GHSA-GM9R-HVC9-96GV
Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob pattern
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-GM9R-HVC9-96GV divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`_extract_from_forwarded_header()` (`guard_core/utils.py:172-181` in 3.12.0; `:179` on master `08780f1`) returns the selected `X-Forwarded-For` entry without any `ipaddress` validation. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes `client_ip` and flows into `BehaviorTracker` (`guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102`), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a `KEYS` glob pattern:
key = f"behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}"
await self.redis_handler.set_key("behavior_usage", f"{key}:{current_time}", "1", ttl=rule.window)
pattern = f"behavior_usage:{key}:*"
keys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern) # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspaceSame shape in `track_return_pattern()` (`behavior_handler.py:135-142`). `redis_handler.keys()` maps to the blocking Redis `KEYS` command (`guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275`).
Details
Three consequences, in increasing severity:
- Cross-client counter contamination. `X-Forwarded-For: *` makes the glob match *every* client's behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client `9.9.9.9` hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying `XFF: *` issued the pattern `behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*`, counted the victim's events, and tripped the rule on its first request. An embedded `:` also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (`behavior_handler.py:94-100`).
- Unbounded key-space growth + blocking scans. Each request creates a new unique key (`f"{key}:{current_time}"`) and then issues a blocking `KEYS` scan whose cost grows with total keys — on the shared Redis instance, degrading every guard-core instance using it. Rotating arbitrary XFF strings multiplies distinct keys without bound.
- Error path. A tripped `ban` action passes the non-IP string to `ip_ban_manager.ban_ip()`, whose `ipaddress` validation raises `ValueError` uncaught in the behavioral processor — the request 500s.
PoC
import asyncio
from types import SimpleNamespace
from guard_core.models import SecurityConfig
from guard_core.utils import extract_client_ip
class CIHeaders(dict):
def get(self, key, default=None):
for k, v in self.items():
if k.lower() == key.lower():
return v
return default
class FakeRequest:
def __init__(self, xff):
self.state = SimpleNamespace()
self.client_host = "10.0.0.1" # the TRUSTED proxy
self.headers = CIHeaders({"X-Forwarded-For": xff})
async def main():
config = SecurityConfig(trusted_proxies=("10.0.0.1",), enable_redis=False)
ip = await extract_client_ip(FakeRequest("*"), config)
print(repr(ip)) # -> '*' (arbitrary string, no validation)
asyncio.run(main())Then `BehaviorTracker.track_endpoint_usage("app.login", "*", rule)` issues `KEYS behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*` — matching other clients' keys (full fake-Redis script: `poc_xff_redis.py`, available on request).
Impact
Integrity and availability of the behavioral-analytics subsystem and the shared Redis instance, in deployments where the extracted XFF position is attacker-controllable. No data exposure; not reachable with default settings (`trusted_proxies` defaults empty).
Fix: validate the extracted XFF entry with `ipaddress.ip_address()` before returning it from `extract_client_ip()` (fall back to the connecting IP on failure); escape glob metacharacters (`*?[]`) in anything interpolated into a `KEYS` pattern — or replace the KEYS+per-request-key design with an atomic counter / Lua sliding window (the rate-limit Lua script already shows the right shape).
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
PyPIguard-core |
Corregida | 3.13.0 | — | — |
3.13.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129304https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/security/advisories/GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gvhttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/pull/68https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/commit/c07239fa1c5aa93e3f179440e79dad652977d3e4https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/releases/tag/3.13.0https://github.com/rennf93/guard-coreLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
