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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · russh

GHSA-G6XM-F9XP-QQ35

Russh: Configured server auth-attempt cap is not enforced in the USERAUTH_REQUEST runtime path

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -50 d de la divulgación
Exposición49 dDesde la divulgación, 30 sept 2026, 6:26 p. m.
Detección47 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.62.6
Monitoreo
Detectada
11 ago 26
30 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
11 ago 26
5 sept 26
30 sept 26
25 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.62.6 russh · -50 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-G6XM-F9XP-QQ35 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Details
Affected versions and vulnerable location
  • Confirmed present on default branch `main` at HEAD `0089c89c94753bebbec12b956c07a1cd38740379`.
  • Crate version at HEAD: `0.62.4`.
  • Vulnerable locations on current default branch:
  • `russh/src/server/mod.rs:91` (`pub max_auth_attempts: usize`)
  • `russh/src/server/mod.rs:121` (default `max_auth_attempts: 10`)
  • `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs:89` (`USERAUTH_REQUEST` dispatch into auth handler path)
  • `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs:98` (`self.common.auth_attempts += 1`)
  • `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs:53` (only runtime read of `auth_attempts`, used for initial reject timing, not attempt limiting)
  • Default-branch history check did not show a newer merged commit adding enforcement against `config.max_auth_attempts`.
Reachability trace verified
  1. Entry point: exported server API `server::run_stream` in `russh/src/server/mod.rs:1049`.
  2. Session run loop in `russh/src/server/session.rs` processes incoming packets and calls `reply(...)` (`server/session.rs:725`).
  3. `reply` forwards encrypted packets to `session.server_read_encrypted(...)` (`server/mod.rs:1221`).
  4. `server_read_encrypted` routes `USERAUTH_REQUEST` to `enc.server_read_auth_request(...)` (`server/encrypted.rs:89`).
  5. On each request, `self.common.auth_attempts += 1` executes (`server/encrypted.rs:98`).
  6. No comparison against `self.common.config.max_auth_attempts` is present in this runtime flow.
PoC
Reproduction steps and observed output

I did not run a full server process in this environment because Rust tooling is unavailable. I verified the issue from source and command output on the audited tree.

  1. Show where `max_auth_attempts` appears:
rtk rg -n "max_auth_attempts" .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/session.rs

Observed:

.scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:91:    pub max_auth_attempts: usize,
.scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:121:            max_auth_attempts: 10,
.scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:148:            .field("max_auth_attempts", &self.max_auth_attempts)
  1. Show runtime auth-attempt handling:
rtk rg -n "auth_attempts == 0|auth_attempts \\+= 1" .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs

Observed:

53:        let initial_none_rejection_wait_until = if self.common.auth_attempts == 0 {
98:                self.common.auth_attempts += 1;
  1. Show production entrypoint-to-auth path references:
rtk rg -n "pub async fn run_stream|match reply\\(|server_read_encrypted\\(|server_read_auth_request\\(" .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/session.rs .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs

Observed:

.scratch/russh/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs:89:                enc.server_read_auth_request(
.scratch/russh/russh/src/server/session.rs:725:                            match reply(&mut self, &mut handler, &mut pkt).await {
.scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:1049:pub async fn run_stream<H, R>(
.scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:1221:    session.server_read_encrypted(handler, pkt).await
  1. Toolchain check:
cargo --version

Observed:

/bin/bash: line 1: cargo: command not found
Impact
Attacker model
  • Attacker: unauthenticated remote client with TCP reachability to a russh-backed SSH service.
  • Preconditions: deployer expects `server::Config.max_auth_attempts` to cap attempts.
  • Impact: repeated `USERAUTH_REQUEST` attempts continue for a single connection beyond configured limit, increasing online guessing opportunity and backend auth workload.
Suggested fix

Enforce `max_auth_attempts` in the `USERAUTH_REQUEST` branch before invoking auth-method handlers, and fail closed once threshold is reached.

Concrete patch direction in `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`:

if self.common.config.max_auth_attempts > 0
    && self.common.auth_attempts >= self.common.config.max_auth_attempts
{
    self.common.disconnect(
        Disconnect::NoMoreAuthMethodsAvailable,
        "Too many authentication attempts",
        "",
    )?;
    return Ok(());
}
How it was found and a note on tooling

The researcher synthesized three lens outputs, then revalidated each claim against current `main`: source presence and commit history, advisory overlap checks in both GitHub advisories and OSV, entrypoint-to-sink reachability, attacker-model realism, and execution-claim integrity. The researcher used `gh`, `git`, `rg`, and direct source inspection under `.scratch/russh`. Because Rust tooling is unavailable in this worker, this report is intentionally marked `source-only`.

AI assistance was used while investigating this and while drafting this report. The finding was verified by reading the cited code at HEAD. The vulnerability was not executed it, and that limit is stated plainly above rather than left implied.

Credits: arpitjain099.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
russh< 0.62.6
0.62.6
0.65.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iorussh
Corregida 0.62.6 -50 d 0.65.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.62.6
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102825
Otrahttps://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-g6xm-f9xp-qq35
Otrahttps://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/f8fd0b11a393364dc7f01a182482d86adafdd653
Otrahttps://github.com/Eugeny/russh
Otrahttps://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.62.6

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.