GHSA-G57G-F23G-4646
Nodemailer: Quoted local-part can produce malformed envelope recipient through RFC 5322 comment parsing
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 10.0.9 | nodemailer · -17 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-G57G-F23G-4646 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
Nodemailer's address parser can produce an unexpected recipient address when an RFC 5322 comment follows the domain of an address whose local-part is a quoted string.
For example:
"user"@example.com(x)evil.comis parsed as:
{
address: "user@example.com evil.com",
name: ""
}The resulting address therefore contains additional attacker-controlled domain text separated by a literal space.
The parsed `.address` value is subsequently propagated into the SMTP envelope:
src/addressparser/index.ts
↓
recipient.address
↓
src/mime-node/index.ts
↓
envelope.toThe envelope construction uses the parsed address without another strict address validation step.
This appears to be a variant of the RFC 5322 comment parsing issue addressed by GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83, but it follows a different parser path when the local-part is quoted.
Reproduction
Input:
"user"@example.com(x)evil.comObserved parser output:
address: "user@example.com evil.com"
name: ""A second example:
"a"@b.com(c)d.com(e)f.comproduces:
address: "a@b.com d.com f.com"
name: ""For comparison, the corresponding unquoted form:
user@example.com(x)evil.comtakes a different code path and is handled by the existing protection differently.
Technical Details
The issue is caused by different parsing behavior for quoted and unquoted local-parts.
The quoted-local-part variant allows the comment-separated trailing domain atoms to remain in the resulting `.address` value.
That value is then used when constructing the message envelope:
envelope.to = recipients.map(to => to.address as string)No additional strict recipient validation is performed at this boundary.
Security Impact
The confirmed impact is that attacker-controlled comment content can result in a malformed/ambiguous recipient address being accepted by the parser and propagated into `envelope.to`.
The reporter did not confirm successful delivery to an unintended recipient through a real SMTP server using this exact quoted-local-part variant.
The remaining question is how real SMTP servers and other Nodemailer transports handle an envelope recipient containing a value such as:
user@example.com evil.comAn end-to-end SMTP test is required to determine whether this parser behavior results in an exploitable delivery or recipient-validation bypass.
Relationship to GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83
This report is intended as a potential variant/follow-up to GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83.
The existing advisory addresses RFC 5322 comment handling in email domains. This report identifies a separate parser path involving quoted local-parts that can preserve additional domain-like content in the normalized address.
Please evaluate whether this behavior is already covered by the existing fix or represents a remaining parser variant.
Suggested Fix
The parser should consistently reject or correctly terminate addresses containing trailing domain atoms after RFC 5322 comments, regardless of whether the local-part is quoted.
In particular:
"user"@example.com(x)evil.comshould not result in:
user@example.com evil.comThe envelope-generation layer should also avoid assuming that a parser-produced address is safe for SMTP delivery without appropriate validation.
Verification Status
Confirmed:
- Parser accepts the quoted-local-part variant.
- Parser produces an address containing additional attacker-controlled text.
- The resulting address is propagated into `envelope.to`.
Not confirmed by reporter:
- Successful delivery through a real SMTP server.
- Delivery to an unintended recipient.
- Exploitability against a specific downstream SMTP implementation.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmnodemailer |
Corregida | 10.0.9 | -17 d | 10.6.0 no afectada |
10.0.9Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-g57g-f23g-4646https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/2f36eb1aa1dd33e312411dc9b888548e14db54eehttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailerhttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v10.0.9Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
