GHSA-FRQ8-GP5P-PRF7
Default `session_key` is a published constant and the default-key warning never fires, exposing every user's cleartext password from session data
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-FRQ8-GP5P-PRF7 divulgada · CVSS 5.5 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Poweradmin stores each user's cleartext login password in the session, reversibly
encrypted with AES-256-CBC under a key derived from the `security.session_key` config
value (`SessionAuthenticator.php:164`, `PasswordEncryptionService::computeKey()`).
That key is weak on a manual install: the shipped default is the published constant
`change_this_key`, and the warning that exists to catch this checks the *wrong* string, so
operators are never told.
The consequence: any read of session storage that would otherwise leak only bcrypt hashes
instead yields plaintext passwords for every user, including administrators. Since
Poweradmin controls DNS zones, an administrator credential is high-value on its own, and
password reuse extends the blast radius past this application.
Docker deployments are not affected `docker-entrypoint.sh:677` correctly uses
`openssl rand -hex 32`.
Split note: this advisory originally also covered the web installer generating the key
with `mt_rand()`. That is an independent defect and is now tracked as GHSA-m8gg-22h2-pj9x so
each can get its own CVE ID.
---
Details: default key is a published constant; the guard warning checks a stale value
`config/settings.defaults.php:53` ships:
'session_key' => 'change_this_key', // IMPORTANT: Change this to a unique random string (default was p0w3r4dm1n, added in 2.1.6)`lib/BaseController.php:755` warns the administrator only when the key equals the
*pre-2.1.6* default:
'session_key_error' => $perm_is_godlike && $session_key == 'p0w3r4dm1n'
? _('Default session encryption key is used, please set it in your configuration file.')
: false,The comparison was never updated when the default changed. An install that never sets
`session_key` runs on a constant published in this repository, and the warning designed to
catch exactly that condition stays silent.
Reproduction
On a checkout with no `config/settings.php` (the state of a fresh manual install before the
operator edits config):
$config = ConfigurationManager::getInstance();
$config->initialize();
$key = $config->get('security', 'session_key'); // 'change_this_key'
// Victim logs in — SessionAuthenticator.php:164
$sessionUserpwd = (new PasswordEncryptionService($key))->encrypt('Adm1n-P@ssw0rd-2026');
// Attacker holds only $sessionUserpwd and uses the constant from this repo:
echo (new PasswordEncryptionService('change_this_key'))->decrypt($sessionUserpwd);Observed output:
effective session_key (no config/settings.php) : 'change_this_key'
derived AES-256 key = sha256(session_key) : 20843d0479360ba0866115768db7c76b35760ba8324c3a51af6d003f2a8cac77
BaseController warning fires? : NO <-- operator is never warned
$_SESSION[userpwd] (victim) : SGDRQdU+TODfgpd2FBjXhgh8EqxKH6A5sKbltwAYq/0=:AHJ4ePuLzwXQcAatCK/d7A==
attacker decrypts with the published constant : Adm1n-P@ssw0rd-2026
matches victim password : YES
time taken : 0.014 ms (no brute force)---
Impact
An attacker who reads session storage recovers the **cleartext password of every user who
has logged in**, including administrators. PHP writes session files as mode 0600 owned by
the web-server user, so the realistic sources are: any code execution or file-read primitive
running as that user, a co-tenant on shared hosting whose PHP runs under the same account,
an exposed backup or container volume, or a DB-backed session store reached through another
bug.
This is the difference between an incident that leaks bcrypt hashes and one that leaks
usable plaintext credentials. Poweradmin administers DNS zones, so a recovered admin
password means zone control and reused passwords carry the compromise to other systems.
On the CVSS score: 5.5 reflects the precondition that the attacker already has access to
session data. I am not claiming remote unauthenticated exploitation. The score understates
what happens once that precondition is met, which is total credential disclosure.
---
Recommended Fix
- Fail closed on a weak key. Refuse to start (or hard-error in the UI) when
- Fix the warning at `BaseController.php:755` check against the current default set,
- Longer term, stop storing the cleartext password. For internal (`use_ldap=0`) accounts,
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin |
Corregida | 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 | — | — |
4.2.64.3.54.4.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-frq8-gp5p-prf7Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
