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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-FPV9-JXPH-QG96

Unauthenticated HTTP access to the background scheduler entry point

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
5.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición78 dDesde la divulgación, 4 sept 2026, 12:35 a. m.
Detección76 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Esta la tienes controlada, confío en ti.Un riesgo moderado es un riesgo con modales.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 sept 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 sept 26
23 sept 26
13 oct 26
2 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FPV9-JXPH-QG96 divulgada · CVSS 5.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

# Security Disclosure: TeamPass — unauthenticated HTTP access to the privileged background scheduler (CWE-306)
### Summary

A stray wrapper file, `public/sources/scheduler.php`, exposes TeamPass's background scheduler inside the web root. The scheduler is a command-line entry point invoked by cron and carries no authentication, session, CSRF or CLI-only check, so any unauthenticated request to `/sources/scheduler.php` runs the scheduled-job dispatcher.

The wrapper is referenced nowhere in the product: the documentation, the Docker entrypoint, the Windows scheduled-task builder and every language file all point at `app/sources/scheduler.php` invoked over CLI. It was created in error when the codebase was split into `public/` (web root) and `app/` (private application layer), and every `public/sources/*.php` file was given a proxy wrapper indiscriminately.

Details

`public/sources/scheduler.php` includes the private implementation with no guard of any kind:

// public/sources/scheduler.php
if (!defined("TEAMPASS_ROOT")) {
    define("TEAMPASS_ROOT", realpath(__DIR__ . '/../..'));
}
require_once TEAMPASS_ROOT . "/app/sources/scheduler.php";

app/sources/scheduler.php then loads the configuration, upserts the last_cron_exec timestamp, registers the background jobs (items_statistics, items_handler) plus any configured maintenance jobs, and calls $scheduler->run().

The file is reachable under both supported deployments:

  • Apache - both RewriteRule directives in public/.htaccess are gated on RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f, so an existing file is never routed through the front controller. Only core.php is denied, by a FilesMatch block.
  • nginx - docker/nginx/teampass.conf hands any existing .php file under the web root to PHP-FPM.

items_handler uses everyMinute(1), which compiles to the cron expression */1 * * * * and is therefore always due, so every request reaches exec() on app/scripts/background_tasks___handler.php.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the web root can invoke the scheduler at will. The consequences are bounded but real:

  • Unauthorized triggering of scheduled maintenance. Backup, cleanup, notification, inactive-account and password-rotation jobs run when the attacker chooses rather than on the administrator's schedule. The attacker cannot select, add or parameterise a job, the task set is fixed by the instance configuration, so this affects the timing of that work, not its content.
  • Masking a broken cron. last_cron_exec is written on every request, and that value is what the "no cron execution detected in the last 10 minutes" health check reads. Sustained requests keep the indicator green while the real cron job is dead, hiding a scheduling outage from the administrator.
  • Resource consumption. Each request costs a PHP-FPM worker, a database connection and a forked CLI process.

There is no confidentiality impact: the script emits no output, and job output is captured into the job object rather than returned to the client, so the HTTP response is empty. There is no integrity impact on stored credentials, no privilege escalation and no code execution, no part of the executed command line derives from the request.

Amplification is limited: background_tasks___handler.php takes an exclusive flock and exits immediately when another instance holds it, so concurrent requests collapse onto that lock.

Affected versions

All 3.2.0.x, 3.2.1.x and 3.2.2.x releases up to and including 3.2.2.1 ship public/sources/scheduler.php. Earlier 3.1.x releases carry the equivalent exposure, with sources/scheduler.php sitting directly in the web root.

Proof of concept

` curl -i https://<teampass-host>/sources/scheduler.php`

The request returns 200 with an empty body and the scheduler runs. Confirm by watching last_cron_exec advance in the misc table, or the background task log.

Resolution

Fixed in 3.2.2.2:

  • public/sources/scheduler.php is removed. Nothing in TeamPass referenced it.
  • app/sources/scheduler.php gains a fail-closed guard so it can never be served, whatever the deployment layout:
if (PHP_SAPI !== 'cli') {
    http_response_code(404);
    exit;
}

The supported way to run the scheduler is unchanged and documented on the Tasks page:

` * * * * * /path/to/php /path/to/teampass/app/sources/scheduler.php`

Workaround for operators who cannot upgrade immediately

Block the endpoint at the web server. It has no legitimate HTTP use.

Apache - in the vhost, or in public/.htaccess:

<FilesMatch "^scheduler\.php$">
    Require all denied
</FilesMatch>

nginx, in the server block, before the generic location ~ \.php$:

location = /sources/scheduler.php {
    deny all;
    return 404;
}

Then confirm with curl -i https://<host>/sources/scheduler.php that the response is 403 or 404. Deleting public/sources/scheduler.php outright is also safe on any 3.2.x install, but it will be reported by the administration file-integrity check until you upgrade.

If you were triggering the scheduler over HTTP — this was never a documented or supported setup, switch to the CLI cron entry shown above before applying either the workaround or the upgrade.

Credit

Reported by @Tike00.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≤ 3.2.2.1
3.2.2.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-fpv9-jxph-qg96

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.