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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · com.rabbitmq:amqp-client

GHSA-H6W7-QMCM-Q6XR

RabbitMQ Java client: plaintext broker credentials leaked in exception message from ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load()

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -47 d de la divulgación
Exposición43 dDesde la divulgación, 7 oct 2026, 11:19 a. m.
Detección40 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 5.35.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
21 ago 26
7 oct 26
19 oct 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 ago 26
13 sept 26
6 oct 26
28 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 5.35.0 com.rabbitmq:amqp-client · -47 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-H6W7-QMCM-Q6XR divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
When property-file/Map-based `ConnectionFactory` setup fails while parsing the `uri` key, the library wraps the underlying exception with the raw connection string — including the plaintext username and password — baked verbatim into the new exception's message.

### Details
`ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(ConnectionFactory, Map<String,String>, String)` (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.java`, lines 142-155):

String uri = properties.get(prefix + "uri");
if (uri != null) {
try {
cf.setUri(uri);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
} catch (KeyManagementException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
}
}

`uri` is the full AMQP URI — `amqp(s)://username:password@host:port/vhost` — concatenated verbatim into the exception message on any of the three catch branches. No masking/redaction exists anywhere in this class or in `ConnectionFactory.setUri()`. This is the library's documented Spring-Boot/ops-config entry point (`ConnectionFactory.load(...)`, available since 4.4.0), not obscure internal code.

RabbitMQ's own AMQP URI spec (rabbitmq.com/docs/uri-spec) explicitly warns the password "should avoid leaking... the full URI should not appear in exception messages or log records." A sibling method twenty lines away (`ConnectionFactory.setUri(URI)`) already avoids this exact mistake for a different malformed-URI case — this path wasn't caught by that same care.

Note: `KeyManagementException` is declared in the throws clause but not actually reachable via the current `setUri(String)` → `setUri(URI)` call chain — the two real, reachable leak surfaces are the `URISyntaxException` branch (trivial, deterministic, scheme-independent) and the `NoSuchAlgorithmException` branch (real but narrower — `amqps://` only, requires a restricted/FIPS-style default TLS provider).

### PoC
Map<String, String> props = new HashMap<>();
props.put("uri", "amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod");
ConnectionFactory cf = new ConnectionFactory();
ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(cf, props, "");

Throws:

java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Error while setting AMQP URI: amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod

A password containing a space is entirely ordinary under common corporate password policies, and `java.net.URI` rejects such input outright — this isn't a contrived edge case.

### Impact
Default Spring Boot startup-failure logging, an APM/error tracker, a CI job log, or an engineer pasting a stack trace into an internal or public ticket now holds the plaintext broker password, in a system typically far less access-controlled than wherever the credential is normally stored. Note the underlying `URISyntaxException` also carries the same string in its own message, chained as the cause of RabbitMQ's `IllegalArgumentException` — so removing RabbitMQ's own `+ uri` concatenation alone would not fully close this; the raw secret-bearing string also shouldn't be handed to `new URI()` for error-reporting purposes at all.

Suggested fix: don't include the raw `uri` string in the wrapped exception's message — redact the userinfo component (or omit the URI entirely) before including it in any exception text.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
com.rabbitmq:amqp-client< 5.35.0
5.35.0
5.37.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavencom.rabbitmq:amqp-client
Corregida 5.35.0 -47 d 5.37.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas5.35.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106123
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-h6w7-qmcm-q6xr
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2052
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/daca1875cdb8b8c0acce78f71103b21a05478446
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.35.0

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