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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · io.netty:netty-codec-http3

GHSA-HFR2-X62W-V49H

HTTP/1 absolute-form Host mismatch is translated to HTTP/3 :authority, overriding the request-target authority

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Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición72 dDesde la divulgación, 9 sept 2026, 7:50 p. m.
Detección70 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Hmm… no me convence. Vigílala de cerquita.Ponle fecha: las tareas sin fecha son leyendas.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.2.18.Final
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 sept 26
10 sept 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 sept 26
27 sept 26
15 oct 26
3 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.2.18.Final io.netty:netty-codec-http3 · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-HFR2-X62W-V49H divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Netty's HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 conversion builds the HTTP/3 `:authority` pseudo-header from the HTTP/1 `Host` header before considering the authority in an absolute-form HTTP/1 request-target.

For a request such as:

GET https://trusted.example/admin HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example

`HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers(...)` emits:

:scheme: https
:authority: attacker.example
:path: /admin

This contradicts the HTTP/1 absolute-form rule that an origin server receiving absolute-form must ignore the received Host header and use the request-target authority instead. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 gateway or proxy pipeline, security or routing decisions made on the RFC-defined HTTP/1 target authority can disagree with the authority sent upstream over HTTP/3.

Technical Details

The vulnerable conversion path is:

  • `Http3FrameToHttpObjectCodec(false)` encodes outbound HTTP/1 request objects into HTTP/3 request stream frames;
  • `HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers(HttpMessage, boolean)` converts an `HttpRequest` into HTTP/3 pseudo-headers.

Current source:

codec-http3/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http3/HttpConversionUtil.java
371: URI requestTargetUri = URI.create(request.uri());
372: out.path(toHttp3Path(requestTargetUri));
374: setHttp3Scheme(inHeaders, requestTargetUri, out);
376: // Attempt to take from HOST header before taking from the request-line
377: String host = inHeaders.getAsString(HttpHeaderNames.HOST);
378-379: if (host != null && !host.isEmpty()) setHttp3Authority(host, out);
381-382: otherwise use requestTargetUri.getAuthority()

The conversion already parses the absolute request-target to derive `:scheme` and `:path`. The guard gap is specifically authority selection: a conflicting `Host` header wins even when the request-target has its own authority.

Impact

In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 gateway, proxy, or protocol bridge, a remote HTTP/1 client can send an absolute-form request-target for one authority while supplying a different Host header. A component that validates, authorizes, or routes using the RFC-defined request-target authority can make a different decision than the HTTP/3 upstream, which receives Netty's generated `:authority` from the conflicting Host header.

This can affect virtual-host routing, allow-list checks, backend selection, cache keys, URL generation, and other authority-dependent security decisions.

This report does not claim code execution, memory corruption, or availability impact. The demonstrated impact is integrity loss through authority confusion at an HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 conversion boundary.

Suggested Fix

When converting an HTTP/1 request to HTTP/3:

  • if the request-target is absolute-form and has an authority component, derive `:authority` from the request-target authority;
  • only fall back to the Host header for origin-form or asterisk-form request targets, or for non-HTTP URI forms without a request-target authority;
  • preserve existing userinfo stripping in `setHttp3Authority(...)`;
  • add regression coverage for direct `toHttp3Headers(...)` and `Http3FrameToHttpObjectCodec(false)`.

The attached patched-control diff demonstrates the minimal behavior change:

`evidence/minimal-fail-closed-patched-control.diff`

Affected Package/Versions

`io.netty:netty-codec-http3`

Confirmed affected:

  • current `4.2` branch at `7bae566a93e69409697fe57fa807910ba5c9720e`
  • `4.2.15.Final` at `a41f7b289ce1d697c50846f3ade3983e22b2ed40`
  • `4.2.2.Final` at `660edeaefad4a4cedbd61584e8f668ad2d89f0b8`

Suggested affected range:

  • `>= 4.2.2.Final, <= 4.2.15.Final`

`codec-http3` was not present in the checked `4.2.0.Final` or `4.1.135.Final` trees, so this report does not claim those versions.

