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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · poweradmin/poweradmin

GHSA-FRQ8-GP5P-PRF7

Default `session_key` is a published constant and the default-key warning never fires, exposing every user's cleartext password from session data

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
5.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versiones4.2.6 · 4.3.5 · 4.4.1
Exposición78 dDesde la divulgación, 3 sept 2026, 11:39 p. m.
Detección76 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 sept 26
24 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 sept 26
23 sept 26
13 oct 26
1 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FRQ8-GP5P-PRF7 divulgada · CVSS 5.5 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Poweradmin stores each user's cleartext login password in the session, reversibly
encrypted with AES-256-CBC under a key derived from the `security.session_key` config
value (`SessionAuthenticator.php:164`, `PasswordEncryptionService::computeKey()`).

That key is weak on a manual install: the shipped default is the published constant
`change_this_key`, and the warning that exists to catch this checks the *wrong* string, so
operators are never told.

The consequence: any read of session storage that would otherwise leak only bcrypt hashes
instead yields plaintext passwords for every user, including administrators. Since
Poweradmin controls DNS zones, an administrator credential is high-value on its own, and
password reuse extends the blast radius past this application.

Docker deployments are not affected `docker-entrypoint.sh:677` correctly uses
`openssl rand -hex 32`.

Split note: this advisory originally also covered the web installer generating the key
with `mt_rand()`. That is an independent defect and is now tracked as GHSA-m8gg-22h2-pj9x so
each can get its own CVE ID.

---

Details: default key is a published constant; the guard warning checks a stale value

`config/settings.defaults.php:53` ships:

'session_key' => 'change_this_key',   // IMPORTANT: Change this to a unique random string (default was p0w3r4dm1n, added in 2.1.6)

`lib/BaseController.php:755` warns the administrator only when the key equals the
*pre-2.1.6* default:

'session_key_error' => $perm_is_godlike && $session_key == 'p0w3r4dm1n'
    ? _('Default session encryption key is used, please set it in your configuration file.')
    : false,

The comparison was never updated when the default changed. An install that never sets
`session_key` runs on a constant published in this repository, and the warning designed to
catch exactly that condition stays silent.

Reproduction

On a checkout with no `config/settings.php` (the state of a fresh manual install before the
operator edits config):

$config = ConfigurationManager::getInstance();
$config->initialize();
$key = $config->get('security', 'session_key');   // 'change_this_key'

// Victim logs in — SessionAuthenticator.php:164
$sessionUserpwd = (new PasswordEncryptionService($key))->encrypt('Adm1n-P@ssw0rd-2026');

// Attacker holds only $sessionUserpwd and uses the constant from this repo:
echo (new PasswordEncryptionService('change_this_key'))->decrypt($sessionUserpwd);

Observed output:

effective session_key (no config/settings.php) : 'change_this_key'
derived AES-256 key = sha256(session_key)      : 20843d0479360ba0866115768db7c76b35760ba8324c3a51af6d003f2a8cac77
BaseController warning fires?                  : NO  <-- operator is never warned
$_SESSION[userpwd] (victim)                    : SGDRQdU+TODfgpd2FBjXhgh8EqxKH6A5sKbltwAYq/0=:AHJ4ePuLzwXQcAatCK/d7A==
attacker decrypts with the published constant  : Adm1n-P@ssw0rd-2026
matches victim password                        : YES
time taken                                     : 0.014 ms (no brute force)

---

Impact

An attacker who reads session storage recovers the **cleartext password of every user who
has logged in**, including administrators. PHP writes session files as mode 0600 owned by
the web-server user, so the realistic sources are: any code execution or file-read primitive
running as that user, a co-tenant on shared hosting whose PHP runs under the same account,
an exposed backup or container volume, or a DB-backed session store reached through another
bug.

This is the difference between an incident that leaks bcrypt hashes and one that leaks
usable plaintext credentials. Poweradmin administers DNS zones, so a recovered admin
password means zone control and reused passwords carry the compromise to other systems.

On the CVSS score: 5.5 reflects the precondition that the attacker already has access to
session data. I am not claiming remote unauthenticated exploitation. The score understates
what happens once that precondition is met, which is total credential disclosure.

---

Recommended Fix

  1. Fail closed on a weak key. Refuse to start (or hard-error in the UI) when
  2. Fix the warning at `BaseController.php:755` check against the current default set,
  3. Longer term, stop storing the cleartext password. For internal (`use_ldap=0`) accounts,

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:L
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
6.4/ 10Medio
Vector 6.4 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.0.0 < 4.2.6
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.3.0 < 4.3.5
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.4.0 < 4.4.1
4.0.0
4.2.6
4.3.0
4.3.5
4.4.0
4.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin
Corregida 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas4.2.64.3.54.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-frq8-gp5p-prf7

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.