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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/Tencent/WeKnora

GHSA-H6GW-8F77-MMMP

WeKnora has DNS Rebinding Vulnerability in web_fetch Tool that Allows SSRF to Internal Resources

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -25 d de la divulgación
Exposición257 dDesde la divulgación, 6 mar 2026, 6:56 p. m.
Detección255 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v0.3.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
9 feb 26
6 mar 26
23 mar 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
9 feb 26
21 abr 26
1 jul 26
10 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v0.3.0 github.com/Tencent/WeKnora · -25 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-H6GW-8F77-MMMP divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

A DNS rebinding vulnerability in the `web_fetch` tool allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass URL validation and access internal resources on the server, including private IP addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x). By crafting a malicious domain that resolves to a public IP during validation and subsequently resolves to a private IP during execution, an attacker can access sensitive local services and potentially exfiltrate data.

Details

The vulnerability exists because the `web_fetch` tool lacks complete DNS pinning. The application performs URL validation only once via `validateParams()`, but the URL is then passed unchanged to the `fetchHTMLContent()` function, which eventually reaches `fetchWithChromedp()`. The headless browser (Chromedp) resolves the hostname independently without DNS pinning, allowing a time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attack.

Validation phase (first DNS resolution):

if err := t.validateParams(p); err != nil {
    // Returns error for private IPs
    results[index] = &webFetchItemResult{
        err: err,
        // ...
    }
    return
}

Execution phase (second DNS resolution):
The original URL (not the resolved IP) is passed through the execution chain:

output, data, err := t.executeFetch(ctx, p)
// Calls fetchHTMLContent(ctx, targetURL) where targetURL is the original hostname

Chromedp execution (vulnerable DNS resolution):

func (t *WebFetchTool) fetchWithChromedp(ctx context.Context, targetURL string) (string, error) {
    // targetURL is not DNS-pinned; browser resolves it independently
    err := chromedp.Run(ctx,
        chromedp.Navigate(targetURL),  // Third DNS lookup occurs here
        chromedp.WaitReady("body", chromedp.ByQuery),
        chromedp.OuterHTML("html", &html),
    )
}

The attacker controls a domain that can be configured to return different DNS responses to different queries, enabling them to bypass the initial private IP check and access restricted resources during the actual fetch.

PoC

Setup:
1. Deploy the DNS rebinding server (attached Python file) with the following systemd configuration:

```systemd
[Unit]
Description=DNS Rebinding Test Server
After=network.target

[Service]
Type=simple
User=root
WorkingDirectory=/root/Repos/dns-rebinding-server
ExecStart=/root/.proto/shims/python -u /root/Repos/dns-rebinding-server/server.py --token aleister1102 --domain aleister.ninja --port 53 --global-tracking --ip1 1.1.1.1 --ip2 0.0.0.0 --first-response-count 1 --reset-time 0
Restart=always
RestartSec=3

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
```

This configures the DNS server to:
- Return `1.1.1.1` (a public IP) for the first DNS query
- Return `127.0.0.1` (localhost) for all subsequent queries
- TTL is set to 0 to prevent caching

The sequence can also be reset via reset.domain.com (reset to 1.1.1.1).

> Note: We may need to reset the sequence as the TOCTOU attack is not truly reliable and needs to be triggered multiple times.

  1. Set up a simple HTTP server on the localhost of the backend service:

```bash
python -m http.server 8888
```

  1. Configure the malicious domain to point to the DNS rebinding server

Execution:
1. Enable web search on an agent.
2. Prompt the agent to fetch content from the attacker-controlled domain (e.g., `http://attacker.example.com`)
3. The sequence of events:
- First DNS query (validation phase): `attacker.example.com` → `1.1.1.1` ✓ Passes validation
- Second DNS query (execution phase): `attacker.example.com` → `127.0.0.1` ✗ Bypass achieved
- The `web_fetch` tool successfully connects to `127.0.0.1:8080` and returns the local server's content

Result:
The attacker gains access to the local HTTP server and can read its content, demonstrating that internal resources are now accessible through the rebinding attack.

<img width="1920" height="1080" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/897e8494-f39e-49ce-a02a-5832bb84a73f" />

PoC video:

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/68daaa87-4b9b-4b6e-b6f6-ee123f5fcda9

### Impact
Vulnerability Type: DNS Rebinding / Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Who is impacted:
- Any user or agent with web search capability can exploit this vulnerability
- The vulnerability grants access to internal services, configuration files, metadata services, and other sensitive resources normally restricted to the internal network
- In cloud environments, this could allow access to metadata endpoints (e.g., AWS IMDSv1) to obtain credentials and secrets\

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/Tencent/WeKnora< 0.3.0
0.3.0
v0.9.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/Tencent/WeKnora
Corregida v0.3.0 -25 d v0.9.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.3.0v0.3.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30858
Otrahttps://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/security/advisories/GHSA-h6gw-8f77-mmmp
Otrahttps://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora

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