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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

GHSA-H246-WPGF-VMQ5

Nginx UI: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-84315 - the api/cluster router was not - wrapped in RequireSecureSession, so those sensitive mutations run without OTP step-up

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición42 dDesde la divulgación, 9 oct 2026, 12:08 p. m.
Detección38 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
9 oct 26
19 oct 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 oct 26
20 oct 26
30 oct 26
10 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-H246-WPGF-VMQ5 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Incomplete fix of GHSA-5v7c-xpfp-p65m: the secure-session (OTP step-up) requirement added to the nginx, cert, dns, backup, site, and stream mutation routers was not applied to the parallel api/cluster router, so cluster node management and cluster-wide nginx reload/restart run with only a JWT and no step-up. An authenticated user whose JWT is stolen or persisted, but who does not hold a fresh secure-session, can perform cluster node CRUD (including reading and rewriting a node token secret) and trigger cluster-wide nginx reload/restart. Confirmed at HEAD 2cb7ee9102c9d87274de2fa104db804841d140a0.

The defect

GHSA-5v7c-xpfp-p65m required a fresh secure session (an OTP step-up beyond the JWT) for sensitive mutation routes. The fix wrapped the nginx, cert, dns, backup, site, and stream mutation handlers in middleware.RequireSecureSession() and added reload/restart to the MCP sensitive-tool list. It did not touch the physically separate api/cluster package, whose router registers the same class of sensitive operations on the bare authenticated group.

The fixed sibling, api/nginx/router.go:

o := r.Group("", middleware.RequireSecureSession())   // line 28
{
    o.POST("nginx/reload", Reload)                     // line 30
    o.POST("nginx/restart", Restart)                   // line 31
}

The missed router, api/cluster/router.go, registers every sensitive operation directly on r with no RequireSecureSession wrapper:

nodeGroup := r.Group("nodes")                          // line 9, no step-up
{
    nodeGroup.POST("", AddNode)                        // line 12
    nodeGroup.POST("/:id", EditNode)                   // line 13
    nodeGroup.DELETE("/:id", DeleteNode)               // line 14
}
r.POST("nodes/reload_nginx", ReloadNginx)              // line 17
r.POST("nodes/restart_nginx", RestartNginx)            // line 18
r.POST("namespaces", AddNamespace)                     // line 22
r.POST("namespaces/:id", ModifyNamespace)              // line 23
r.DELETE("namespaces/:id", DeleteNamespace)            // line 24

Both routers mount on the same group in router/routers.go: `g := root.Group("/", middleware.AuthRequired(), middleware.Proxy())` (line 87); nginx.InitRouter(g) creates its own RequireSecureSession subgroup, cluster.InitRouter(g) does not. So the cluster routes inherit only AuthRequired and Proxy, exactly the pre-fix posture the advisory closed for the nginx routes. AuthRequired has no role gate, so any authenticated user reaches them.

Attacker model and impact

An authenticated, OTP-enabled user who does not present a fresh X-Secure-Session-ID (the parent advisory's model: a stolen or persisted JWT used without the step-up). Such a user can: add/edit/delete cluster nodes (AddNode/EditNode store an AES-serialized node token, the secret used to control a remote node, so this reads back and rewrites a cross-node credential); trigger nodes/reload_nginx and nodes/restart_nginx across the cluster (the exact reload/restart action class the fix protected on the single-node path); and add/modify/delete/reorder namespaces.

Proof of concept: with a valid JWT but no fresh secure session, call POST /api/nodes (AddNode) or POST /api/nodes/reload_nginx. The nginx equivalent POST /api/nginx/reload returns the secure-session challenge; the cluster route succeeds.

Verification

Source-verified at HEAD: the nginx router wraps reload/restart in RequireSecureSession, the cluster router registers node/namespace/reload/restart directly on the group with no such wrapper, and both mount on the AuthRequired+Proxy-only group. I did not stand up a live nginx-ui.

Suggested fix

Wrap the cluster router's mutation handlers (node CRUD, nodes/reload_nginx, nodes/restart_nginx, namespace CRUD) in middleware.RequireSecureSession(), mirroring api/nginx/router.go. Secondary lower-confidence items worth checking in the same pass: the system/restart handler, the core-upgrade websocket, and the upstream socket PUT also appear to run without the step-up (I did not fully trace these).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI≥ 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1 < 1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3b
v1.9.9
1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1
1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3b
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Sin parche — — v1.9.9 no afectada
Versiones corregidascommit a3999bd
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-h246-wpgf-vmq5
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/a3999bd78a3b97ab22e6b5e9fd478ac57598a954
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0

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