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Advisory · GitHub · Hex · quic

GHSA-FQQ7-RG4W-X69M

Default connection expiry performs repeated full-table cleanup and stalls the QUIC listener

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CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición25 dDesde la divulgación, 25 oct 2026, 11:50 a. m.
Detección24 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
25 oct 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
25 oct 26
1 nov 26
7 nov 26
13 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FQQ7-RG4W-X69M divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The `quic 2.1.1` listener defaults to no address validation and no connection
cap. A remote unauthenticated sender can create a large cohort of short-lived
connection processes. When they expire near the default 30-second deadline,
the single listener handles every process exit by scanning the entire shared
connection-ID ETS table with `ets:select_delete/2`.

The resulting approximately quadratic cleanup work prevents the listener from
serving unrelated clients. A 75,000-packet run caused more than 47.5 seconds of
continuous independent service failure.

Details

Affected revision: `quic 2.1.1`, commit
`0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd`.

  • The listener defaults `address_validation` to `never` https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/blob/0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd/src/quic_listener.erl#L360-L389.
  • A new DCID enters connection creation https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/blob/0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd/src/quic_listener.erl#L1020-L1032, and the no-Retry branch starts an unvalidated connection https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/blob/0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd/src/quic_listener.erl#L1049-L1098.
  • `max_connections` defaults to `infinity` https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/blob/0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd/src/quic_listener.erl#L1100-L1108.
  • Each connection inserts client and server CIDs into the shared table https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/blob/0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd/src/quic_listener.erl#L1194-L1202.
  • Every linked connection exit invokes `cleanup_connection/2` in the listener process https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/blob/0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd/src/quic_listener.erl#L540-L566.
  • `cleanup_connection/2` runs `ets:select_delete/2` over the shared table https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/blob/0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd/src/quic_listener.erl#L904-L908.
  • The default idle timeout is 30 seconds https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/blob/0b5634b6468c1b2aa3132baaabe5515d4ea485bd/include/quic.hrl#L340-L347.

For `N` expiring connections and approximately `2N` CID entries, the listener
performs `N` table-wide cleanup scans. Because routing and cleanup share the
same listener process, unrelated connection attempts wait behind this work.

Proof of concept
Required conditions
  • A QUIC listener using the default no-Retry admission policy is reachable over
  • `max_connections` remains at its default `infinity` value.
  • No external admission or per-source rate limit stops the connection cohort.

No completed handshake, application authentication, response feedback, or
server-side access is required.

Proof of concept
  1. Build `quic 2.1.1` at the tested commit with OTP 27.
  2. Start a listener with default `address_validation=never`, default
  3. Run it with exact 4 GiB Docker memory and total memory+swap limits.
  4. Send 75,000 short QUIC-v1 Initial-shaped datagrams with distinct destination
  5. Throughout attack, expiry, and recovery, repeatedly open a fresh legitimate
  6. As a policy control, repeat the same count and pacing with

The default arm created 59,238 routing entries. After the live process count
fell to 84, 58,272 stale entries still remained and legitimate probes failed
continuously for more than 47.5 seconds. A 10,000-packet arm recovered after
five initial recovery failures, confirming cohort-size dependence. Two
75,000-packet Retry controls remained healthy and passed every probe.

Independent malformed-token and batched-version admission campaigns also
reproduced the same cleanup sink in `2/2` matched runs; they are trigger
variants of this root cause.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote peer can stall the shared QUIC listener and prevent
unrelated clients from establishing connections for tens of seconds. Existing
connection processes may remain alive, but admission and routing through the
listener become unavailable.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
quic≤ 2.1.1
2.1.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Hexquic
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/security/advisories/GHSA-fqq7-rg4w-x69m

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.