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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · awcodes/filament-curator

GHSA-FC8P-659H-3959

Stored cross-site scripting via HTML uploads permitted by Curator's default accepted file types

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Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
5.4
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones4.1.5 · 5.1.5
Exposición107 dDesde la divulgación, 5 ago 2026, 2:04 p. m.
Detección105 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
5 ago 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
5 ago 26
1 sept 26
28 sept 26
25 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FC8P-659H-3959 divulgada · CVSS 5.4 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Curator's upload components fell back to a default list of accepted file types that
included `text/html` and other types that render as documents. An authenticated user
with permission to upload media could upload an HTML file containing a `<script>` tag.
The file was stored unmodified and later served from the application's own origin,
executing the script with the session of whoever opened it.

Impact

Stored cross-site scripting. Because the payload runs in the application's origin, an
attacker with only upload permission (for example a content editor) could target a more
privileged user — typically to steal an admin session.

Exploitation requires an authenticated account that is already permitted to upload
media. It is not exploitable by anonymous visitors.

All four upload entry points were affected, since they share the same default:

  • the Media resource create/edit form
  • `MultiUploadAction` (bulk upload)
  • `CuratorPicker`
  • the rich editor's `AttachCuratorMediaPlugin` attachment flow

Applications that already set `acceptedFileTypes()` themselves — globally via
`Curator::acceptedFileTypes()` or per field — were never affected, because the
vulnerable list was only used as a fallback.

Details

`Awcodes\Curator\Concerns\CanUploadFiles::getAcceptedFileTypes()` returned
`MimeType::toArray()` when no explicit list was configured. That enum is a general
catalogue of MIME types and included `text/html`, `application/xhtml+xml`,
`text/javascript`, `application/xml` and `application/octet-stream`, among others.

`acceptedFileTypes()` compiles to a Laravel `mimetypes:` rule, which validates against
the server-detected MIME type. A genuine HTML file therefore passed validation without
any bypass. Curator sanitizes SVG uploads, but no other type, so the file was written to
disk verbatim and served back with `Content-Type: text/html`.

`application/octet-stream` compounded this: it is what `finfo` reports for anything it
cannot classify, so its presence in the list effectively made the allow list a wildcard.

Patches

Fixed in 4.1.5 and 5.1.5.

The default is now `MimeType::defaults()`, which is the full list minus types that are
effectively executable content: `text/html`, `application/xhtml+xml`, `text/javascript`,
`application/xml`, `application/vnd.mozilla.xul+xml`, `application/x-httpd-php`,
`application/x-sh`, `application/x-csh`, `application/x-shockwave-flash` and
`application/octet-stream`.

As defense in depth, media served through Curator's own route is now sent with
`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and restricted types are forced to
`Content-Disposition: attachment`.

`MimeType::toArray()` is unchanged, so code referencing the enum directly still works.

Workarounds

Set the accepted types explicitly, either globally or per field:

Curator::acceptedFileTypes(['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp', 'application/pdf']);

Note for applications that opt these types back in

Curator only sanitizes SVG uploads; any other type you allow is stored and served
verbatim. The response headers added in this release apply only to Curator's own media
route. With the default `public` disk, files are also reachable directly through the
`storage` symlink, where those headers do not apply. Serve deliberately-allowed
executable types from a private disk.

Not affected

The 3.x line is not affected. It reads its accepted types from
`config('curator.accepted_file_types')`, whose default has always been limited to
`image/jpeg`, `image/png`, `image/webp`, `image/svg+xml` and `application/pdf`.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.2/ 10Alto
Vector 7.2 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
awcodes/filament-curator≥ 4.0.0 < 4.1.5
awcodes/filament-curator≥ 5.0.0 < 5.1.5
4.0.0
4.1.5
5.0.0
5.1.5
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistawcodes/filament-curator
Corregida 4.1.5, 5.1.5 — —
Versiones corregidas4.1.55.1.5
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/awcodes/filament-curator/security/advisories/GHSA-fc8p-659h-3959

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