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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark

GHSA-GJ7R-P794-HHQ5

Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición3 dDesde la divulgación, 16 nov 2026, 5:18 p. m.
Detección24 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
16 nov 26
20 nov 26
16 nov 26
17 nov 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-GJ7R-P794-HHQ5 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Ecosystem / package: Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`
CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)
Affected component: `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `download_file`
Affected versions: `>= v53.1.0`, `< v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the
tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
Patched version: `v53.4.0`
Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

## Summary
The `download_file` MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied `path` from the Kubeshark
Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied `dest` on the local
filesystem with no validation of `dest`. An attacker who can influence the MCP
tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving
`kubeshark mcp` — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path
writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,
`~/.kube/config`, `~/.bashrc`), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.
`download_file` is registered unconditionally (available in the default,
non-`--allow-destructive` posture).

## Introduced in
Commit `eb7dc42b` — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)",
2026-03-04 — first released in v53.1.0 (`v53.1.0~1`). An earlier attempt
(`dbfd17d9`) was reverted (`a46f05c4`) before any release, so no tag before
v53.1.0 is affected.

## Details
In `callDownloadFile` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), both `path` and `dest` come straight
from the tool arguments:
- `dest` was passed directly to `os.Create(dest)` with no confinement — no
`filepath.Clean`, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute
paths or `../` traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.
- `path` was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any
Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.

## Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)
The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication
gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now
forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and
rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. But
the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default
`kubeshark tap` the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic
(credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing
Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is not
part of this advisory's fix.

## Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)
Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install:
`export_snapshot_pcap` → obtain a relative path → `download_file` with that
`path` and an attacker-chosen `dest`. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic
PCAP and recovered a planted canary `Authorization: Bearer …` credential from
it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.

## Impact
- Integrity (local): arbitrary file write on the machine running
`kubeshark mcp`, as that user.
- Confidentiality: read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic
(credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
- Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).

## Severity rationale
Kubeshark scores this 5.3 Medium, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:

  • `AV:N` → `AV:L`. The vulnerable component has no network listener the
  • `I:H` → `I:L`. The write is confined to paths writable by the user running
  • `A:L` → `A:N`. Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the

Kubeshark kept `C:H`: on a default community install the Hub API answers
unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely
readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept `AC:H` (the attacker must land an injection in
content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), `PR:N`
(`download_file` is registered unconditionally — no `--allow-destructive`
needed), `UI:R` (an operator must be driving an agent against
`kubeshark mcp`), and `S:U` (the impact stays within the local user's
authorization scope).

## Patches
Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit
`a76a1920` https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214
(PR #1957 https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957).

Changes in `cmd/mcpRunner.go`:
- `dest` is resolved through `secureDownloadDest` and confined to a base
directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via `KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR`);
a `dest` that resolves outside the base (via `../` or an absolute path) is
rejected.
- `path` is rejected if it contains `..` segments.
- Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked
subdirectory inside the base (or a `dest` that is itself a symlink) cannot
redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with `O_NOFOLLOW` where the
platform provides it.
- Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the
gated-auth refactor).

## Workarounds
- Run `kubeshark mcp` as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory.
- Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
- Enable Hub authentication (`AUTH_ENABLED=true` + an IdP/license) to close the
unauthenticated read path.

## Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)
- Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub `path` (current fix only rejects `..`).
- Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark≥ 0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0 < 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75
v0.0.1
0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0
0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/kubeshark/kubeshark
Sin parche — — v0.0.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidascommit a76a192
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129235
Otrahttps://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/security/advisories/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5
Otrahttps://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957
Otrahttps://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214
Otrahttps://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark
Otrahttps://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/tag/v53.4.0

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