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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · remdex/livehelperchat

GHSA-GXMC-38J6-M839

Department assignment for any account via user/newdepartment

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CVSS 3.1
8.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición38 dDesde la divulgación, 12 oct 2026, 1:52 a. m.
Detección37 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
12 oct 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
12 oct 26
22 oct 26
31 oct 26
10 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-GXMC-38J6-M839 divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`modules/lhuser/module.php:49-53` gates `newdepartment` with `'functions' => array('selfedit')` and no `limitations` entry, and `selfedit` is part of the Operators role the installer creates (`modules/lhinstall/install.php:2995` and `:3001`).

The handler computes which departments the caller may edit at `:113-119`, and the groups at `:121-128`, and never uses either result for the write decision. It loads the target user from the URL at `:5` and never compares it to the session user. It calls `erLhcoreClassUserValidator::validateDepartmentAssignment()` at `:157` and discards the return value ten lines later with `$Errors = [];` at `:167`.

What the POST sends is written: `:169-174` copies `dep_ids` into the model, `:206-215` saves one row per id.

The sibling handlers check properly: `modules/lhuser/account.php:234-236` requires `editdepartaments` plus `see_assigned_departments`, and `modules/lhuser/edit.php:248-275` requires `edituser` plus `edit_all_departments`.

Result: a default operator grants itself, or any other account, membership in every department, and then reads and writes the chats of all of them.

Details

`newdepartment.php:113-119` builds `$depIds` from `edit_all` and `edit_personal`, and `:137` passes it to the template; the write path never consults it. `:5` loads the target through `erLhcoreClassModelUser::fetch($Params['user_parameters']['user_id'])`, `:147` only checks its type, and no comparison against the session user exists anywhere in the file, so the `user_id` in the path selects the victim. `:157` calls the validator and `:167` overwrites `$Errors` with an empty array, so its verdict cannot block anything. `:150-152` assigns a response array when the CSRF token is missing or wrong and then falls through without `return` or `exit`, so the write proceeds regardless. The boundary that moves is `erLhcoreClassChat::hasAccessToRead()` (`lib/core/lhchat/lhchat.php:1622-1664`), where for `all_departments == 0` the department membership test at `:1644` is the binding condition; the remaining checks at `:1634` and `:1645` are satisfied by the stock role, which carries `allowopenclosedchats` and `allowopenremotechat`.

Reachable in a stock install with no configuration change, by any account in the default Operators role.

The victim user id is a small sequential integer. At least one unassigned department has to exist: `:184` rejects ones already assigned, and `:161` declares `dep_ids` with `min_range` 1.

Every write leaves a row in `lh_audits`: `:272-283` calls `erLhcoreClassLog::logObjectChange` unconditionally, and the row carries the previous and new value together with the id of the acting account.

The modal offers every department as a checkbox to a `selfedit` account: the template passes `'filterin' => ['id' => $dep_ids]` with an empty array, and `lib/core/lhcore/lhdbtrait.php:445` breaks out of the loop on an empty value, dropping the `IN` clause.

Proof of concept

LiveHelperChat 4.94v (`d8787d04`), Docker, default configuration. Attacker is `vrfy_opB`, a member of the stock Operators role assigned to department 2 only.

  1. Establish the boundary. Both requests are refused.
GET  /index.php/site_admin/chat/printchatadmin/7   (chat in department 5)
     -> You do not have permission to access the current chat

POST /index.php/site_admin/chat/addmsgadmin/9      (chat in department 4)
     -> You cannot read/write to this chat!        (no row in lh_msg)
  1. Assign the missing departments to the attacker's own account. No CSRF token is sent.
POST /index.php/site_admin/user/newdepartment/<attacker-id>/(editor)/self
     dep_ids[]=5
     (then the same request with dep_ids[]=4)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Updated
  1. Repeat both requests from step 1.
GET  /index.php/site_admin/chat/printchatadmin/7   -> SECRET5-MARKER-ABC
POST /index.php/site_admin/chat/addmsgadmin/9
     X-CSRFToken: <session token>                  -> {"error":"false"}
     lh_msg row with the attacker's user id, and the chat is accepted by him

`addmsgadmin.php:22-26` does check the CSRF token; only `newdepartment` lets the check fall through.

  1. The same against a foreign account, without the `(editor)/self` suffix. The victim here is a freshly created account whose only department is 1.
POST /index.php/site_admin/user/newdepartment/7
     dep_ids[]=3

HTTP/1.1 200 OK, body contains: Updated
lh_userdep(user_id=7): {2,4,1} -> {2,4,1,3}
lh_users.departments_ids(7) = '2,4,1,3'
Controls
  1. The victim's group holds no roles at all, so the write is not explained by the attacker's own scope.
  2. Raw captures of the requests in step 2 and step 4 contain zero occurrences of `X-CSRFToken` or `csfr_token`.

Live-verified: an account in the stock Operators role moved itself into two foreign departments, read a chat it had been refused, posted into another one as the company, and rewrote the department membership of a different account.

Impact
  • Read access to the transcripts of every department, which for the stock Operators role includes `chat_see_email` and `see_sensitive_information`.
  • Write access as the company into any department's chats, since the stock role also carries `writeremotechat`.
  • Durable rewrite of another account's authorisation rows.
  • No permission beyond the default role is required.
  • The write is recorded: each one appends an `lh_audits` row naming the acting account and the previous and new department list.

Credit

Jan Kahmen, turingpoint https://www.turingpoint.de (jan@turingpoint.de)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
remdex/livehelperchat≤ 4.94v
4.94v
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistremdex/livehelperchat
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/LiveHelperChat/livehelperchat/security/advisories/GHSA-gxmc-38j6-m839

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.