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GHSA-FRVG-QW88-HWW9

vllm p2p never connected zmq_exhaustion

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -9 d de la divulgación
Exposición23 dDesde la divulgación, 27 oct 2026, 9:45 a. m.
Detección20 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.32.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
18 oct 26
27 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
18 oct 26
26 oct 26
3 nov 26
11 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.32.0 vllm · -9 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FRVG-QW88-HWW9 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

When the `OffloadingConnector` uses `TieringOffloadingSpec` with a P2P secondary tier, an API client can submit many unique non-listening peer addresses through `kv_transfer_params.prefill`. vLLM keeps every never-established P2P session and its ZeroMQ sockets after the request finishes. On vLLM 0.26.0, 340 such peers filled the default ZeroMQ context socket quota; creating the next peer raised an uncaught `ZMQError`, terminated `EngineCore`, and shut down the API server. The path was reproduced with a normal API key and no access to the internal P2P listener.

Details
Root cause

In vLLM 0.26.0, `P2PSecondaryTierManager.on_new_request()` reads the following request-controlled fields:

{
  "kv_transfer_params": {
    "prefill": {
      "kv_request_id": "id",
      "remote_host": "127.0.0.1",
      "remote_port": 49101
    }
  }
}

`on_new_request()` calls `_get_or_create_session(peer_id)`. This calls `ZmqTransport.connect()`, creates a `P2PSession`, and stores it in `_sessions` before the asynchronous ZeroMQ connection has been established.

`ZmqTransport._open_connection()` creates a DEALER, enables a libzmq monitor, creates a PAIR socket for that monitor, calls `dealer.connect()`, and immediately stores the resulting `ZmqConnection` in `_connections`. Returning from `dealer.connect()` does not prove that the peer is reachable.

The monitor subscribes only to `zmq.EVENT_DISCONNECTED`. A peer that never accepts the initial connection produced `EVENT_CONNECT_DELAYED`, `EVENT_CONNECT_RETRIED`, and `EVENT_CLOSED`, but no `EVENT_DISCONNECTED` during a 60-second observation. The production monitor therefore never calls `mark_dead()`, and `ZmqConnection.alive` remains true.

Request completion calls `session.finish_request()`, but does not close or remove the peer session. The manager reaps only a session for which `session.connected and not session.alive` is true. A never-established peer remains `connected=True`, `alive=True`, and `ready=False`. There is no establishment deadline, idle eviction, or limit on pending or total peers.

Each unique retained peer uses about three sockets in the same ZeroMQ context: the DEALER, the monitor endpoint created by libzmq, and the PAIR monitor client. With the measured default `MAX_SOCKETS=1023`, 340 peers use approximately 1,020 sockets in addition to the local ROUTER. The next peer fails while creating its monitor PAIR. The exception escapes through `on_new_request()` and the scheduler into the EngineCore loop:

P2PSecondaryTierManager._get_or_create_session()
  -> ZmqTransport.connect()
  -> ZmqTransport._open_connection()
  -> monitor_sock = self._zmq_ctx.socket(zmq.PAIR)
  -> zmq.error.ZMQError: Too many open files
  -> EngineDeadError

The process open-files limit was 65,536. The EngineCore had about 1,215 file descriptors at the failure point, so the failure was not the operating-system FD limit.

Boundary and controls

Each row below used a fresh vLLM process and pre-generated unique non-listening loopback ports.

| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| Default `MAX_SOCKETS=1023`, 340 unique peers | 340 HTTP 200 responses; 340 active peers; service healthy |
| Default limit, 344 unique peers, concurrency 4 | 340 HTTP 200 and 4 HTTP 500 responses; EngineCore and API exited |
| Default limit, 344 unique peers, concurrency 1 | Same 340-peer ceiling and service exit |
| Same endpoint repeated 512 times | 512 HTTP 200 responses; one active peer; service healthy |
| 512 requests without P2P parameters | 512 HTTP 200 responses; no active peers; service healthy |

A diagnostic A/B changed only the context `MAX_SOCKETS` value. Raising it from 1,023 to 2,048 moved the last fully successful point from 340 to 682 peers. The 683rd peer then raised the same `ZMQError` and terminated the service. The approximately 2.01x movement in the boundary identifies the ZeroMQ context quota as the exhausted resource.

The failure runs used logging-only instrumentation around `_open_connection()` to record the context limit, peer count, and process FD count. It did not add or close any ZeroMQ socket and re-raised the original exception.

Related public work

PR #47843 https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/47843 is an open, unmerged proposal that identifies client-supplied P2P peer addresses as an SSRF risk and proposes API sanitization plus a configured peer allowlist. Those changes would block this public API trigger, but the PR does not add a connection deadline, session cleanup, or a capacity limit for never-established peers. This report adds the deterministic resource-exhaustion and service-exit impact of the retained state.

PR #49823 https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/49823 fixes cleanup and reconnection after a connection has been marked dead. A peer that never establishes does not receive the subscribed `EVENT_DISCONNECTED` event, so it never enters that dead-state cleanup path.

Impact

This is uncontrolled resource consumption leading to denial of service. An attacker needs network access to an OpenAI-compatible inference endpoint and a normal API key when `--api-key` is enabled. The attacker does not need access to the internal P2P control or data ports and does not need any peer to answer.

Only deployments that explicitly enable `OffloadingConnector`, `TieringOffloadingSpec`, and a P2P secondary tier are affected. Repeating a cheap one-token request with unique non-listening endpoints steadily consumes scheduler and ZeroMQ resources. In the tested default context, about 341 requests were enough to terminate EngineCore and stop all inference on the instance until restart. Confidentiality and integrity were not affected; the demonstrated impact is availability loss.

This advisory was fixed in MR51504 https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51504.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
vllm< 0.32.0
0.32.0
0.34.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypivllm
Corregida 0.32.0 -9 d 0.34.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.32.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94624
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-frvg-qw88-hww9
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51504
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/93d2cab35e8ae66bbaa1dea1c077986d5a79eb80
Otrahttps://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-4006.yaml
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/v0.29.0/vllm/v1/kv_offload/tiering/p2p/control/zmq.py#L240-L260
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/v0.29.0/vllm/v1/kv_offload/tiering/p2p/manager.py#L667-L677
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.32.0
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-through-0.29.0-denial-of-service-via-unbounded-p2p-kv-offloading-sessions

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