References

  • Netty security policy: https://github.com/netty/netty/security/policy
  • RFC 9112 absolute-form and Host authority rules: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#section-3.2
  • RFC 9114 malformed request handling: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114#section-4.1.2
  • RFC 9114 request pseudo-header fields: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114#section-4.3.1
  • RFC 9110 Host and authority semantics: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9110#section-7.2
  • Guzzle PSR-7 host confusion advisory: https://github.com/guzzle/psr7/security/advisories/GHSA-34xg-wgjx-8xph
  • Koa Host header injection advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7gcc-r8m5-44qm

CWE and CVSS

Suggested CWEs:

  • `CWE-20`: Improper Input Validation
  • `CWE-436`: Interpretation Conflict
  • `CWE-444`: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Suggested severity: High, score 7.5.

Rationale: the issue is network-triggerable by an unauthenticated HTTP/1 client when Netty is used in an HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 gateway/proxy path, requires low complexity, and can cause upstream authority-dependent security decisions to be made on a different host. Confidentiality and availability are not claimed.

Duplicate Boundary

This is distinct from visible Netty reports:

  • `GHSA-cg2g-fxr4-mg8m` covers the HTTP/2 conversion code and `io.netty:netty-codec-http2`.
  • `GHSA-h235-6gmg-jv93` covers HTTP/3-to-HTTP/1 inbound downgrade of an absolute-form `:path`.
  • `GHSA-qf63-3vvr-7272` and `GHSA-w2m9-rvg6-gfxg` cover HTTP/3-to-HTTP/1 inbound `:authority` downgrade cases.

This report covers the outbound HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 direction in `HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers(...)` and `Http3FrameToHttpObjectCodec(false)`. Maintainers may choose to group this with the HTTP/2 absolute-form report, but the affected artifact and implementation are different.

Live duplicate evidence is in `evidence/advisory-duplicate-check.tsv`.

Local PoV

PoV file:

`pov/Http3AbsoluteFormHostAuthorityConfusionPovTest.java`

Run from a Netty checkout after copying the PoV file into `codec-http3/src/test/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http3/`:

./mvnw -q -pl codec-http3 \
  -Dtest=Http3AbsoluteFormHostAuthorityConfusionPovTest \
  -Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false \
  -DskipNativeTests -DskipAutobahnTests -Dmaven.antrun.skip=true test

The PoV is local-only. It does not start a server or contact any third-party host.

It proves:

  • direct `HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers(...)` converts `GET https://trusted.example/admin` plus `Host: attacker.example` into `:authority: attacker.example`;
  • `Http3FrameToHttpObjectCodec(false)` emits the same conflicting authority through the normal HTTP/1 object to HTTP/3 frame conversion path;
  • a matching Host control keeps `trusted.example`;
  • an absent Host control falls back to the absolute-form request-target authority, proving the converter already knows how to use that authority.

Observed results:

current 4.2 head: Tests run: 4, Failures: 0, Errors: 0
4.2.15.Final:    focused PoV passed
4.2.2.Final:     focused PoV passed
patched control: Tests run: 2, Failures: 0, Errors: 0

Version sweep details are in `evidence/version-sweep.tsv`.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

RFC 9112 says that when an HTTP/1.1 request-target includes an authority component, Host must match that authority. It also says an origin server that receives absolute-form must ignore the received Host header and use the request-target host information instead.

RFC 9114 says HTTP/3 requests with invalid pseudo-header values are malformed, and intermediaries must not forward malformed requests. Converting an HTTP/1 message with a trusted request-target authority into an HTTP/3 request with a different `:authority` creates exactly the kind of authority disagreement that HTTP pseudo-headers are meant to avoid.

Netty's HTTP/2 conversion already has the same root-cause class reported privately as `GHSA-cg2g-fxr4-mg8m`. This report is the HTTP/3 sibling in `io.netty:netty-codec-http3`.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
io.netty:netty-codec-http3≥ 4.2.2.Final ≤ 4.2.17.Final
4.2.2.Final
4.2.17.Final
4.2.20.Final
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http3
Corregida 4.2.18.Final -1 d 4.2.20.Final no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.2.18.Final
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-hfr2-x62w-v49h

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.