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Advisory · GitHub · npm · directus

GHSA-FF8W-8CRV-9RCF

Resource exhaustion via unbounded GraphQL documents on the WebSocket endpoint

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -35 d de la divulgación
Exposición107 dDesde la divulgación, 5 ago 2026, 9:59 a. m.
Detección105 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Riesgo con buenos modales, atiéndela con calma.Bien priorizada, bien dormida.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 12.1.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
1 jul 26
5 ago 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
1 jul 26
6 ago 26
11 sept 26
16 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 12.1.0 directus · -35 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FF8W-8CRV-9RCF divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The GraphQL WebSocket endpoint did not apply the parser and validation limits that guard the HTTP GraphQL endpoint.
Documents arriving over the WebSocket transport were parsed without the `GRAPHQL_QUERY_TOKEN_LIMIT` bound. Because that
transport accepts `query` and `mutation` operations alongside subscriptions, an ordinary query with deeply nested
relational fields could be executed there without the document size ceiling that applies over HTTP, expanding a single
client message into a disproportionate amount of server side work.

Details

The HTTP GraphQL endpoint parses incoming documents through a middleware that enforces `GRAPHQL_QUERY_TOKEN_LIMIT`,
capping document size before any execution work begins. The WebSocket transport did not route through that middleware
and supplied no equivalent bound of its own, so document size and nesting depth were effectively unbounded on that path.

Two consequences follow. The cost of parsing, validating, and executing a single client message was unbounded. And
because relational fields can be nested repeatedly, each additional level multiplies the underlying database work, so
one message can expand into a large number of queries and hold database connections for its duration.

The same transport also did not honour `GRAPHQL_INTROSPECTION=false`, leaving introspection and validation field hints
available over WebSockets on instances that had disabled them over HTTP. The WebSocket GraphQL schema is scoped to user
defined collections and generated against the connected client's own permissions, so this revealed no more of the schema
than that client was already entitled to see. It is a hardening parity gap rather than an information disclosure.

Amplification depends on the deployed data model: nesting deeply requires user defined collections with cyclic or self
referencing relations. System collections are absent from this schema, so `directus_*` data and system mutations are not
reachable over this transport.

Impact

Availability. A client that can reach the GraphQL WebSocket endpoint can consume CPU, memory, and database connections
out of proportion to the size of its request, degrading or exhausting the API for other users. In the default
authentication mode the client must present a valid access token, so exploitation is limited to authenticated users.
Confidentiality and integrity are not affected.

Affected configurations

An instance is affected only if all of the following hold:

  • `WEBSOCKETS_ENABLED` is `true` (default: `false`)
  • `WEBSOCKETS_GRAPHQL_ENABLED` is `true` (default: `true` once WebSockets are enabled)
  • the WebSocket GraphQL endpoint is reachable by the attacker

Exposure is wider where `WEBSOCKETS_GRAPHQL_AUTH` is set to `public` (default: `handshake`), since the endpoint is then
reachable without a token, but only to the extent that the public role has read access to related collections.

Patches

Fixed in Directus `12.1.0` (`@directus/api` `37.0.0`). The WebSocket transport now parses documents under
`GRAPHQL_QUERY_TOKEN_LIMIT` and validates them against the same shared rule set as the HTTP endpoint, including the
introspection settings, so the two transports enforce the same protections. Upgrade to `12.1.0` or later.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, set `WEBSOCKETS_GRAPHQL_ENABLED=false`, or `WEBSOCKETS_ENABLED=false` to disable all
WebSocket endpoints.

Credits

Reported by ProScan AppSec (https://proscan.one).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
directus< 12.1.0
12.1.0
12.6.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmdirectus
Corregida 12.1.0 -35 d 12.6.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas12.1.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-ff8w-8crv-9rcf

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.