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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · admidio/admidio

GHSA-G292-GRP6-8QWV

Stored XSS via SVG upload in Documents & Files (served inline as image/svg+xml), introduced in 5.0.16

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
5.4
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición13 dDesde la divulgación, 6 nov 2026, 3:50 p. m.
Detección11 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
6 nov 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
6 nov 26
10 nov 26
13 nov 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-G292-GRP6-8QWV divulgada · CVSS 5.4 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Since 5.0.16, a user with upload rights on a Documents & Files folder can upload an `.svg` file. Admidio serves it from the file's view link with `Content-Type: image/svg+xml`, `Content-Disposition: inline`, no `X-Content-Type-Options` and no CSP. A script inside the SVG therefore runs on the Admidio origin for anyone who opens that link. In a public folder, that includes visitors who are not logged in.

Reproduced on the official Docker Hub image `admidio/admidio:v5.0.16` and on `master` @ `7a3e6bf`, with script execution confirmed in headless Chrome on both. Not reproducible on `v5.0.15` or `v5.0.2` (official images), which reject the `.svg` upload.

Details

The problem has two parts:

  1. Upload accepts SVG (new in 5.0.16). Document uploads (`system/file_upload.php:143-149`) are checked against the extension allow-list `FileSystemUtils::allowedFileExtension()` (`src/Infrastructure/Plugins/UploadHandlerFile.php:65`), which is the keys of `$iconFileExtension`. PR #2144 (merged 2026-09-12) added `svg` to that list (`src/Infrastructure/Utils/FileSystemUtils.php:99` in v5.0.16) with `'viewable' => false`. The PR description says this flag was set "to force download and prevent potential inline script execution (XSS)".
  2. Download ignores that flag. `src/Documents/Service/DocumentsService.php` `downloadFile()` (line 68; headers at 96-98 in v5.0.16, 85-87 on master) chooses `inline` purely from the `view` request parameter.
  3. It never calls `File::isViewableInBrowser()`, so the `viewable => false` flag has no effect.
  4. It sets no `nosniff` header.
  5. The file list links every file with `view=1` (`src/UI/Presenter/DocumentsPresenter.php:579` in v5.0.16, `:580` on master).

So the protection the PR intended is not in effect. The project previously decided to disallow SVG uploads for exactly this reason (issue #1106, "Disallow upload of svg files because of xss attacks", 2021), so this behaviour is not intended.

### Relation to prior advisories
No published Admidio advisory covers SVG or inline serving of documents. GHSA-95cq-p4w2-32w5 (CVE-2026-32756) is a CSRF-error path that skipped the extension check to write `.php` files (RCE). The documents advisories CVE-2026-47230/47231/47226 and GHSA-m9h6-8pqm-xrhf concern access control and path handling on rename/move/delete/add. This report is an allow-listed type served inline.

Proof of concept

Setup (stock demo data): the folder `documents_demo` is public. As administrator, grant the role "2. Jugendmannschaft" / "2. youth team" the upload right on that folder (folder permissions). The uploader is the demo user `Mitglied` / `Member`: a member of that role and of "Member", with no administrator or documents-administrator role. In the scripted run this grant was written directly as the `adm_roles_rights_data` row (`folder_upload`, role 5, folder 1) that the permissions dialog stores.

  1. As that user, `POST /system/file_upload.php?module=documents_files&mode=upload_files&uuid=<folder uuid>` with `adm_csrf_token` and `files[]=poc.svg`, where `poc.svg` is `<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>document.documentElement.setAttribute("data-ambit","FIRED:"+document.location.origin)</script></svg>`. The response lists the file and has no `error` field.
  2. `GET /modules/documents-files.php?mode=download&file_uuid=<uuid>&view=1` returns `Content-Type: image/svg+xml` and `Content-Disposition: inline`, with no `X-Content-Type-Options` and no `Content-Security-Policy`, and the script unchanged.
  3. The same request without any session cookie returns HTTP 200 with the same inline SVG (public folder).
  4. Opening that URL in headless Chrome with no session runs the script: the rendered DOM carries `data-ambit="FIRED:<Admidio origin>"` (`http://127.0.0.1:8093` for the v5.0.16 instance, `http://127.0.0.1:8091` for master).

Steps 1-4 were executed as written on v5.0.16 (official image) and on master. On v5.0.15 and v5.0.2 (official images), step 1 fails with `SYS_FILE_EXTENSION_INVALID` ("Dateien dieses Dateityps sind auf dem Server nicht erlaubt."), so nothing further happens.

Control and fix: with the patch below applied to v5.0.16 and to master, the same SVG is served `Content-Disposition: attachment` with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and headless Chrome does not run the script. A PNG document is still served `inline` as `image/png` both with and without the patch. Reverting the patch restores inline SVG serving. A self-contained reproduction script (fresh local instance, one PASS/FAIL assertion per claim) is available on request.

Impact

Any user who has been given upload rights on a folder (a per-folder, per-role right; demonstrated with a non-administrator role) can store JavaScript that runs on the Admidio origin for anyone who opens the file's view link. In a public folder that includes visitors who are not logged in. Demonstrated: the script executes on the origin. Not separately demonstrated, but the usual consequence of same-origin script: when a logged-in user (for example an administrator) opens the link, the script can make requests as that user.

### Remediation
In `downloadFile()`:
- honour `isViewableInBrowser()`, so types marked not viewable, such as svg, are sent as attachments;
- always send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.

The patch below is against master `7a3e6bf`; it also applies unchanged (offset +11) to v5.0.16. It passes `php -l` and was verified on both. Optionally, also send a restrictive CSP on file downloads.

diff --git a/src/Documents/Service/DocumentsService.php b/src/Documents/Service/DocumentsService.php
index 9277fb5..2649feb 100644
--- a/src/Documents/Service/DocumentsService.php
+++ b/src/Documents/Service/DocumentsService.php
@@ -75,7 +75,13 @@ class DocumentsService
         // determine filesize
         $fileSize = filesize($completePath);

-        if ($inline) {
+        // Only serve inline when the file type is a browser-safe type to display (the
+        // 'viewable' flag in FileSystemUtils). Types such as SVG carry active content
+        // (image/svg+xml can embed <script>) and MUST NOT be rendered inline on the
+        // Admidio origin, or an upload-right holder can store same-origin XSS. Anything
+        // not explicitly viewable is forced to a download, and content-type sniffing is
+        // disabled so the browser cannot re-interpret an attachment as active content.
+        if ($inline && $file->isViewableInBrowser()) {
             $content = 'inline';
         } else {
             $content = 'attachment';
@@ -83,6 +89,7 @@ class DocumentsService

         // Create appropriate header information of the file
         header('Content-Type: ' . $file->getMimeType());
+        header('X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff');
         header('Content-Length: ' . $fileSize);
         header('Content-Disposition: ' . $content . '; filename="' . $file->getValue('fil_name') . '"');

I would appreciate a CVE being requested for this issue.

### Credits
Please credit as: Dylan McGuinness (GitHub @dylanzonix), Ambit Security (finder, reporter).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Versiones afectadas

5.0.16
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistadmidio/admidio
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-g292-grp6-8qwv

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.