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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · surrealdb

GHSA-FPXG-5XMV-922M

SurrealDB has bypass of field-level SELECT permissions through JSON Patch `copy` and `move` with empty `from`

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -36 d de la divulgación
Exposición140 dDesde la divulgación, 1 jul 2026, 3:18 p. m.
Detección138 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
26 may 26
1 jul 26
4 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 may 26
10 jul 26
23 ago 26
6 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.1.0 surrealdb · -36 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FPXG-5XMV-922M divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

SurrealDB lets callers modify records using JSON Patch operations via the `UPDATE … PATCH` statement (and SDK equivalents such as `db.patch()`). One of those operations is `copy`, which duplicates one field's value into another field of the same record. A `PATCH` with an empty `from` — for example, `UPDATE thing:1 PATCH [{ op: 'copy', from: '', path: '/leak' }]` — was treated as "copy the entire record" and duplicated every field, including fields the caller has no permission to read, into the destination field the caller chose. The permission filter that hides protected field values from the response only knew to hide the *original* protected field names, not the new destinations, so the protected values were returned to the caller intact under the new field name.

Impact

An authenticated user with permission to issue `UPDATE … PATCH` against a record could read the values of any field on that record, regardless of field-level `PERMISSIONS FOR select` restrictions. The leak is confidentiality-only, and bounded to the fields of the single record the caller targets per PATCH request — it does not expose other records on the same table or any data outside that record's scope.

Patches

A patch has been introduced that rejects an empty `from` pointer at parse time for both `copy` and `move` operations.

  • Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds

Affected users who are unable to update should restrict `UPDATE … PATCH` to callers who already hold SELECT permission on every field of the target record — for them, the bug exposes nothing they can't already read. Otherwise, switch the mutation to an explicit `SET` or `MERGE` clause, which removes the attack surface since neither form accepts JSON Patch operations.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
surrealdb< 3.1.0
3.1.0
4.0.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iosurrealdb
Corregida 3.1.0 -36 d 4.0.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63751
Otrahttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-fpxg-5xmv-922m
Otrahttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/56a7a1540d9228f82fd6284c258344e8dcb690fd
Otrahttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/surrealdb-before-field-permission-bypass-via-json-patch

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