GHSA-H4H3-3RFJ-X6FQ
SurrealDB: Indexed ORDER BY leaks the value ordering of a SELECT-restricted field
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-H4H3-3RFJ-X6FQ divulgada | |
| Remediación | Parche 3.1.5 | surrealdb · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
A field can be hidden from a user with a field-level SELECT permission (`DEFINE FIELD code ON secret PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE owner = $auth.id`). When that field is indexed, a record user who cannot read it could still recover the relative ordering of its values across every record by issuing `ORDER BY <field>`: the field came back `null` as intended, but the rows were returned in the hidden values' true sorted order.
To satisfy the sort, the planner selects the field's index and walks it in value order; the field-level permission is applied later, when the row is projected, so the value is nulled but the row order already encodes it. The guard that withholds restricted fields from the `WHERE` path was never applied to `ORDER BY`.
Impact
What an attacker can do:
- As a record (scope) user with table SELECT, learn the relative ordering of a field hidden by a field-level SELECT permission, across other users' records, by ordering on it when an index covers the field — the value returns `null`, but the rows come back in the hidden values' order.
- With rows they control in the same table, use that ordering to narrow the hidden values toward exact ones.
What it can't do:
- Read the field value directly — only its relative ordering leaks; the projected value is correctly redacted.
- Cross table, record, or namespace/database boundaries — the table's SELECT permission and any row-level `WHERE` are still enforced, so only records the caller may already read are ordered.
- Leak anything when the restricted field is not indexed, affect root or record-owner sessions, or modify data (confidentiality only).
Patches
The query planner now applies the field-permission guard to the `ORDER BY` clause as well as the `WHERE` clause. When an ordered field is hidden from the caller by a field-level SELECT permission, the index sort pushdown is withheld and the rows are sorted after redaction instead, so the row order no longer reflects the hidden values. The dynamic-scan fallback is closed the same way, and a regression test was added.
The fix is included in SurrealDB 3.1.5.
Workarounds
Users unable to upgrade are advised to consider the following:
- Force the legacy executor with `SURREAL_PLANNER_STRATEGY=compute-only`; the sort then runs after redaction, so no ordering leaks.
- Do not place an index on a field whose values are hidden by a field-level SELECT permission — without the index the leak does not occur.
- Do not rely on field-level SELECT permissions to hide values on indexed fields from record users; restrict at the table level instead.
- Use namespace / database isolation as the primary trust boundary where feasible.
References
- SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE FIELD
https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/field - SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE INDEX
https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/indexes - SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS
https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/table - Related advisory (same class, indexed COUNT variant): GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp
https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp - `fix(planner): prevent ORDER BY value-ordering oracle on restricted SELECT fields`
- `fix(planner): close ORDER BY value-ordering oracle on the DynamicScan fallback`
Acknowledgements
Thanks to George Chen (@geo-chen https://github.com/geo-chen) for finding and reporting this issue.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iosurrealdb |
Corregida | 3.1.5 | 0 d | 4.0.1 no afectada |
3.1.5Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-h4h3-3rfj-x6fqhttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdbLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
