthenticated API, generating a public `.trycloudflare.com` URL accessible from the internet. |
| 3. Exploitation | Chain with secondary vulnerabilities | Attacker uses the newly exposed public URL to execute write primitives (e.g., `POST /api/docs`), trigger SSRF, or execute the LSP RCE chain from anywhere on the internet. |

Preconditions: Knowns running with default config (no `--password` flag); server started without explicitly binding to `127.0.0.1`.

Analysis

Auth Bypass - `auth.go`

The middleware design relies on an opt-in security model rather than a fail-closed model. The check `!am.HasPassword()` assumes that an empty password implies a local, trusted development environment. However, because the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default, this assumption is fundamentally broken in any real-world deployment. There is no mechanism to enforce password creation before the server begins accepting connections.

Network Binding - Server Initialization

The use of `net.Listen("tcp", ":"+port)` is a common anti-pattern for local development tools that are inadvertently deployed to production or shared networks. Without explicitly defaulting to `"127.0.0.1:" + port`, the Go standard library binds to the wildcard address, making the service discoverable and reachable via ARP/routing on the local subnet.

Tunnel Endpoint - `tunnel.go`

The `SetupTunnelRoutes` function registers the tunnel control endpoints directly onto the router. Inside the `/start` handler, the code unconditionally executes:

// internal/server/routes/tunnel.go (vulnerable sink)
r.Post("/start", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    url, err := tunnelMgr.Start() // No internal auth check
    // ...
})

It delegates security entirely to the global middleware. Since the global middleware is bypassed when no password is set, the tunnel creation becomes a zero-credential action. Cloudflare Quick Tunnels (`cloudflared tunnel --url`) punch through NAT/firewalls, effectively turning a LAN-restricted service into a public-facing target. This is a classic Missing Function Level Access Control (CWE-862) flaw compounded by the insecure global state.

Fix

*Patch is available right now at New Release https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/releases.*

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
knowns≤ 0.29.1
0.29.1
0.35.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmknowns
Corregida 0.30.0 0 d 0.35.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.30.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/security/advisories/GHSA-fc85-99vc-9c75

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.