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Advisory · GitHub · Hex · quic

GHSA-H2QX-FXX7-7R6J

QUIC distribution never verifies the peer certificate; the verify option is ignored

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
8.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición13 dDesde la divulgación, 7 nov 2026, 9:06 a. m.
Detección11 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
7 nov 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
7 nov 26
10 nov 26
14 nov 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-H2QX-FXX7-7R6J divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

With `-proto_dist quic`, neither side of a distribution connection authenticates the other through TLS, whatever the configuration says. The `verify` and `cacert_file` options of the `dist` configuration are read and then never used. Unless the listener runs PSK-only, the only thing that authenticates a node is the distribution cookie handshake, which is not bound to the TLS channel.

Details
  • Client: `connect_to_node/7` in src/dist/quic_dist.erl hard-codes `verify => false` ("% TODO: Enable proper verification", line 1141 in 2.1.3).
  • Server: `start_quic_server/4` (line 639) passes neither `verify`, `cacerts` nor `require_client_cert`, so the listener sends no CertificateRequest and accepts any client.
  • `verify` is parsed into `#quic_dist_config.verify` (line 424) and never read.
  • `load_credentials/1` loads `cacert_file`, and both callers discard it (`_CACert`, lines 642 and 1111).

The moduledoc of quic_dist and docs/QUIC_DIST.md present `{verify, verify_peer}` with `cacert_file` as the production setting ("Use verify_peer in production"). A user who follows them gets no certificate check on either side.

Impact

An attacker on the network path between two nodes can terminate QUIC towards each of them with any certificate. It relays the distribution handshake messages unchanged: the cookie challenge/response proves knowledge of the cookie to whoever is at the other end of the TLS session, which is the attacker. After the handshake the attacker reads and injects distribution traffic, which includes `rpc:call` and so arbitrary code execution on both nodes.

That is the exposure of plain `inet_tcp_dist`, while the documentation promises TLS-authenticated distribution.

Not affected: a listener configured PSK-only (`external_psk`/`psks`/`psk_callback` without cert/key). An application can also check the server certificate itself in a `quic_dist_auth` callback through `quic:peercert/1`, but only on the client side, since the client never sends a certificate.

Steps to reproduce
  1. Configure two nodes as in docs/QUIC_DIST.md with `{verify, verify_peer}` and `{cacert_file, "ca.pem"}`.
  2. Give node B a certificate that is not signed by ca.pem (a fresh self-signed one).
  3. `net_adm:ping(B)` from A returns `pong`. Expected: the connection fails certificate verification.

We ran this on 2.1.3 with two peer nodes, each with its own self-signed certificate and `cacert_file` pointing to a third, unrelated self-signed certificate: `pong`, and `rpc:call(B, os, getpid, [])` from A succeeds.

Suggested fix

Pass `verify` and the loaded CA certificates into both option maps, and on the listener set `require_client_cert => true` when `verify_peer` is configured. Until then, the docs should say that certificate verification is not implemented for distribution and that only PSK-only listeners authenticate peers.

We can prepare the patch in the advisory's private fork if that helps.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
quic≥ 1.3.1 ≤ 2.1.4
1.3.1
2.1.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Hexquic
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/security/advisories/GHSA-h2qx-fxx7-7r6j

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