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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · guard-core

GHSA-GM9R-HVC9-96GV

Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob pattern

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.13.0
Exposición7 hDesde la divulgación, 19 nov 2026, 5:50 p. m.
Detección20 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
05:50 p. m.
06:00 p. m.
01:06 a. m.
05:50 p. m.
07:39 p. m.
09:28 p. m.
11:17 p. m.
01:06 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-GM9R-HVC9-96GV divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`_extract_from_forwarded_header()` (`guard_core/utils.py:172-181` in 3.12.0; `:179` on master `08780f1`) returns the selected `X-Forwarded-For` entry without any `ipaddress` validation. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes `client_ip` and flows into `BehaviorTracker` (`guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102`), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a `KEYS` glob pattern:

key = f"behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}"
await self.redis_handler.set_key("behavior_usage", f"{key}:{current_time}", "1", ttl=rule.window)
pattern = f"behavior_usage:{key}:*"
keys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern)      # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace

Same shape in `track_return_pattern()` (`behavior_handler.py:135-142`). `redis_handler.keys()` maps to the blocking Redis `KEYS` command (`guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275`).

Details

Three consequences, in increasing severity:

  1. Cross-client counter contamination. `X-Forwarded-For: *` makes the glob match *every* client's behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client `9.9.9.9` hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying `XFF: *` issued the pattern `behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*`, counted the victim's events, and tripped the rule on its first request. An embedded `:` also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (`behavior_handler.py:94-100`).
  2. Unbounded key-space growth + blocking scans. Each request creates a new unique key (`f"{key}:{current_time}"`) and then issues a blocking `KEYS` scan whose cost grows with total keys — on the shared Redis instance, degrading every guard-core instance using it. Rotating arbitrary XFF strings multiplies distinct keys without bound.
  3. Error path. A tripped `ban` action passes the non-IP string to `ip_ban_manager.ban_ip()`, whose `ipaddress` validation raises `ValueError` uncaught in the behavioral processor — the request 500s.
PoC
import asyncio
from types import SimpleNamespace
from guard_core.models import SecurityConfig
from guard_core.utils import extract_client_ip

class CIHeaders(dict):
    def get(self, key, default=None):
        for k, v in self.items():
            if k.lower() == key.lower():
                return v
        return default

class FakeRequest:
    def __init__(self, xff):
        self.state = SimpleNamespace()
        self.client_host = "10.0.0.1"          # the TRUSTED proxy
        self.headers = CIHeaders({"X-Forwarded-For": xff})

async def main():
    config = SecurityConfig(trusted_proxies=("10.0.0.1",), enable_redis=False)
    ip = await extract_client_ip(FakeRequest("*"), config)
    print(repr(ip))        # -> '*'  (arbitrary string, no validation)

asyncio.run(main())

Then `BehaviorTracker.track_endpoint_usage("app.login", "*", rule)` issues `KEYS behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*` — matching other clients' keys (full fake-Redis script: `poc_xff_redis.py`, available on request).

Impact

Integrity and availability of the behavioral-analytics subsystem and the shared Redis instance, in deployments where the extracted XFF position is attacker-controllable. No data exposure; not reachable with default settings (`trusted_proxies` defaults empty).

Fix: validate the extracted XFF entry with `ipaddress.ip_address()` before returning it from `extract_client_ip()` (fall back to the connecting IP on failure); escape glob metacharacters (`*?[]`) in anything interpolated into a `KEYS` pattern — or replace the KEYS+per-request-key design with an atomic counter / Lua sliding window (the rate-limit Lua script already shows the right shape).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
guard-core≥ 1.0.0 < 3.13.0
1.0.0
3.13.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPIguard-core
Corregida 3.13.0 — —
Versiones corregidas3.13.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129304
Otrahttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/security/advisories/GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gv
Otrahttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/pull/68
Otrahttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/commit/c07239fa1c5aa93e3f179440e79dad652977d3e4
Otrahttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/releases/tag/3.13.0
Otrahttps://github.com/rennf93/guard-core

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