GHSA-GWCW-8GXQ-XWMF
CardDAV readers can delete shared address books and contacts without Delete permission
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-GWCW-8GXQ-XWMF divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub) | |
| Remediación | Parche v0.13.52 | github.com/daptin/daptin · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
An authenticated user with read-only access to a shared CardDAV address book can delete the entire address book and every contact in it by sending a collection-level CardDAV DELETE request. This includes contacts the delegate cannot read. A related missing check lets a user with Update permission on the book delete individual contacts without Delete permission on those contacts.
Affected versions and prerequisites
Released versions through 0.13.51 containing the affected CardDAV deletion implementation are affected. The collection-deletion bug was reported and reproduced in 0.13.49; the same unguarded implementation is present in 0.13.51. It was reported as present at least as early as 0.13.37; the earliest affected version has not been established.
The CalDAV/CardDAV service must be enabled, and the attacker must have an account with read access to the target shared address book and the required table access. This is an authorization bypass causing data deletion, not remote code execution.
Root cause
`DaptinDAVBackend.DeleteAddressBook` resolves the book through a read-filtered resource lookup, then calls `deleteAfterAuthorizationWithTransaction` for the contacts and the book without checking Delete permission. These lifecycle helpers intentionally omit the table and object permission middleware because their caller is responsible for authorizing the operation first. That required authorization was missing.
As a result, a successful Read check was sufficient to reach destructive operations. The REST deletion path correctly denied the same caller, and the CardDAV privilege response did not advertise deletion rights, but neither prevented the unguarded backend operation.
`DeleteAddressObject` separately checked Update permission on the book but omitted Delete permission checks on the contact table and contact row.
Reproduction
- Enable CardDAV and create an owner account and a delegate account with the required table access.
- As the owner, create an address book and add contacts.
- Share the book with the delegate using only `GroupRead|GroupPeek` (49152), through `address_book/share`, `address_book/share_user`, or a grant-only DAV ACL.
- As the delegate, send `DELETE /carddav/<owner-reference-id>/addressbooks/<book-name>/`.
- On an affected version, the server returns 204 and deletes the book and its contacts. The same delegate's REST DELETE is denied.
Impact and severity
An authorized reader of a shared address book can permanently delete the book, its contacts, and its sync state for the owner and all other sharees. Individual contact deletion can also exceed an editor's granted rights.
Severity: High, CVSS 3.1 8.1 (`AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`). Weaknesses: CWE-285 and CWE-862.
Fix
Upgrade to Daptin v0.13.53 https://github.com/daptin/daptin/releases/tag/v0.13.53, the first published packaged release containing this fix. The release includes commit `b18e5b40acbe8173d8e6ea5b8deea7ebccc7a787`. Platform archives, SHA-256 checksums and the Docker image `daptin/daptin:v0.13.53` are available.
Commit b18e5b40acbe8173d8e6ea5b8deea7ebccc7a787 https://github.com/daptin/daptin/commit/b18e5b40acbe8173d8e6ea5b8deea7ebccc7a787 requires Delete permission on both the address-book table and row, the contact table, and every contact row before any deletion lifecycle hooks run. A denied child blocks the entire collection delete. Individual contact deletion now additionally requires Delete permission on its table and row while retaining the book Update check.
Regression coverage exercises read-only and update-only shares, group/account sharing actions and DAV ACLs, table and row denial, hidden protected contacts, preserved contact data and sync history, permission revocation, and authorized delegate and administrator deletion. The regression returns an unexpected 204 against the unpatched backend and passes with 403 after the fix.
Validation completed: the ordinary Go suite, resource tests and vet, the CardDAV ACL and table-permission real HTTP E2E tests, and the CardDAV sync E2E test. An adjacent CalDAV metadata test fails identically on the unpatched and patched backend and is unrelated to this fix.
A CVE identification number has been requested from GitHub; assignment is pending.
Workarounds
Until deploying a fixed build, disable the CalDAV/CardDAV service, or revoke access to shared address books from accounts that must not be able to delete their contents. Read-only sharing alone does not protect against this issue on affected versions.
Credit
Thanks to hgrgr https://github.com/hgrgr for reporting the vulnerability and providing the reproduction details.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/daptin/daptin |
Corregida | v0.13.52 | 0 d | v0.13.57 no afectada |
v0.13.52Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-gwcw-8gxq-xwmfLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
