GHSA-G293-VF99-XV36
Unthrottled system GraphQL resolvers allow anonymous DoS via alias amplification
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 12.1.0 | directus · -35 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-G293-VF99-XV36 divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
A prior advisory (GHSA-6q22-g298-grjh) addressed GraphQL alias-amplification on `server_health` by wrapping the
resolvers in `resolvers/system.ts` with a deduplication layer. The companion resolver file `resolvers/system-global.ts`
was not covered. Several anonymously reachable, expensive resolvers remain un-deduplicated, so a single anonymous
`POST /graphql/system` request containing many aliased calls is multiplied into many server-side operations.
This enables an unauthenticated attacker, in a single HTTP request, to:
- Account-lockout DoS: flip any account with a guessable email to a suspended state by exceeding the per-account
- Mail flooding: trigger an arbitrary number of password-reset emails to any address, exhausting SMTP quota and
- CPU exhaustion: force many argon2id hashing operations per request, amplified further by parallel connections.
- Accelerated credential probing: test up to the lockout threshold of credentials against an account in a single
Details
The affected resolvers in `resolvers/system-global.ts` are anonymously reachable and each carry meaningful server-side
cost (argon2id hashing, user lookups, or SMTP sends): `auth_login`, `auth_password_request`, `utils_hash_generate`, and
`utils_hash_verify`.
Because GraphQL aliasing lets one document invoke the same field many times, and these resolvers are not deduplicated,
one HTTP request expands into N operations. The HTTP-level rate limiter counts requests, not resolver invocations, so
the amplification bypasses it even when the limiter is enabled.
Default configuration increases exposure rather than mitigating it. The HTTP and email rate limiters are disabled by
default, the default per-account failed-login threshold is low enough to be crossed within a single amplified request,
and GraphQL introspection is enabled by default, making the schema anonymously discoverable.
Impact
Any Directus deployment with `/graphql/system` reachable by the attacker is affected. An unauthenticated attacker can
suspend arbitrary accounts (including privileged ones with guessable emails), flood arbitrary recipients with
password-reset mail, and impose amplified server-side CPU cost, all from a single anonymous request and repeatable from
one IP. This is a denial-of-service and resource-abuse issue. It does not by itself grant account takeover, since the
per-account lockout caps the credential-probing window.
Credits
Reported by @assakafpix
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmdirectus |
Corregida | 12.1.0 | -35 d | 12.6.1 no afectada |
12.1.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-g293-vf99-xv36Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
