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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · guzzlehttp/guzzle

GHSA-H95V-H523-3MW8

Guzzle: URI fragments disclosed in redirect Referer headers

Parche disponible
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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión7.15.1
Exposición123 dDesde la divulgación, 20 jul 2026, 6:28 p. m.
Detección119 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (media) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Ni pánico ni ignorarla: término medio.Si tu inventario está al día, ya ganaste.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
20 jul 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
20 jul 26
20 ago 26
20 sept 26
21 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-H95V-H523-3MW8 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Impact

When the optional `referer` redirect setting is enabled, affected versions of `RedirectMiddleware` can copy the fragment from the referring request URI into a generated `Referer` header. A URI fragment is the part after `#`. It is handled locally by the client and is not part of the HTTP request target, so the server handling the original request does not receive it. A generated `Referer` tells the redirect destination which URI led to the request. Guzzle correctly removes user information from that value, but retains the fragment when it follows a redirect to the same scheme, such as HTTPS to HTTPS. For example, an initial URI ending in `#secret` is sent without the fragment, but the redirect destination can receive a `Referer` ending in `#secret`. This behavior affects both the cURL and stream handlers.

An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read the fragment from the incoming header, including through request logs or application code. If the fragment contains a one-time login secret, access token, state value, or other private client data, it is disclosed to a server that was never meant to receive it. Exploitation requires the application to enable `allow_redirects.referer`, make a request to a URI with a sensitive fragment, and follow a same-scheme redirect to a less-trusted destination.

The `referer` setting is disabled by default. Applications that leave it disabled, do not put sensitive data in URI fragments, do not follow redirects, or only redirect within the same trust boundary are not affected. Guzzle already omits the generated header when the scheme changes. This issue is limited to the fragment's inclusion. Reducing the path and query on cross-origin redirects is a separate privacy policy question.

Patches

The issue is patched in `7.15.1` and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle removes both user information and the fragment before generating a redirect `Referer` value. Other redirect behavior does not change. Guzzle retains the referring path and query, and continues to omit the header when the scheme changes. Versions before `7.15.1` are affected when the optional `referer` setting is enabled.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, leave automatic Referer generation disabled. It is off by default. If redirect options are configured explicitly, ensure that `referer` is `false`:

$client->request('GET', $uri, [
    'allow_redirects' => ['referer' => false],
]);

Alternatively, disable automatic redirects and follow trusted destinations manually, or remove the fragment from the request URI before sending a request that may redirect. Do not rely on the fact that fragments are absent from the initial HTTP request target, because the affected middleware can reintroduce them in the generated header.

References
  • https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#section-10.1.3
  • https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.html#section-3.5
  • https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700.html#section-4.2.3

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
guzzlehttp/guzzle< 7.15.1
7.15.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistguzzlehttp/guzzle
Corregida 7.15.1 — —
Versiones corregidas7.15.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67354
Otrahttps://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-h95v-h523-3mw8
Otrahttps://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3901
Otrahttps://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/7b68220d6543f6f80fe62e633361fc9d4ead14d4
Otrahttps://github.com/guzzle/guzzle
Otrahttps://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.1
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/guzzlehttp-guzzle-before-uri-fragment-disclosure-via-referer

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