GHSA-FX35-MQ7G-6G98
Verification bypass via public key in legacy bundle
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche v3.1.3 | github.com/sigstore/cosign/v3 · -1 d desde divulgación | |
| Remediación | Parche v2.6.5 | github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 · -1 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-FX35-MQ7G-6G98 divulgada · CVSS 7.4 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Description
In `cosign verify-blob` and `cosign verify-blob-attestation`, keyless verification using `--certificate-identity` and `--certificate-oidc-issuer` (or their regular expression equivalents) can be bypassed when a legacy JSON `--bundle` is supplied.
Note that this does not affect verification with the newer standardized bundle format https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/bundle/, the default in Cosign v3.
When reading the `cert` field of a legacy bundle, if the contents failed to parse as an X.509 certificate, Cosign silently fell back to loading the input as a raw public key and populated `co.SigVerifier`. In downstream verification, whenever `co.SigVerifier` is set, X.509 certificate chain validation and policy enforcement (`CheckCertificatePolicy`) are skipped. As a result, `--certificate-identity` and `--certificate-oidc-issuer` flags are ignored, and verification succeeds as long as the signature is cryptographically valid for the embedded public key.
Additionally, because the fallback unconditionally assigned to `co.SigVerifier`, if an operator passed an explicitly trusted `--key` alongside a legacy bundle containing a public key, the public key embedded in the bundle would overwrite the key provided via `--key`.
Affected Commands & Formats
* Affected: `cosign verify-blob` and `cosign verify-blob-attestation` when verifying legacy JSON bundles (`LocalSignedPayload`).
* Not Affected:
* OCI container image verification (`cosign verify` and `cosign verify-attestation`).
* Verification using the modern Sigstore protobuf bundle format (`--new-bundle-format`, e.g., `application/vnd.dev.sigstore.bundle+json`).
## Impact
An attacker can bypass keyless identity and OIDC issuer pinning in `cosign verify-blob` and `cosign verify-blob-attestation` by shipping a legacy bundle whose `cert` field contains an arbitrary bare public key (`-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----`) instead of a Fulcio X.509 certificate.
- False assurance of identity enforcement: Verification completes with exit code `0` and reports `Verified OK`, causing operators or CI/CD pipelines to trust and consume artifacts signed by an unauthorized key.
- Key override: If an operator explicitly specifies `--key` while verifying against a legacy bundle containing a bare public key, the attacker's bundle key silently overrides `--key`.
Patches
Upgrade to v3.1.3 or v2.6.5.
Workarounds
Adopt the Standardized Protobuf Bundle Format:
Migrate from legacy JSON bundles to the modern Sigstore protobuf bundle format (`--new-bundle-format`). The protobuf bundle verification engine is not affected by this vulnerability. You can upgrade bundles with `cosign bundle create`.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/sigstore/cosign/v3 |
Corregida | v3.1.3 | -1 d | v3.1.4 no afectada |
gogithub.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 |
Corregida | v2.6.5 | -1 d | v2.6.5 no afectada |
v2.6.5v3.1.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-fx35-mq7g-6g98Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
