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Advisory · GitHub · npm · tooljet

GHSA-FH59-QRP9-3R65

Low-privilege query execution can receive plaintext workspace secrets in REST query metadata

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición12 dDesde la divulgación, 9 nov 2026, 6:34 a. m.
Detección11 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (baja) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 nov 26
12 nov 26
15 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FH59-QRP9-3R65 divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

In ToolJet CE `v3.20.188-lts` and `v3.20.189-lts`, a low-privilege app/query viewer can run a REST
query and receive backend-generated request metadata containing resolved
plaintext `{{secrets.*}}` values.

The same low-privilege user cannot read decrypted organization constants
directly: the decrypted constants endpoint returns `403`, and the normal
constants list returns masked values. However, when stored REST query options
place a secret placeholder in URL parameters or a non-redacted request header,
ToolJet resolves the secret before plugin execution and serializes the resolved
value back in `metadata.request`.

This is not a generic SSRF claim and does not require contacting any public or
third-party service. The PoC uses a local echo container on the same Docker
network only to make the request metadata deterministic.

Details

Tested version:

  • ToolJet CE Docker images: `tooljet/tooljet-ce:v3.20.188-lts` and `tooljet/tooljet-ce:v3.20.189-lts`
  • Latest LTS tags tested locally: `v3.20.188-lts` and `v3.20.189-lts`
  • Local-only Docker environment
  • No ToolJet Cloud, public ToolJet instance, customer system, or third-party

Relevant code path:

  • `server/src/modules/data-queries/controller.ts`
  • `POST /data-queries/:id/run`
  • protected by `RUN_VIEWER` app/query execution permissions
  • data-query app/source abilities
  • allow users with app execution access to run the query
  • data-query util service
  • resolves `{{constants.*}}`, `{{secrets.*}}`, and server globals before
  • `plugins/packages/restapi/lib/index.ts`
  • serializes `metadata.request` from the actual outbound request after
  • `plugins/packages/common/lib/utils.helper.ts`
  • redacts selected header names such as `authorization`, but does not redact

Expected behavior:

  • Decrypted secret constants should not be returned to a user who lacks

Actual behavior:

  • A low-privilege query viewer receives the plaintext secret in
PoC

I used only a local ToolJet Docker environment, a local Docker-network echo
server, and a marker secret. No public ToolJet instance, ToolJet Cloud tenant,
external service, customer data, real credential, SSRF bypass, RCE,
persistence, or destructive payload was used.

Attachment:

  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629.zip`
  • SHA-256:

Attachment root:

  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629/`

Key files:

  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629/runtime/run_http_poc.sh`
  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629/runtime/out-echo/summary.json`
  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629/runtime/out-echo/enduser_decrypted_constants.json`
  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629/runtime/out-echo/enduser_masked_constants.json`
  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629/runtime/out-echo/enduser_run_query_reflection.json`
  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629/runtime/out-echo/enduser_run_missing_secret.json`
  • `query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629/evidence-index.md`

High-level reproduction:

  1. Start local ToolJet CE `v3.20.188-lts` or `v3.20.189-lts`.
  2. Start a local Docker-network echo server.
  3. Create an admin-owned app and REST API query.
  4. Store `{{secrets.TJ_SECRET_MARKER_20260629}}` in query URL params,
  5. As the low-privilege end-user, confirm the direct decrypted constants
  6. As the same end-user, confirm the normal constants endpoint returns only
  7. Run the query as the low-privilege end-user.
  8. Observe `metadata.request.params.marker` contains the plaintext secret.
  9. Observe `metadata.request.headers["x-secret-marker"]` contains the plaintext
  10. Confirm a missing-secret control query does not return the expected marker.
  11. Confirm `metadata.request.headers.authorization` is redacted, so this is a

Important evidence:

{
  "statuses": {
    "enduser_decrypted_constants": "403",
    "enduser_masked_constants": "200",
    "enduser_run_query_reflection": "201",
    "enduser_run_missing_secret": "201"
  },
  "controls": {
    "masked_constants_contains_plain_secret": false,
    "missing_secret_response_contains_plain_secret": false,
    "authorization_header_redacted_in_metadata": true
  },
  "positive": {
    "response_contains_plain_secret": true,
    "metadata_request_params_marker": "tj_secret_marker_value_20260629",
    "metadata_request_headers_x_secret_marker": "tj_secret_marker_value_20260629"
  },
  "confirmed": true
}
Impact

A low-privilege app/query viewer can receive plaintext workspace secrets
through REST query execution metadata even though the same user cannot read
decrypted constants directly.

The preconditions are that the user can run the affected query and that a
stored REST query option references a secret in a reflected field. If ToolJet
intends query metadata to be visible to all query viewers, the missing
security invariant is that decrypted secrets should still be redacted before
that metadata is returned.

Non-claims:

  • No public ToolJet target was tested.
  • No ToolJet Cloud tenant was tested.
  • No third-party service was contacted.
  • No SSRF bypass is claimed; the target is a local self-hosted Docker-network
  • No arbitrary secret enumeration is claimed without knowing the secret name.
  • No RCE, persistence, credential-id decrypt endpoint bypass, or destructive

Relationship to known issues:

This is adjacent to prior datasource secret/decrypt issues and to the separate
OAuth URL secret constant leak, but the endpoint and sink are different. This
report does not use the removed/fixed decrypt endpoint and does not rely on an
SSRF bypass. The sink is REST query execution metadata returned to a
low-privilege query viewer.

Suggested fix:

  • Redact resolved `{{secrets.*}}` values from REST query execution metadata
  • Treat URL params and arbitrary request headers as metadata fields that can
  • Add regression tests for direct decrypted constants denial, masked constants

query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629.zip https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29498957/query-metadata-secret-reflection-20260629.zip

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
tooljettodas
0.0.1-security.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmtooljet
Sin parche — — 0.0.1-security.1 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/ToolJet/ToolJet/security/advisories/GHSA-fh59-qrp9-3r65

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.